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Due to the numerous and increasingly malicious attacks on computer networks and systems, current
security tools are often not enough to resolve the issues related to illegal users, reliability, and to 
provide robust network security. Recent research has indicated that although network security has
developed, a major concern about an increase in illegal intrusions is still occurring. Addressing
security on every occasion or in every place is a really important and sensitive matter for many users, 
businesses, governments and enterprises. A Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
(NIDPS) is one of the most tested, reliable, and strongest forms of technology used to sniff out
network packets, monitor incoming and outgoing network traffic, and identify the unauthorised usage 
and mishandling of computer system networks. It can provide a better understanding of the things that
are really happening on the network. In addition, an NIDPS has the potential to detect, prevent, and
report any evidence of attacks and malicious traffic. It is critical to implement an NIDPS in a 
computer network that has high traffic and high-speed connectivity. This thesis presents an
investigation, involving literature review and intensive experiments, which shows that current
NIDPSs have several shortcomings such as they are incapable to detect or prevent the rising attacks 
and threats to high-speed environments, such as flood attacks (UDP, TCP, ICMP and HTTP) or
Denial and Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DoS/DDoS), because the main purpose of these
types of attacks is basically to send heavy traffic to systems at high-speed to stop or slow down 
performance. To investigate the status of NIDPS performance and test the capability of NIDPS
analysis, detection, and prevention modes when exposed to malicious attacks that come through high-
load and high-speed traffic, a prototype network has been designed. The prototype consisted of virtual
and physical stations including six (6) PCs and three (3) switches (i.e two layer 2 switches and 1 layer
3 switch). Several tools were used to carry out the research experiments, implementation and
evaluation. The research presents a study using Snort NIDPS open source software. It shows that
NIDPS performance can be weak in the face of high-speed and high-load traffic in terms of packet
drops, and outstanding packets without analysis and failing to detect/prevent unwanted traffic. The
research has designed a novel QoS architecture to increase the analytical, detection, and prevention
performance of NIDPS when deployed in high-speed networks. It has proposed and evaluated a
solution using a novel QoS configuration in a multi-layer switch to organise and improve network
traffic performance in order to reduce the packets dropped and then uses parallel techniques to 
increase packet processing speed. The novel architecture was tested under different traffic speeds,
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction 
The research is introduced in this chapter, including the background, motivation and purpose, 
leading to a problem statement and introduction of research questions. The research aims and
objectives are stated and an overview of the research methodology and approach is also provided. An
analysis of the research relative to the state of the art and a summary of its original contributions are
included. Finally, the structure of the thesis is described.
1.2 Introduction to the Research
The drastic growth of various network and wireless systems-based malicious attacks has
rendered conventional security tools, such as firewalls and anti-virus programs, insufficient to provide
integral, reliable and secure free networks. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer
strong, reliable technology that monitor inbound and outbound network traffic to detect illegal usage
and corruption of systems (Scarfone and Mell 2007, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013, Bul’ajoul, 
James and Pannu 2015 and Kenkre, Pai and Colaco 2015). IDPS also identify the activity of malicious
attackers. Several computer network systems are incompetent to stop computer network terrorisations
such as overflow attacks, including Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flood, User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) flood and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) flood. In addition, Denial of
Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks disturb numerous systems, and the
influence of such attacks is severe and serious. The key technique of these attacks is to send traffic at
high-speed and high-volume to a network system address, which can be stopped or slowed down the 
performance by taking advantages of system vulnerabilities such as misconfigurations and software
bugs (Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015, Goel and Mehtre 2016, Ordi et al. 2015, Wang et al. 2015
and Van der et al. 2015).
IDPS are capable of monitoring, identifying and reporting evidence of malicious activities
and attacks such as DoS and DDoS, unauthorized log-ins, privilege escalation, illegitimate access and
modification of data and data-driven attacks. Therefore, an IDPS’s sniffing mechanism can be applied
at a network gateway to provide offered valuable information about traffic and packet types to
security professionals. IDPS are widely used to reduce the risks of attacks.
This research is based on Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (NIDPS). 








           
     
    
        
          
        
     
       
         
      
      
   
          
     
          




       
          
      
       
            
   
      
         
     
    
     
        
     
        
         
 
monitored. An open-source IDPS software has been used in this research, which acts as a Network
Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS) and Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), and can
therefore be considered a NIDPS. Snort NIDPS open source is quite famous within the research 
community. It is the most widely deployed IDPS worldwide (Akhtar, Matta and Wang 2015,
Sadhukhan, Mallari and Yadav 2015 and Samani and Karamta 2016). Snort NIDPS has three modes:
Network IDPS mode; Host IDPS mode; and Hybrid IDPS mode. This research used Network
Sniffing, Network Detection and Network Prevention configurations within the NIDPS mode. Many
studies have used Snort IDPS to observe and monitor high-speed levels of network environments and
detect high-speed traffic attacks, such as DoS, DDoS and flood attacks, by developing and designing
new rules (Buchanan et al. 2011, Saboor, Akhlaq and Aslam 2013, Khamphakdee, Benjamas and
Saiyod 2014, Khamphakdee, Benjamas and Saiyod 2015, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Goel
and Mehtre 2016). The research demonstrates the weaknesses of the NIDPS, namely its incapability
to process various traffic at high-speed and heavy volumes of packets, and its inability to detect or
prevent unwanted traffic that might attack the system. The research proposes a solution to improve
NIDPS performance. This study shows how a novel configuration of QoS (Quality of Service) in the
Layer 3 network switch combined with the introduction of parallel technologies can increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of NIDPS platforms. 
1.3 Motivation and Purpose
Information technology (IT) influences almost every aspect of modern life. Today, various
devices are available to meet users’ requirements such as high machine processor speed, quick
network responses and reliable security. Alongside our increasing dependence on IT, there has
unfortunately been a rise in security incidents (Arbor Networks 2015). Threats and attacks may range 
from stealing personal information from a laptop or network server to stealing the most top-secret
information stored on a Security Intelligence Service (SIS). Furthermore, hackers can snoop on users’
online purchases by eavesdropping on their credit card details, or, even more dangerous, a damaged
web resource can cause failures in the movement of air traffic. Multi-faceted attacks and threats have
made the implementation of security systems more challenging. Hackers have evolved along with the
sophistication of the IT industry. For example, hackers exploit the developments in computer
processors and network speeds (multi-core and cloud environment technologies) to increase the
volume and speed of malicious traffic that might constitute a DoS or DDoS attack (Cheung et al.
2009, Gao and Xiao 2012, Wang et al. 2015, Chauhan and Prasad 2015, Malina, Dzurenda and Hajny
2015, Bukac and Matyas, 2015 and Samani and Karamta, 2016). Network security is therefore
extremely important and has developed into an industry aimed at improving applications and









      
   
     
 
        
              
      
     
           
         
      
   
 
     
          
       
  
    
   
  
 
          
         
       
     
          
      
    
 
       
            
     
       
         
  
One of the most established concepts in the information security is a defence-in-depth 
approach which utilised a multi-layered structural design in which firewalls, vulnerability assessment
tools (anti-viruses and worms) and IDPS are employed to prevent any hostile endeavours on network
systems and servers. The NIDPS has been designed to serve as the last point of defence in the network
architecture. The name “NIDPS” is derived from the fact that the system monitors the network traffic
from the viewpoint of where it is installed. NIDPS monitor the transportation of network traffic for
any malicious and uncomfortable activities and create alerts when operating in detection mode or
block packet alerts when operating in prevention mode. NIDPS can be used to defend and protect
network strategic segments and monitor a specific part of a network or system. NIDPS can also be
placed in the external border of the network architecture to defend important parts of the system, such
as servers, from any intrusion attempts or malicious attacks (Dave, Trivedi and Mahadevia 2013, 
Vasudeo, Patil and Kumar 2015and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015). 
The detection and prevention mechanisms of the NIDPS are grounded in observing the
comparison of ingress packets (traffic) to any known aggression (attack) through patterns (signature
NIDPS mechanism) or identifying unknown malicious patterns from ingress traffic (anomaly NIDPS
mechanism). NIDPS are important in that they:
• counter intrusions or malicious attempts to access networks and systems;
• analyse network traffic and identify hackers’ targets and techniques; and
• detect or prevent unwanted and malicious traffic.
Open source is the most common category of NIDPS software configured platforms (Akhtar,
Matta and Wang 2015 and Sadhukhan, Mallari and Yadav 2015); however, its performance in high-
speed networks communication remains a major issue. Irrelevant alerts (false positive alerts) occur, 
thus creating a more difficult job for system security managers. Moreover, despite claims of increased
capabilities and efficient performances by several NIDPS dealers, research has shown that systems
lack the required capabilities to monitor and analyse high-speed network traffic (Kenkre, Pai, and
Colaco 2015, Li et al. 2015, Kim et al. 2015 and Kizza 2015). 
Innovators have created current hardware IDPS to process millions of packets at the same 
time (Cisco 2016b and Trevisan et al. 2016), but there are limitations in the capability to perform
particular software tasks. In addition, limited memory size is a problem for hardware-based NIDPS
solutions. Furthermore, hardware-based NIDPS offer a high range of processing speed but are very
costly. Software solutions are popular because they are cheaper and offer more flexibility than









        
     




           
        










    
 
   
         
    
 
 
   
      
       
     
      
       
         
Computer network and Internet security face increasing challenges and many companies rely
on NIDPS to secure their data sources and systems. The need to ensure that the NIDPS can keep up 
with the increasing demands as a result of increased network usage, higher speed networks and 
increased malicious activity, makes this an interesting area of research and motivates this study.
1.4 Problem Statement
The problem addressed by this research is that NIDPS is unable to detect or prevent unwanted
packets (traffic) when faced with unexpectedly high volumes of traffic exceeding network interface’s
speed i.e. 100MBps / 1Gbps. This study investigates the problem and proposes a solution.
1.5 Research Questions
The main research question is:
How can network security architecture be improved to cope with high-speed traffic and high-
volume data attacks?
To answer the research question, the following sub-questions were addressed:
1. What are the current performance issues with NIDPS?
2. How can network management and traffic performance be improved through QoS 
technology?
3. Can parallel technology along with QoS improve the performance of NIDPS?
4. Can a generalised NIDPS architecture be built through the application of QoS and
parallel technology for improving security performance?
1.6 Research Methodology and Approach
In this study, a quantitative approach based on experimental analysis has been followed.
There are three types of quantitative approach: simulation, experimental, and inferential. The
simulation approach is concerned with the construction of an artificial network environment, within
which relevant database information and traffic (packets) are generated. The experimental approach
involves changing variables in an observed domain and monitoring the effects. The inferential
approach uses relationships or characteristics of a population to deduce new findings. The simulation








      




       
          
      
         
      
   
 
       
       
       
        
  
      
           
 
 
      
     
       
   
      
         
      
 
 
      
            
       
    
 
simulated environment. This study initially uses a quantitative methods experimental approach. 
Experiments were carried out to analyse the performance of NIDPS under various traffic scenarios
with and without improved novel security architecture. 
1.7 Identifying State of the Art Technology
Regardless of the accessibility of monitoring tools and security-enforcing software, the
understanding of the issues involved in designing a software security solution are difficult and
expensive. Although effective techniques can be learned that identify and detect different types of
attacks, there are no software approaches and that are realisable globally and that achieve unfailing
results for detecting numerous types of high-level and high-speed attacks. The discoveries of cyber-
based attacks on network systems continue to be an important and challenging area of research.
Malicious traffic and attacks continue to grow and develop daily. Current security software 
cannot keep up with this development; it is still unable to handle some high-speed attacks such as
DoS, DDoS and flood attacks (TCP, UDP and ICMP). The largest speed attack in the history was
carried out against the BBC website. It is DDoS attack. The attack’s speed reached up to 602 Gbps
(The Hacker News 2016), which is far higher than the speed of current networks and security systems.
The previous record was 400Gbps in 2014 (Arbor Networks 2015). Detection of such kind attacks by
traditional network security operations alone is almost difficult due to the rise of network traffic speed
and volume of data and real-time environment.
This study investigates the concern that current security systems, while continuously
developing, are not keeping up with the increasingly high-speed intrusions into computer networks.
This study further demonstrates how to improve the methods used by the NIDPS for analysing, 
detecting, and preventing attacks in network security systems. There are two major areas of concern in
computer security: the speed and volume of attacks, and the complexity of multi-stage attacks (De
Muila and Ferdinand 2010 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015). The study analyses state of the art
developments in network switch and parallel technology to provide a solution to the problem of
NIDPS not meeting the demands of high-speed and high-volume attacks.
This research focuses on the improvement of a novel and unique infrastructure for NIDPS
based on an open-source software which has a benefit of employing the right usage of QoS and
parallel technologies to improve attack detection rates and thus contribute to state-of-the-art network
security. In addition, the proposed approach enables handling of the most high-speed and severe










         
 
  
   
  
       
 
    
 
   









       
     
  
          




   
 
   
       
          
1.8 Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of the research is to develop a solution to the problem of NIDPS that are unable to
cope with high-speed and high-volume traffic attacks.
The objectives of this research are to:
• Review the literature to assess weaknesses of NIDPS;
• Investigate a particular NIDPS to see if such weaknesses exist;
• Design an experiment that will enable NIDPS to be tested under high-speed traffic
with various network packets;
• Design new architecture based on a novel QoS configuration to improve NIDPS
performance;
• Design and develop a parallel implementation of the novel architecture;
• Carry out experiments to test the improved architecture; and
• Evaluate the redesigned NIDPS architecture.
1.9 Original Contribution
This research offers an original contribution, described as follows:
• Development of a new architecture for NIDPS that improves overall network security
and performance.
The architecture is founded on the integration and development of two techniques:
1. A novel QoS architecture was designed that enhances network traffic
performance based on classification and policy methods and then improves
overall network management and security.
2. A high level parallelism was designed for the novel architecture to improve
traffic throughput processing with the aim of improving NIDPS throughput
performance and reducing NIDPS processor time.
1.10 Thesis Structure
The remaining chapters are organised as the follows:
Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter discusses the historical perspective and provides information about the








       
      
 
   
     
          
  
 
   




      
    
  
   









   
 
   
  
 
      
     
      
    
 
prevention technologies and their methodologies; some discussion of open-source IDPS, 
Snort and Bro; and, finally, related research in parallel technology.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Experimental Design
This chapter explains the methodology and experimental design, including the configuration
of Snort NIDPS rules and components. The experimental testbed is described along with its
constituent parts and the experiments carried out are listed.
Chapter 4: Exposure of Problem through Experimentation
This chapter exposes the research problem in more detail through implemented experiments.
The weakness of current NIDPS technology is shown.
Chapter 5: A Novel Architecture
This chapter presents a solution to the problem of dropped packages and missed attacks. The
solution proposed is based on Layer 3 QoS switch technology and parallel processing.
Chapter 6: Evaluation of the Novel Architecture
An evaluation of the proposed solution through a second set of experiments is presented in
Chapter 6. The solution is shown to improve NIDPS performance.
Chapter 7: Conclusion, Recommendation and Future work
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the study and suggests recommendations and further work.
1.11 Research Outputs
In this section publications which have arisen from the research are listed.
1.11.1 Publications arising from the Research
1. Bulajoul, W., James, A., and Pannu, M. (eds.) (2013) E-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2013 
IEEE 10th International Conference on. 'Network Intrusion Detection Systems in High-Speed 
Traffic in Computer Networks': IEEE.
2. Bul'ajoul, W., James, A., and Pannu, M. (2015) 'Improving Network Intrusion Detection 
System Performance through Quality of Service Configuration and Parallel Technology'.








   
    
   
 
          
 
 
    
     
 
 
   
 
      
  
 
    
                         
 
    
     
 
      
    
                                                 
 
    
   
 
   
 
    
    
 
 
     
   
 
3. Bul'ajoul, W., James, A., Shaikh. S, and Pannu, M. (2016) 'Using Cisco Network Components
to Improve NIDPS Performance. Second International Conference of Networks, 
Communications, Wireless and Mobile Computing (NCWC 2016).
4. James, A., Bulajoul, W., Shehu, Y., Li, Y and Obande, G (2017) ‘Security Challenges and 
Solutions for E-Business’, The Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET).     (accepted)
5. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. (2017). Intrusion Detection Systems: Management, Technology
and Recent Advances. Nova Science Publishers. (The abstract is accepted and chapter under
process)
1.11.2 Posters arising from the Research
1. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2013. Network Intrusion Detection systems (NIDS) for Multi
Attack Scenarios in Computer Networks. Research Symposium, Coventry University, UK.
2. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014. Intrusion Detection Systems for High-speed
Environments. BCS Symposium, University of Warwick, UK. (Achieved Award)
3. Bul’ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014.Intrusion Detection Systems for High-speed
Environments. EC Annual Research Symposium, Coventry University, UK. (Achieved Award)
4. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014. Intrusion Detection systems for Multi Attack Scenarios in
Computer Networks. Libyan Higher Education Forum-London, Libyan Embassy, London,
UK. (Achieved Award)
5. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014. Network Intrusion Detection Systems for High-speed 
Traffic in Computer Networks. PGR Symposium, Coventry University, UK.
1.11.3 Presentations arising from the Research
1. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2013. Network Intrusion Detection Systems for High-Speed
Traffic in Computer Networks. 2013, IEEE 10th International Conference, Coventry 
University, UK.
2. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014. Intrusion Detection Systems for High-speed








    




    
   
 
 
     
         
     
       
  
3. Bul'ajoul, W., and James, A. 2014. Improving Network Intrusion Detection System
Performance through Quality of Service Configuration and Parallel Technology. PGR
Symposium, Coventry University, UK.
4. Bul'ajoul, W., James, A., Shaikh. S, and Pannu, M. (2016) 'Using Cisco Network Components
to Improve NIDPS Performance. Second International Conference of Networks, 
Communications, Wireless and Mobile Computing (NCWC 2016), Dubai, UAE.
1.12 Conclusion
This chapter has given a brief background to the research, describing the motivation, problem
statement and research questions addressed. It has also briefly described the methodology and set out
the aims and objectives. The original contribution has been highlighted and the thesis structure
outlined. Finally a list of publications and presentations made in connection with this research has








    
 
 
       
     




     
        




             
 
    
         
        
    
        
         
  
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the state-of-the-art and literature review of related work. It gives an
overview and background about the latest threats and attacks in computer networks, common security
mechanisms and approaches including IDPS types and methodologies and discusses advances in 
research towards improving the performance of NIDPS.
2.2 Threats and Attacks
A company’s network plays a vital role in its business projects. Keeping the computer
network up-to-date with the latest software and security techniques is essential for success and
progress. Reliability and safety are the major concerns in enabling a company to achieve success and
boost its progress. 













2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 
Figure 2. 1: Largest DDoS attack reported by The Hacker News 2016 and Arbor Networks 2015.
However, networks can also be considered a major risk in any business project. Security
issues have increased as technology has advanced (Jang-Jaccard and Nepal 2014). Fuchsberger (2013)
reported that, according to a survey conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Crime 
Scene of Investigation (FBI/CSI), viruses are behind many attacks on business networks. Moreover,
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and unauthorized user access (which can be initiated from external or








         
   
 
        
        
   
              
          
          
       
            
       
          
           
 
 
     
   
        
     
          
        
        
      
       
 
 
        
    
     




         
       
        
powerful intrusion tools available, allowing hackers to attack networks even if they know little of the
software. Attackers can now use several tools simultaneously to achieve an objective.
The 10th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report and ATLAS 2015 data report
(Arbor Networks 2015) reported that the number of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks has
grown significantly, nearly doubling on a year-to-year basis between 2005 and 2010 (see Figure 2.1). 
The size of attacks in 2016 increased by over 33 percent compared to the previous year. The largest
reported attack by BBC website respondents in 2016 was over 600 Gbps (The Hacker News 2016);
the previously largest reported attack size by WISR was recorded at 400 Gbps. Moreover, ATLAS
recorded more than 8x number of malicious attacks over 20 Gbps as compared to 2012 in 2013, The
largest monitored attack by ATLAS in 2014 was slightly more than that at 324Gbps. Ten years ago 
the largest monitored attack was 8Gbps. Recent DDoS attacka have utilised networks and internet
servers that employ a large number of automated detection and mitigation techniques in order to
prevent the misuse of the services. The hackers simply use their script on the server’s services to set
the bandwidth limit as unlimited and to hide the amendment.
Therefore, security products, such as firewalls, vulnerability assessment tools, antivirus
programs, and Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (NIDPSs), are utilised to reduce
the risk of attacks. However, even these measures are not 100 percent effective in protecting
networks. One problem is that increase network traffic speed and valoume over its limit, packets can 
be dropped prior to analysis, detection and prevention (Shiri, Shanmugam and Ideis 2011, Albin and
Rowe 2012, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Kenkre, Pai and Colaco 2015). It is becoming 
recognised that advantage could be taken of parallel technology such as multi-core technology or
distributed systems to overcome the problem of the network traffic rate superseding the rate at which
NIDPSs can process incoming data (Jiang et al. 2014, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Zhang et
al. 2015).
Flood attacks, also known as DoS attacks or DDoS attacks, are deliberate over-requesting of
network system resources which become rendered unavailable. Statistically, the most common attack
is flood attack. Between 2011 and 2014, there was a massive rise in the speed at which this attack
occurred, indicating that the security system must be able to perform at similarly attacks’s speed (Wei
and Xiangliang 2011 and Arbour Networks 2015).
Hardware-based IDPS are more powerful in performance terms than software-based and some 
companies have opted to use such technology as defence against the rapid development of bandwidth
and the speed of attacks (Lesk 2007, TeleGeography Research 2008 and M86 Security 2010). NIDPS








       
         
     
          
  
   
   
 
     
      
      
        
        





        
         




            
         
      
          
        
    
      
        
       
   
 
up dropping, outstanding packets and losing alerts, logs, and blockings of malicious packets when the
software is implemented as a solution (Whitman et al. 2012, Weaver, Weaver and Farwood
2013:265-292, Hussain, Lalmuanawma and Chhakchhuak 2015 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu
2015). However, hardware IDPSs are very costly and are not available in the many organisations and
companies. A solution is therefore needed to enhance software approaches in the context of affordable
infrastructure. This research focuses on this challenge.
2.3 Security mechanisms and approaches
Security products such as firewalls and antivirus programs are less efficient than NIDPS and 
have different functionalities. NIDPSs analyse collected information and detect or prevent unwanted
traffic to infer more useful results than other security products. The difference between NIDPS and 
other security products such as antivirus programs is that, while NIDPS require more embedded
intelligence than other security products, they analyse gathered information and deduce useful results
(Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Ahmed, Khan and Bashir
2015).
2.3.1 Firewall technology
In order to secure a corporate network or a sub-network, network traffic is usually filtered
according to criteria such as origin, destination, protocol and service, typically forwarded from
dedicated router to firewall through the network and also could be placed before router. It depends on
the network and policy requirements (Khorchani, Halle and Villemaire 2012 and Bul’ajoul, James and
Pannu 2015).
The Firewall is a standard security system defence and has become an important part of all
network gateways for stopping inbound and outbound intruders from getting access to private/local
networks and systems (Beg et al. 2010, Shuo and Quan 2015 and Genge, Graur, and Haller 2015).
The functionality of the firewall is based on filtering mechanisms specified by a set of rules, known as
a policy, which can protect a system from such attacks. The fundamental function of the firewall is to
sort packets according to allow/deny rules, based on header-field information. The basic operation of
the firewall is filtering packets passing through specific hosts or network ports, which are usually
open in most computer systems. It does not perform deep analysis (malicious code detection in the
packet) and treats each packet as an individual entity (Marinova-Boncheva 2007, Beget al. 2010,









        
       
    
     
       
           








     
        
    
     
The disadvantage of a firewall is that it cannot fully protect an internal network; it is unable to
stop internal attacks, outside attacks such as anomaly attacks (unknown signatures attacks), or high-
volume attacks from accepted signatures (Kim and Cho 2012, Wang, Zhang and Song 2012,
Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Shuo and Quan 2015). A
firewall is just a set of rules such as to allow or deny protocols, ports or an IP address. Today’s denials
of service (DoS) attacks are too complex for firewall technology, because it cannot distinguish good 
traffic from DoS attack traffic (Bessis and Rana 2015, Ormazabal et al. 2015 and Chen et al. 2015). 
However, the firewall provides the benefit of added security to strengthen a network when used in
conjunction with an IDPS (Alpcan and Başar 2010:29-33).
This item has been removed due to 
3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in 
the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University
Figure 2. 2: Basic firewall installation.
2.3.2 Anti-virus technology
Computer viruses are programs which cause computer failure and damage computer data. A 
computer virus poses an immeasurable threat and can be very destructive especially in a network
environment. Antivirus programs are software that can be installed onto a computer in order to detect,








       




      
   
       





         
    
      
        
        
      
        
   
 
 
        
          
          
          
       
  
 
     
          
            
       
           
malware, worms or viruses. The functionality of an anti-virus program is a running process that
examines executables, worms and viruses in the memory of guarded computer/network systems 
instead of monitoring network traffic (Wang, Zhang and Song 2012, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013
and Al-Saleh 2015 ). 
Although the anti-virus program monitors the integrity of data files against illegal
modifications, it is unable to block unwanted network traffic intended to damage the network. Anti-
threat software is installed only at explicit points of the servers such as interface between the network
segment to be protected and outside environments (Shiri, Shanmugam and Idris 2011and Bul’ajoul, 
James and Pannu 2015).
2.3.3 Commercial state-of-the-art
Many vendors are now trying to produce security appliances that can protect networks and
which combine technologies. For example, the Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 series
is a range of essential Cisco products that aims to secure an organisation’s network from end to end.
The main gear of Cisco Secure X design is a firewall called the adaptive security appliance (ASA). 
The product comes in different sizes and has been a popular choice for network designers because of
its high performance. The Cisco ASA 5500 Series integrates multiple full-featured, high-performance
security services, including application-aware firewall, SSL and IPsec VPN (virtual private network),
IPS with Global Correlation and guaranteed coverage, antivirus, antispam, antiphishing, and web
filtering services (Cisco 2016b). 
The ASA series includes the essential ASA 5505 through to the ASA 5585. The
differentiating feature between the ASA appliances and other software security products is that the
ASA series products combine firewall, VPN concentrator and intrusion prevention in one image
software. Cisco claims that this technology, which combines tools, provides a great improvement to
network security. New features of the ASA technology include virtualisation, identity firewall, and
threat control and containment services (Cisco 2016b). 
ASA virtualization is the capability to split an ASA appliance into numerous separate devices.
The feature of “high availability with failover” uses redundancy so that full availability can be
provided even if an ASA devices fails. The identity firewall allows the ASA to use an organisation’s
active directory, which contains user and departmental policies and rules, to provide identity-based













          
          
     
             
        
       
         
         
     
      
 
       
     
        
     
       
   
 
   





   
    
     
      
        
  
containment services” allows the ASA Cisco appliance to use external intrusion detection models
(Cisco 2016b).
2.3.4 IDPS technology
An IDPS is a more advanced and enhanced security tool than a firewall, because a firewall
just drops packets but cannot detect intrusion since the packets not examined (Whitman et al. 
2012:150-164 , Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:83, Kenkre, Pai, Colaco 2015 and Yan, Jian-
Wen and Lin 2015). The difference between a firewall and IDPS can be indistinguishable to the user
as the separate technologies are often combined to a single gateway sentry system. The firewall
checks headers on packets and blocks depending on header information such as protocol type, source
address, destination address, source port, and/or destination port according to network security policy.
An IDPS identifies the attacks and protects the system handling issues like misuse of the computer
system, DoS/DDoS attack, and flooding attacks (Whitman et al. 2012:224, Weaver, Weaver,
Farwood 2013:269, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Özçelik, Brooks 2015, ).
Current state-of-the-art IDPS provides highly accurate results as compared to other security
protection techniques. Some researchers indicated that IDPS has significantly improved with the
passage of time, but they still often produce an unacceptable quantity of false positives and false 
negatives (Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:83 and Amudhavel et al. 2016). In addition, it is
difficult to detect suspicious activities in the midst of high traffic and other such adverse
circumstances in the network, consequently resulting in an inaccurate detection mechanism. IDPS is 
still unable to control all threats and malicious activities (Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015, Malik and
Singh 2015 and Özçelik, and Brooks 2015). These issues motivated the research towards the aim of
developing a solution to the under-performance of NIDPS in high-speed and high-volume traffic 
situations.
2.4 Intrusion Detection system (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS)
A distinction is often made between intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion
prevention systems (IPS). This distinction is that the IDS detects intrusions and reports them, whereas
the IPS detects reports and prevents them through blocking. Therefore the IPS can be seen as an
extension of the IDS. However, nowadays the technologies have converged and most IDS systems
cover prevention as well as detection. The mode of operation between detection and prevention may 








     
      




       
              
       
     
     
    
       
   
      





      
 
  
   
 
          
     





     
       
      
separate technologies are often combined to a single gateway sentry system. The IPS checks both 
headers and payload, blocking on recognisable known features according to network security policy. 
Combined Systems are often known as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) (Whitman
et al. 2012:221, Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013, and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015).
2.5 Types of Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS)
IDPS are often used to sniff out network packets giving the network users/administrator a 
clear picture of what is truly happening on the network. An IDPS also has the potential to detect and
reports any evidence of attacks such as flooding attacks, unauthorised log-ins, privilege escalation,
illegitimate access, modification of data and data-driven attacks. IDPS are effective and useful in
controlling malicious activity and threats under circumstances where traffic is constantly growing. 
NIDPSs are further classified as software- or hardware-based. The mechanism of an IDPS is based on
how, where and what it detects, along with mandatory requirements. In particular, IDPSs should be 
based on flexible and scalable network components to accommodate the drastic increase in today’s
network environments (Whitman et al. 2012, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013 and Bul’ajoul, James
and Pannu 2015). The IDPS should provide straightforward and user-friendly management and
operational procedures and steps instead of complicating its underlying tasks. 
The typical actions of IDPS software can be classified as follows:
• Monitors entire and/or partial packets;
• Detects (alerts, logs and passes) or prevents (blocks, rejects and drops) suspicious 
activities;
• Records required events; and
• Sends updates to the network administrator. 
Some of the existing types of IDPSs are: network-based (NIDPS); host-based (HIDPS); and
graph-based IDS (GrIDPS). Hybrid systems also exist which combine one or more types into a single 
system (Whitman et al. 2012:224, Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:265-285 and Bul’ajoul, James
and Pannu 2015).
2.5.1 Network-based IDPS (NIDPS)
According to Yang, Fang, Liu and Zhang (2004) and Hofstede and Pras (2012), network-
based IDPS (NIDPS) have become a critical component of an organization’s security solution. A








       
     
      




          
 
       
       
         
       
      
    
      
       
              
            
             




    
      
    
     
        
     
   
application, network and transport layers, along with unexpected services based on multiple
applications. In addition, NIDPS are able to detect and monitor the network traffic and secure the
computer systems from network-based threats without network policy violations (Scarfone and Mell
2007, Whitman et al. 2012:226-230, Stanciu 2013, Arbor Networks 2015, Bul’ajoul, James and
Pannu 2015, Malik and Singh 2015, Özçelik and Brooks 2015 and Li et al. 2015).
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version 
of the thesis can be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry University
Figure 2. 3: An example of network-based IDPS (Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu, 2015).
However, an NIDPS can have disadvantages. NIDPSs are usually unable to check all
incoming network packets in high-speed and high-load environments. This results in incomplete
analyses and therefore considerable delays. The NIDPS itself is affected by DoS and DDoS attacks,
similar to those against IPSec gateways. In addition, an NIDPS is unable to inspect encrypted network 
traffic (packets) due to the placement in the middle of the network connections (see Figure 2.3);
similarly, eavesdroppers are unable to understand encrypted traffic in the middle of the traffic. DoS
and DDoS attacks can also overcome the processing power of the NIDPS because of the attacks’
speed and volume (Arbor Networks 2015 and Malik and Singh 2015).  The NIDPS only works on the
transporting or routing part of the network environment, as opposed to an end point of a network (see
Figure 2.3). The NIDPS can be placed at the hub and can see all traffic but this is not possible in a
switched network where there is no hub. In a switched network, port mirroring or spanning is used to
enable a complete view but this causes overhead.
2.5.2 Host-based IDPSs
In order to overcome the problems with NIDPS discussed above, host-based IDPS (HIDPS)
are implemented to monitor suspected events happening in local host machines. The HIDPS is 
versatile due to its installation over servers, workstations and notebooks, as compared to NIDPS. In 
addition, HIDPS are capable of monitoring malicious networks and multiple events happening within
the protected host. A HIDPS is situated at the end point of a computer network (see Figure 2.4) same
as anti-threats applications (spyware detection, firewalls and antivirus software programs), which








      
       
         
   
 
 
      
 
 
        
 
    
     
 
        
 
         
 
 
    
    
   
   
      
 
   
       
      
various kinds of log files (e.g., system, kernel, network and server firewall) and compare logs and an
internal database of common signatures for recognised attacks (Vigna and Kruegel 2006:1-13, 
Scarfone and Mell 2007, Topallar 2009, Whitman et al. 2012:230, Roozbhani and Rikhtechi 2010, 
Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Li, et al. 2015).
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the Lanchester 
Library, Coventry University
Figure 2. 4: An example of host-based IDPS.
Additional advantages of HIDPSs include:
• Capable of integrating code analysis, monitoring system calls, detecting buffer
overflows, privilege misuse and abuse, file system, library list and application, system
configuration and system analysis. This can be done by the HIDPS, because the
HIDPS is designed to operate with a specific host and with respect to applications
such as web servers, database servers, file servers, mail servers and DNS servers.
• The HIDPS is often integrated into server software and can be relatively easily
implemented to communicate with other network components and operating system.
• It can inspect encrypted traffic, because the HIDPS has capability to analyse packets 
at the application ends.
The disadvantages of an HIDPS are as follows:
• It consumes computer system resources that should be allocated for services.
• It may conflict with existing security policies of firewalls and operating systems.
• It is difficult to analyse intrusion attempts on multiple computers.
• It can be very difficult to maintain in large networks with different operating systems 
and configurations.
• It can be disabled by attackers after the system is compromised.
• It requires many hosts to reboot after a complete installation or updates and many













       
        
        
  
 
   
 
       
     
         
     
          
  
     
       
    
    
     
 
       
    
       
      
           
           
        
      
        
         
    
Scarfone and Mell 2007, Whitman et al. 2012:225-232, Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 
2013 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015).
2.5.3 Hybrid-Based IDPS
In some situations, HIDPS and NIDPS may unable to fulfil the requirements for intrusion
detection because each type of IDPS has both inherent virtues and shortcomings. Therefore, the
combination of HIDPS and NIDPS is known as Hybrid IDPS (Kim, Pamnami and Patel 2007, and Li,
et al. 2015). These are widely used in computers and networks for security management. 
2.5.4 Graph-based IDPS (GrIDPS)
Graph-based IDPSs (GrIDPSs) are designed to protect computer networks from large-scale
malicious attacks, which severely affect computer networks. Network traffic and computers are linked
through GrIDPs. The advantages of GrIDSs are that they can gather data about computer activity
across a network and help to recognize comprehensive automated or coordinated attacks in real time. 
They allow network systems to state and implement policies specifying which users are permitted to
utilise the particular services of an individual host or group of hosts. Assumptions made in this kind of
system include the existence of related networks within a single organisation that has an independent
infrastructure and sovereign departments. It also assumes that no single component of the network is
actively hostile, and therefore the IDPS must be designed to operate in non-hostile situations.
(Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015, Costa et al. 2015 and Fredj 2015).
2.6 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) methodology
Most IDPSs utilise either misuse detection and prevention or non-regular pattern detection
and prevention. The technique of misuse detection is employed to find known intrusions and/or a
pattern of signatures. Due to its reliance on signatures, its detection speed is quite fast and has a low
false positive rate (Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:265-290). On the contrary, an anomaly-based
method is able to detect unknown intrusions due to its intelligent detection behaviour. It is based on
profiles which present the usual behavioural activities of users, systems, network connections and
applications. These profiles are expanded to monitor the attributes of typical activity over a period of
time (Whitman et al. 2012:233, Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:268 and Bul’ajoul, James and
Pannu 2015). Profiles can be generated depending on a number of behavioural attributes such as
number of emails generated by a user, the number of failed login attempts for a host, and the








          
        
    
 
 
       
 
     
      
       
   
      
       
   
       





     
          
       
the profiles are not defined properly or are broadly defined, some attacks might not be detected,
leading to a low detection rate for the computer system. On the contrary, if the profiles are too
narrowly defined then various usual activities might be detected and considered as intrusion.
Figure 2. 5: General architecture for an IDPS.
The functional components of an integrated IDPS are: events management, data storage, 
analysis engine, and response manager. Event management gathers information on events (such as
alerts or block events) to and from the monitored system (see Figure 2.5) and sends these to the
database source. The database source stores multiple events gathered by event management. The 
analysis engine collects data from the data source in order to analyse and determine whether the data
is free of policy violations or other attacks. This engine can utilize anomaly/statistical detection,
misuse/signature-based detection, or both. The analysis engine processes events and transmits alerts.
The response manager neutralizes an attack once it is detected. The response manager responds to
events and stops intrusions (Whitman et al. 2012:232-254, Weaver, Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012,
Weaver, and Farwood 2013 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and). 
2.6.1 Signature-based IDPSs methodology
Signature detection has been used to detect known attacks. Signature-based IDPSs compare
observed signatures with known attack signatures. It has a higher level of security than anomaly








          
    
              
         
       
     
   
 
   
     








    
         
           
 
 
     
      
(Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012) and are therefore unreliable when it comes to detecting threats. The
IDPS uses known signatures of malicious codes, which are stored in an IDPS database. This kind of 
detection system is highly efficient for use in a small IDPS. The major drawback of such a system is
that its database must be regularly updated, resulting in an ever-increasing database that must include
as many available signatures as possible (Hoque et al. 2012, Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012 and
Bul'ajoul, James, and Pannu 2015). Thus the checking process takes more time, which tends to 
weaken the performance of the IDPS. 
The architecture shown in Figure 2.6 utilizes the detectors which discover and evaluate the
signatures available in the monitored environment to the known signatures database. The system
generates alerts if signatures match but on the contrary, the detector does not generate any alert if
there is no signature match with the database (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
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Coventry University
Figure 2. 6: Signature-based methodology architecture (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
2.6.2 Anomaly-based IDPS methodology
Anomaly-based IDPSs require foundation information and particular knowledge of the
system being protected. Such systems have profound merit in gathering evidence in the form of
statistics, data, facts and figures, which are responsible for the formation of baselines during the
learning period. 
The baseline profile is the normal learned behaviour of the monitored system and is








      
        
    
     
         
  
 
    
         
        
          
 
 
    
      
           
          
          
      
        
          
          
          
        
      
 
         
        
      
       
       
 
 
profile of the monitored system. This environment can be a network, users or a system. Anomaly-
based IDPSs are further classified as follows: Protocol-based Anomaly; and Application Payload-
based Anomaly (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012, Whitman et al. 2012, Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood
2013:256-274 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013). Anomaly-based IDPSs recognise breaches on
computer technology and systems that are outside the normal range for standard network traffic and
system operations.
Anomaly-based methodologies can identify and detect unknown intrusions and attacks on a
computer network environment without requiring updates to the system. Whenever an anomalous
operation is sensed, a standard anomaly-handling action should be initiated. This might occasionally
lead to false positives (Chen and Chen 2009, Shiri, Shanmugam and Idris 2011 and Pal and Verma
2015). 
The anomaly/statistical NIDPS method is a comparison-based method which compares any
activity to the profile for all possible learned actives through statistical data, facts and figures. There
are two types of profile, fixed and dynamic. A fixed profile is the most efficient as compared to other
schemes, because it terminates the occurrence of any unusual behaviour and it classifies the behaviour
as anomalous. A fixed profile cannot be modified once it is established, whereas a dynamic profile
can be changed as the system being monitored changes. An extra overhead will be added to the
system as the IDPS continues to update the dynamic profile. In the IDPS that implements a dynamic
profile, an attacker can avoid detection by spreading the attack over a long time period. The attack 
becomes part of the profile as the IDPS incorporates the changes into the profile as normal system
changes A dynamic profile cannot be created without an existing fixed profile; once the dynamic 
profile has been created, it allows the attacker to observe and alter his or her behaviour in long-term
activities (Hoque et al. 2012, Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012 and Bul'ajoul, James and Pannu 2015). 
Anomaly detection can be used to detect new attacks, but there is no guarantee of the
accuracy of the detection. It generates false positive alarms (Shiri, Shanmugam and Ideis 2011,
Weaver, Weaver, and Farwood 2013:268 and Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2013); therefore, the
problem of accuracy is still an issue for researchers (Ru et al. 2016 and Zhao, Jiang, and Stathaki
2016). According to Scarfone and Mell (2007) there are three general techniques for anomaly
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Figure 2. 7: Anomaly-based methodology architecture (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
The monitored environment is observed by the detector that matches events against a baseline
profile with two possibilities. If the observed event does not equate with the baseline but lies within
the range of an acceptable threshold, then the profile is updated. On the other hand, if the observed
event equates with the baseline, then no action is required. If the observed event does not match the
baseline profile and is outside the range of the threshold, the alert must be issued and the event
marked as anomaly (see Figure 2.7) (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
2.6.3 Analysis-based stateful protocol IDPS methodology
The Stateful Protocol IDPS methodology incorporates the notion of state and is therefore
capable of understanding and tracking the network protocol state. Stateful protocol models are built
on TCP/IP protocols using their specifications. The stateful protocol analysis models are built on 
TCP/IP protocols using their specifications. The stateful protocol NIDPS technique is based on 
analysis of the behaviour of the protocols. It observes the protocol behaviour and then compares it to
those stored in its protocol behaviour database. It detects anomalies in the packet on the head part of
the protocol. This technique is quite effective, but can be easily avoided by attackers working inside
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Figure 2. 8: Analysis-based stateful protocol architecture (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
Multiple vendors established and designed a baseline profile of the protocols. Stateful
protocol analysis provides in-depth understanding of related applications and protocols and how they
interact and work each other, but it introduces additional overheads in the system (Scarfone and Mell
2007 and Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
Furthermore, intruders usually use signatures which behave similarly to viruses used in
computers. The protocol anomaly detection method analyses data packets related to intrusion, which
contain known anomalies and single or sets of signatures. The detection system is capable of detecting
suspicious activity in the logs and generates alerts based on these signatures and rules. Anomaly-
based IDSs generally depend on detecting packet anomalies available in the header parts of the 
protocol. The universal architecture of the Stateful protocol and its analysis is similar to the
methodology of the signature-based approach (see Figure 2.8) and requires a database of acceptable
protocol behaviours.
2.6.4 Hybrid IDPS methodologies
The hybrid system is the integration of two or more methods. Hybrid methodology can 
combine two or more intrusion detection and prevention systems methodologies in order to analyse, 
detect and match any suspicious behaviour and signature-based malicious code that attempt to attack








            
      




         
  
 
         
      
           
 
 
        
          
            
 
         
 
     
    
  
 
         
        
relatively better results as compared to other methods. Figure 2.9 depicts the behaviour of the general
hybrid methodology which combines stateful protocol analysis, signature and anomaly methods. The 
monitored environment is analysed by each method in turn (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012and
Bul’ajoul, James and Pannu 2015).
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Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University
Figure 2. 9: Hybrid methodology architecture (Mudzingwa and Agrawal 2012).
2.7 Open Source NIDPSs (Snort and Bro)
Snort (2016) and Bro (2014) are both well-known open-source IDPSs. This research uses the
Snort open-source IDPS. In this section some comments are made on these two main open-source
IDPSs and reasons are given on why Snort was adopted as the vehicle to demonstrate the novel
architecture developed in this research.
Snort is ranked among the top NIDPSs currently available. In spite of the huge development
over the years and offering a de facto open-source IDP/IPS solution for many years (Khalil 2015), 
Snort is still struggling to sustain its growth in the network industry and prevent attacks (Bul’ajoul,
James and Pannu 2015, Podofillini et al. 2015 and Wang and Kissel 2015). It was released as an open-
source, rule-centred NIDPS, which stores rules in text files that can be modified by a text editor. The
rules are grouped into categories, and the rules belonging to each category are stored as information in
separate files; these files are then integrated into the main configuration file, named “snort.conf”. The
data is captured in terms based on described rules, which are read at the initialisation of Snort and are
used to construct the internal data structure.
Although, Snort is one of the most useable and popular NIDPS tools, other NIDPSs such as








          
     
       
   
   
 
        
          
           
      
      
         
      
            
      
 
 
      
    
     
      
  
     
 
 
        
         
         
         
       
    
          
  
 
           
      
           
based, open-source NIDPS capable of monitoring network traffic using passive methods to observe
suspicious and malicious activity. It detects specific attacks based on event signatures. Some studies (
Khalil 2015, Jaiswal, Lokhande and Gulavani 2015 and Stocks 2015) compare Snort and Bro are on 
the basis of various parameters such as performance, processing speed, signatures, flexibility, 
deployment, interface and capability of operating system.
Bro is getting popular in the research area due to its flexibility and easy customization. It is
also useful for the advanced techniques of detection and is easy to integrate with existing tools.
Association and correlation are other important and useful features which secure and protect the
overall network system. The performance of Bro is higher than Snort in terms of correlation of events.
Bro users use the sys-log as an output which provides the broad results of the events in the system.
These features are not available in Snort but researchers are working to add such features to Snort
(Mehra 2012, Jaiswal, Lokhande and Gulavani 2015 and Stocks 2015). A multi-instance feature has
been added to Snort whereby a new Snort instance can be launched across each core to support load
balancing across multiple CPUs. Snort has become multi-threading to address high-throughput
networks. However, Bro lacks built-in, multi-threading. 
Bro and Snort have the ability handle high-speed traffic. This makes them suitable for larger
scale Gbps networks but both have limits. Both are flexible and can be configured for their intended
computer network. Bro includes pre-written rule scripts which cannot be modified and these will
detect the most well-known attacks. More features can be added and policy scripts can be customised
to cope with new attacks. The policy scripts can be customised to contain application-specific rules.
Snort rules are powerful, flexible and relatively easy to write and also have provision for
customization.
Bro differs from Snort in its event-driven analysis. It has its own policy engine, which 
provides the capabilities of analysis, downloading of files on the wire, and then notifying the
administrator. When a computer user tries to modify or download its script, the event engine will stop
and shutdown. Snort does not have its own facility to capture packets. An external packets-sniffing
library is required. Often used is the LipPcap library, which is widely supported across various
operating systems. When Libpacp packets are delivered to Snort, the packets will be processed 
through a series of decoders corresponding to the protocol stack elements. Once the packets are
decoded, they move up to the pre-processor and detection engine for analysis.
Arguably Snort is easier to use than Bro because it has a graphical interface Therefore it more
popular. Snort can run on most of today’s common OSs such as Windows, UNIX, Mac, and Linux








        
   
 
           
       
             
        
      
     
 
         
    
           
         
      
          
            
       
             
        
      
    
 




    
    
 
      
      
      
      
       
different IDS/IPS modes such as Sniffing, passive and inline mode. Bro does not support inline
intrusion prevention (IP) mode; it offers a script-driven IDS.
Bro architecture is different from Snort. It is a script-driven policy engine rather than
processing and decoding engine. Snort offers a wide variety of pre-processors which examine and
modify packets for input to the detection engine which has rules for parsing and signature detection.
New functionality can be added in Bro through the creation of policy scripts which can be written in
the Bro. New functionality in Snort is written in the C language (Mehra 2012, Stocks 2015, Jaiswal, 
Lokhande, and Gulavani 2015 and Khalil 2015).
Several NIDPSs are available on marketplace and some open-source NIDPSs are also
available. Snort and Bro are free-of-charge NIDPSs and both are available for download from their
respective websites. Snort, Bro and other freeware NIDPS systems are often used both in research and
operational systems (Bro 2014, Snort 2016). According to the Snort website (Snort 2016), the Snort
community includes more than 500,000 registered and active users. Also, there have been over four
(4) millions downloads from national and international universities which are actively using Snort for
their research purposes and tutorials. Snort is the most widely deployed IDPS in the world. On the
contrary, there are no numbers published in the community to show the users of Bro and it is assumed 
that the user base is smaller. Snort has been developed to be suitable for speedy networks and is
packet-oriented whereas Bro is connection-oriented (Mehra 2012, Chen et al. 2015, Kenkre, Pai and
Colaco 2015 and Bul'ajoul, James and Pannu 2015).  Snort focuses on performance and simplicity and
is one of the best known lightweight NIDPSs.
It was decided to use Snort instead of Bro in this research because of its larger user base, 
longer established research community and ability to be used on multiple operating systems.
2.8 Use of Parallelism in Intrusion Detection
Multi-core technology and parallelism is a possible solution for the high-speed network traffic
security problem. This section describes relevant related work in parallelism in intrusion detection.
Salah and Qahtan (2009) implemented a hybrid scheme in Linux OS to prove that a hybrid
scheme can improve the performance of general-purpose network desktops or servers running
network I/O-band applications when such network hosts were exposed to both light and heavy traffic
load conditions. In order to achieve a high throughput of analysed traffic, the researchers tuned the 








            
         
        
           
          
  
 
       
      
      
             
        
          
       
      
         
            
           
           
        
   
 
          
         
         
        
    
 
        
        
 
       
      
central processing unit cycle. However, this solution will cause another problem, which is polling of
speedy and large traffic to CPU for which there is no buffer. If the incoming traffic speed is higher
than CPU processing speed, some of the traffic will be dropped.  The method proposed in this thesis is 
similar to the work of Salah and Qahtan in that it exploits configuration in a general purpose
environment, but it is different in that it introduces a novel configuration of QoS at a multi-layer
switch level by using a buffer reservation technique together with parallel processing technology.
Thus it is network-based rather than the host-based.
Shiri, Shanmugam and Idris (2011) proposed a type of parallelism to improve the
performance of signature based IDSs. They used two signatures and created parallel implementations
of Snort. Then they distributed the traffic between the two Snort nodes, each node handling one of the
signatures. Beg et al. (2010) gave an overview about using AI (Artificial Intelligence) techniques in
IDS and showed their capabilities for intrusion handling and minimising false alarms. They provided
details about how using different AI approaches in IDS has serious disadvantages in a large and high-
speed network. The variations in the AI algorithms make it quite difficult to pin-point exact
limitations of the system or the technique used. Moreover, for a large, high-speed network,
corresponding computation needs arise which make AI algorithms more difficult and less scalable.
Beg et al. suggested the use of HPC in a centralized network to improve processing of large data and
speedy traffic in the context of using AI techniques. This thesis has similarities to the research of Beg
et al. in that it uses multiple Snort nodes and parallelism but it addresses performance in a different
way. It explores the use standard network components to improve processing of a speedy and heavy
traffic through improved QoS architecture.
One of the most important weaknesses of NIDPSs is that they fail, when processing
unexpected increases in traffic volume. It is crucial that more efficient approaches are developed. To
find a solution to this problem, several nodes can be used to process network traffic concurrently and 
in parallel. Wheeler and Fulp (2007) proposed a framework that is complementary to NIDPS. Their
research illustrates that three levels of parallelism can be used:
• the node level (the node plays a vital role in the running of several identical systems
(entire systems) in a parallel fashion: the same set of tasks (or rules) are replicated at
each node);
• the component level (defines a form of practical parallelism; a fraction of tasks (rules)








      
     
     
 
    
         
         
      
            
       
     





       
   
    
         
      
       
      
   
        
       
          
 
         
        
    
     
   
     
       
       
• the sub-component level (refers to the further parallelisation of individual
components). The parallelisation of pre-processing into critical and non-critical pre-
processing can be viewed as a functional sub-component parallelism).
In Snort, rules are placed into rule groups based on their source and destination: for example, 
rules associated with web traffic are usually placed in port number 80. In the work of Wheeler and
Fulp, Snort organises the rules into discrete groups, and each individual group is commonly 
recognised by its file name. Packet duplicators are used to duplicate incoming packets that run across
all the nodes at the same time, because of different tasks (or rules) maybe maintained at different
nodes. In the node level parallelism, one can therefore assume that one packet may pass through the
same inspection many times. The main flaw of this method is repetition, so that when a packet is sent
to the node, the node must check whether its rules are related to that of the packet. Wheeler and Fulp
(2007) do not cover this issue in their research. 
There are many difficulties associated with node level parallelism:
• If all communications are considered to be stateless, the node level is able to work. 
However, this seems to be unrealistic with today’s attack, as demonstrated by
(Hernandez-Herrero and Solworth 2007 and Shaikh et al. 2009);
• Duplication of processing may occur if a packet is sent to more than one node. In
contrast, in the method proposed in this thesis, traffic (packets) was configured and 
treated by using QoS configuration and other switch technology such as ACL,
Queues, bandwidth, threshold and DiffServ architecture to help prevent duplications
of packet processing at multiple NIDPS nodes.  
• No co-relation was reflected in the packets that were sent in multiple frames; in
contrast, the method proposed in this thesis classifies and processes the traffic
through specific class and policy maps and then packets are passed to multiple
NIDPS nodes, which analyse traffic depending on packet IP frames. 
• A flaw in the node level parallelism method further reveals that it does not take into 
account the fragmentation issue, which is the latest primary technique used by 
abusers who overflow systems. The latest IDPSs are unable to handle the process of
fragmentation because of the sheer speed of the attacks (Vasanthi and Chandrasekar
2011). In the novel architecture configuration proposed in this thesis, the traffic speed 
has been organised and controlled wherever the speed is high to help prevent the
effectiveness of increasing attack speed. QoS queuing, DSCP (Differentiated Service








          
   
 
      
       
           
     
 
 
       
         
          
    
    
              
        
    
    
    
 
      
             
         
          
         
      
          
  
 
       
         
      
        
        
      
        
      
bandwidth to ensure real-time network traffic does not suffer from high jitter and
delay.
Wheeler and Fulp (2007) demonstrate that at the component level, some particular functions, 
including e-fragmentation, can be parallelised. However, it has not been properly clarified how this
will take place in this system, and the risk may be exacerbated by the formation of a bottleneck at this 
level. This can even be increased if the top-level categorisation is not done in order to isolate the
fragmented packets from whole and complete packets.
Shiri, Shanmugam and Idris (2011) proposed a parallel technique for improving the
performance of a signature-based NIDPS. Their idea was to send different types of packets to
different parallel Snorts for analysis and they obtained a 40% improvement in processing time.
Schuff, Choe and Pai (2007) proposed a multi-thread Snort called MultiSnort which executes multiple
instances of the original Snort in parallel. The research of this thesis is similar to these in that different
types of packet are sent to parallel Snorts. However, while the research of this thesis confirms the
findings of previous research, the main difference is that it provides new detail on how to achieve the
improvement through QoS and parallelisation using industry standard software systems. Another
difference is that it has concentrated on NIDPS analysis, detection and prevention and also provided 
further experiments with greater detail of relevant parameters. 
Chen et al. (2009) presented Para-Snort which revised the structure of the original Snort
decoupling the decoding part so that this activity is carried out centrally before the parallel queues are
formed. The approach also used central load balancing to distribute packets to parallel Snort
processing units. The research of this thesis differs from Chen et al.’s work in that the whole of Snort
is parallelised (including decoding). Parallel queues are formed in the switch before being sent to
Snort pre-processing and decoding. The problem with central decoding, pre-processing and load
balancing modules is that they could become additional bottle necks in the system. Chen et al. also
researched how to reduce the load balancing bottle neck issue.
Vasiliadis, Polychronakis, and Ioannidis (2011) proposed a new model for a multi-parallel
IDS architecture (MIDeA) for high-performance processing and stateful analysis of network traffic.
Their solution offers parallelism at a subcomponent level, with NICs, CPUs and GPUs doing
specialised tasks to improve scalability and running time. They showed that processing speeds can 
reach up to 5.2Gbps with zero packet loss in a multi-processor system. Jiang et al. (2013) proposed a
parallel design for NIDS on a TILERAGX36 many-core processor. They explored data and pipeline
parallelism and optimized the architecture by exploiting existing features of TILERAGX36 to break








      
      
        
      
      
       
       
   
     
         
       
      
         
          
   
     
        
             
     
   
 
      
        
       
        
    
         
          
         
    
  
        
      
          
       
      
     
for implementing an NIDS on the TILERAGX36 which has a 36 core processor (Tilera). The system
was designed according to two strategies: first a hybrid parallel architecture was used, combining data
and pipeline parallelism; and secondly a hybrid load-balancing scheme was used. They took
advantage of the parallelism offered by combining data, pipeline parallelism and multiple cores, using
both rule-set and flow space partitioning. They showed that processing speeds can handle and reach 
up to 7.2Gbpswith 100-bytes packets and 13.5 Gbps for 512-bytes. Jamshed et al. (2012) presented
Kargus’s system which exploits high processing parallelism by balancing the pattern matching
workloads with multi-core CPUs and heterogeneous GPUs. Kargus adapts its resource usage 
depending on the input rate, to save power. The research shows that Kargus handles up to 33 Gbps of
normal traffic and achieves 9 to 10 Gbps even when all packets contain attack signatures. The various 
approaches described in this paragraph are not directly comparable in terms of throughput as different
numbers of processors is used in each. However the experiments show that high gains can be made
by parallelising NIDPSs in order to combat problems of higher speeds and increasing traffic. The
novel research presented in this thesis differs from the research described in this paragraph in that the
research presented in this thesis shows how QoS and queue technologies can be exploited in a multi-
layer switch to improve packets processing performance. Further enhancements occur when queuing
is combined with parallel processor technologies. The other research did not exploit QoS. The
approach of this thesis has shown how parallelism at a lower level of granularity, which is simpler to
implement, can also make impressive improvements for NIDPS performance in terms of throughput
and the number of dropped packages. 
Chen, et al. (2015) proposed an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design with
parallel exact matching (PEM) architecture to accelerate processor packets speed. The ASIC hardware 
has been designed to operate at 435MHz to perform up to 13.9 Gbps throughput to manage the
requirements of high-speed and high accuracy for IDS, which resolves the issue of the information
security limitation to manage data received from the 10Gbps core network. They proposed SRA
(Snort Rule Accelerator) with parallel rules to increase the performance of the IDS. The SRA is
proposed with a stateless parallel-matching scheme to perform high throughput packet filtering as an
accelerator of the Snort detection engine. The ASIC is composed of five major modules, including the
Inspector, Counter, Parallel Matching, Conformity and Compare modules. The parallel matching
scheme compares a packet’s payload with the stored rule. When an entry packet is matched with Snort
rules, the ASIC is in an idle state and sends a compare signal to the conformity module, which
integrates all signals and determines whether an abnormal payload is presented. Here the authors
designed a half mesh architecture in the parallel matching rules module, which allows the traffic to be
compared with several rules. The research of this thesis addressed performance in a different way. It
utilised hardware Layer-3 switch technology (QoS, memory and buffer dynamic reservation and








       
            
      
         
             
        
          
     
 
       
        
     
  
      
          
 
 
        
    
       
        
   
 
        
             
      
        
          
      
    
 
 
        
      
       
      
             
NIDPS performance. It configured an interface into queues (interface-to-queues), which allows
packets to be processed through the component level parallel NIDPS nodes. The approach is designed
to deal with the limitation of real networks speed and finds solutions to the problems that caused the
NIDPS performance. The approach can deal with any incoming traffic-speed that may allow
malicious packets to enter the system and prevent NIDPS from detecting or preventing them. It does
this by imposing advanced management of network packets traffic. The advantage of the proposed
approach is that every-day equipment can be utilised in a new way to achieve improvements and it is 
also more scalable than the proposal of Chen et al. (2015).
In the context of big data and distributed systems, Zhao et al. (2014) have developed a
security framework in G-Hadoop. This work focuses on authentication and access rather than
intrusion detection but offers an interesting new direction. The framework could be enhanced with
intrusion detection and protection functionality to create a more complete solution. The research of
this thesis has focussed on standard business infrastructure whereas the work of Zhao et al. has 
concentrated on single cluster across cloud data centres. Cross-cluster security services in a high
performance environment such as that afforded by G-Hadoop is an area where attention is welcome. 
Vendor companies are aiming to develop security solutions to protect the enterprise network.
Equipment has been designed to meet connectivity speed and load standards. The improvements in
the throughput of NIDPS shown in this thesis are achieved by pairing the ASA Cisco equipment
(Cisco 2016b) with multiple implementations of Snort. The principles of the method proposed in this
thesis could be applied to other equipment combinations where similar facilities are offered. 
Interesting work is being carried out in the classification of internet traffic which can be used
to support attack detection. In order to counteract limitations of current internet traffic classification
techniques, which are based only on header and payload inspection, Wang et al. (2014) have
developed a system which can classify traffic in terms of their intended application by considering
packet and flow characteristics. A machine learning approach has been used to develop the classifier.
Extra complexity introduced by more demanding methods such as machine learning, albeit with the
purpose of producing better detection performance, supports the contention of this thesis for a solution
based on parallel NIDPS in high-speed and heavy traffic environments. 
To summarise, the research of this thesis differs from the research described in this section in
terms of the architecture used. The research of this thesis investigates how QoS technology and 
parallelism can have impact in high-speed and heavy traffic network using an industry standard
switch and standard desktop processors. This solution is a more accessible way of receiving good 








        
      
    




          
          
      
           
  
software and replicating Snort on standard machines. Further improvements could be made if higher
performance equipment was used. However, there is room for various approaches in the security
arena and more exploration of the suitability of various methods in varying circumstances is welcome. 
Also the cost is generally an important concern. The design proposed in this research benefits the
network security requirements at low cost.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter an overview has been given of the ever-growing problem of network and
system attacks and the current technology used to combat them, including its limitations. It has also
discussed related research work which, like this research, aims to improve the performance of









      
 
 
           
             
           
        
     
     
   
        
         




     










       
         
       
        
     
 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology and experimental design of this research. First the
chapter provides a description of the overall approach applied in this research. A major part of the
approach included practical experiments which were set up using a number of technologies including
Snort as the base NIDPS. The proposed solution to the research problem involved the use of QoS
configuration in a Layer 3 Cisco switch together with parallel NIDS technology. The experimental
testbed also incorporated generator traffic tools, such as NetScanPro, Packets Generator, Packets
Traceroute, TCP reply and Packets flooder. Thus after describing the general approach to the research,
relevant aspects of the participating technologies in the experimentation and solution are described.
The NIDPS methodology used was the signature-based and thus the chapter also includes coverage of
this. Finally, the chapter informs readers about the actual experiments carried out and the performance
metrics used.
3.2 General Approach to the Research
The general method used in this research was quantitative including experimentation,
inferential and simulation techniques (see section 1.5). The research followed the steps given below
(also see Figure 3.1).
1. Literature Review
A literature review was undertaken to establish the state of the art and clearly define the
problem to be solved.
2. Research design
A method to carry out the research was designed. An experimental approach was
determined. It was decided to first analyse the problem through a set of practical
experiments (stage 1), further tested with different tasks carried out with some additional
virtual experiments (stage 2). Finally, design a solution to the problem and evaluate the








     
 
      
         
   
      
      
        
 
 
     
 
    




     
 
3. Analysis of the Problem (Stage 1 and Stage 2)
The problem was exposed through a set of experiments, the results of which were
analysed. The experiments show the rates of dropped packets when a network is
subjected to high-speed and high-volume traffic. The first sets of experiments were
carried out in a specially designed testbed. The second set of experiments was carried out
in a virtual environment to investigate the reason of problem. The experiments show how
the rates of dropped packets are different under different OSs, buffer size and processor
speed.
4. Solution Design and Evaluation (Stage 3)
A solution to the problem based on Layer 3 switch configuration, QoS and parallel
technology was designed and implemented. The solution was evaluated through a third
set of experiments.








     
 
         
          
      
        
        
 
 
      
       




        
 
          
    
     
       
       
3.3 The NIDPS used - Snort NIDPS
Snort, a software-based NIDPS, was used as the example NIDPS for the research. Snort is
one of the strongest and most popular open-source NIDPSs. Its architecture is represented in Figure
3.2. When a packet arrives at the network, Snort listens and captures packets. In the beginning, the
packet decoder receives packets from multiple network interfaces, such as Point-to-Point Protocol
(PPP) or Ethernet and Serial-Line-Internet-Protocol (SLIP), and then pre-processes such packets
ready for the detection engine (filters organise and modify the data packets before transferring them to 
a detection engine). The detection engine performs three main tasks: sniffing (analysis), detection and 
prevention. It can perform network traffic analysis and content searching/matching in both real-time
and for forensic post-processing (Caswell and Beale 2004:170, Chi 2014 and Snort 2016). Snort can 
be configured in three main modes: sniffer, packet logger, and network intrusion detection and
prevention mode (NIDP mode).  
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University
Figure 3. 2: Snort architecture (Bul'ajoul, James and Pannu 2013).
In NIDP mode, Snort analyses the network traffic against a set of defined rules in order to
detect/prevent intrusion threats. In the experiments, the researcher focussed on the Snort capabilities
in network intrusion detection and prevention in order to determine how many packets could be
analysed, detected and prevented by Snort under varying conditions. It has been shown previously








        
 
 
          
         
          
      
         
       
 
 
         
      
        
         
         
  
 
    
     
       
       
        
       
   
 
      
    
           
          
       
      
       
      
 
not processed properly (Balkanli 2015, Bul'ajoul, James and Pannu 2015 and Dhakar and Tiwari
2015).
The detection engine is time-critical and the most important part of the Snort. It utilises 
different processing times based on the length of the packet, the specifications of the system and the 
number of rules defined in the system. Snort sometimes drops or leaves outstanding packets when it
runs in real-time NIDPS mode, particularly when traffic is heavy and high-volume Snort rules are
employed to detect intrusive actions in the data packet. In NIDPS mode, Snort is capable of reading
chains (internal data structures), which have to be matched against all packets. If a packet does not
match any rule, it will be blocked; otherwise, appropriate action is taken. 
Logs and alerts depend on the nature of what is detected inside the packets. If any suspicious 
activity is found inside a packet, the packet usually logs the malicious activity and/or generates an
alert. Logs are usually stored in simple text-based files, such as tcp-dump files. Output modules (plug-
ins) are capable of performing multiple operations depending on the results generated by the Snort log
and alert system. In general, output modules control the form of outcome produced by the log and
alert system. 
Snort is a combination of both basic signature code analysis and content-driven rules. Snort
can execute a protocol analysis and a search and match of the content. It can be utilised for the
detection of various attacks and probes, such as those regarding stealth port scans, buffer overflow,
SMB (Server Message Block) probes, CGI (Common Gateway Interfaces) attacks, fingerprinting
attempts of OS and many more. Snort uses the rules, provided by developers or security analysts, to
identify the traffic types that can be passed or collected (Bul'ajoul, James and Pannu 2015, Edge and
O’Donnell 2016 and Snort 2016).
There are several features available for Snort; the most common feature is its real-time alert
mechanism. Alerts can also be collected by using a mechanism called syslog, which allows the
reporting of suspicious activities in various ways: logs for additional investigation; a UNIX socket;a
specified file of the user; or a Win-Popup message to the window client (Snort 2016). Snort is
different from other packet sniffers, due to the tcp-dump sniffer, which can be run by different
operating systems and the use of the hex-dump payload dump that the tcp-dump has employed during
recent years. Snort also has the capability to display packets in different networks through the same 
method. The default detection method of Snort in NIDPS is the signature method. The alerts are










       
          
        
          




        
 
          
     
 
 




   
 
      
        
    
        
 
 
       
        
3.4 Snort Rules
Snort rules activate on an TCP/IP network and protocol layer. The part containing options 
normally also covers an alert message and information regarding relevant parts of the packets that can
be used to generate an alert message. The options area keeps additional matching criteria. The rule
can detect or prevent one or more types of interruption activity. Good rules should cover multiple
intrusion signatures. Snort’s rules consist of two logical parts: a rule header; and rule options (See
Figure 3.3) (Weaver, Weaver and Farwood 2013:284-304 and Snort 2016).
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University
Figure 3. 3: Basic structure of Snort rules (Rehman 2003:79).
The rule header keeps the information regarding action taken by the rule and stores the
criteria for matching a rule against data packets. A Snort rule structure can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University
Figure 3. 4: Structure of Snort rule header (Rehman 2003:79).
3.4.1 Rule Header 
The rule header consists of several different parts:
Action: The action rule is used to perform a typical function to generate an alert or log 
message or to initiate another rule. This performance is the first part of the rule,
which shows the predicted action that will be taken when rule conditions are met.
The action will take place in the case that all conditions mentioned in the rule are
true.
Protocol: The application of the protocol is used only for a particular protocol. This is the 








     
   
 
   
         
       
    
        
       
        
          
    
 
                          
 
 
           
        
             
           
     
         
  
       
   
 
                
 
                         
      
       
         
     
    
 
        
 
(e.g. IP, UDP, TCP and ICMP). If a protocol is TCP or UDP, then Snort checks the
transport layer to determine the packet’s type. 
Address: The address is utilised to define source and destination addresses on a rule.
Addresses may consist of one or numerous IP hosts of network addresses. The
address fields in rules are of two types: a destination address and a source address.
Both addresses can be determined on the basis of the direction field. For example, if
the direction field is ‘->’, the source address is on left side and the destination
address is on right side of a given address. For example, the following rule is to
generate an alert message whenever it detects any ICMP packet from source address
10.0.0.0/8, any source port to any destination address and any destination port with
time to live (ttl) of ICMP packets equal to 138:
Alert icmp[10.0.0.0/8] any -> any any (msg: “ping with ttl=138 “; ttl: 138; sid:
100001 ;).
Port: The port number is employed to apply a rule to a packet, which originated from or
travelled to a specific interface (port) or range of interfaces. These port numbers are
very useful for applying a rule to a specific type of traffic (packets). For example, if
the point of network security weaknesses is related only to a HTTP (Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol) web server, port 80 can be used in a rule to detect any attempts at
exploitation. Moreover, port range, lower and upper boundaries, and the symbol of
negation can be used to write an effective rule. The sample rule below would detect
any UDP packets that come from any source address and specific source port range 
(1024 –2044) to any destination address and ports:
Alert udp any 1024:2044 -> any any (msg:” udp ports”; sid: 100002 ;).
The parts of the port identify the source and destination ports of the packets where
the rules are applied. Due to the source address and port address, the rule can be
applied to packets that are coming from a source port, which is related to the type of
packet. If the destination IP and port are set to “any”, the rule will apply to all IP
address traffic (packets), irrespective of their destination address. Port numbers will
be related if the protocol is either TCP or UDP.









        
      
    
    
   
 
    
      
 
        
      
      
        
      
       
            
 
 
    
           
       
        
   
 
      
        





     
        
  
 
Rule options follow the rule header and appear within the pair of parentheses. It is possible
that there may be single or multiple options, which may be separated by a semicolon. The rule header
is checked when relevant true criteria are found in options. Keywords are used to define all rule
options, although some rule options also include arguments. A rule header can also define other rule
header action, such as dropping, blocking or rejecting a rule. 
There are five predefined actions that comprise the rule header: Pass, Log, Alert, Activate and
Dynamic and User Defined Actions (Snort 2016). The Alert and Log are the two most common
actions, which were used in the experiments and also some user-defined actions, such as Drop, 
Prevent and Block. The Alert action rule sends an alert message in case true rule conditions are met
for particular packets. There are multiple ways to send alerts. It can be sent to a file or console. In the 
experiments, alerts were sent to a text file. The Log action uses to record packets details, and different
methods are used to accomplish this. For example, a packets detail logs to a database or a file. Packets
and headers can be recorded with several levels of detail, depending on the configuration file and
command line arguments. Log and Alert have different functions: the Alert action performs a task to
send an alert message and then record (log) the packet, whereas the only task of the Log action is to
log the packet. 
The Pass action rule is a process to inform Snort to ignore the packets. The Activate action
generates an alert and then to activate another rule in order to check further conditions. The Activate
rule is utilised if further testing is required for a captured packet. The Dynamic action is initiated by
another rule, by using the Activate action. In fact, it can be activated only by using the Activate
action, which already defines in another rule. 
The User Defined action is rule actions devised by the user. These rule actions are employed
for various purposes, such as sending messages to syslog, taking multiple actions on packets, and
logging messages into a database such as MySQL the preventative action rules, (e.g. Block, Reject or
Drop) are implemented to prevent the unwanted traffic from entering the system.
3.4.2 Rule Options
Generally, an option in a rule can consist of two parts: an argument and a keyword (Snort
2016). Colons are used to separate arguments from keywords of the option. There are various kinds








         
     
           
        
         
       
        
    
     
           
      
       
            
   
  
 
          
      
      
        
          
  
       
  
 
        
    
            
            
 
 
       
     
     
          
The ttl keyword rule checks the IP time-to-live values. This rule has the ability to prevent any 
packet reassembly. The ttl keyword can be used for many protocols constructed on the TCP/IP
protocols including ICMP and UDP headers. The content rule detects a pattern in the packet. It
enables the user to look for a specific content within the packet payload and activate a response. The
offset keyword enables the means to start the search for a pattern from a particular point within a
packet. The depth keyword enables specification of how far along the packet the search should
continue. The criteria for a Snort packet search for a specific pattern depth, which modifies the
previous content keyword in the rule. The offset and depth options are used to specify where to start
searching (offset) for a particular content in the payload and where to stop (depth).The dsize keyword 
looks for payloads of the specified size (e.g. >800). It checks for abnormalities in the size of the
packets, which can become a cause of buffer overflow. The content list keyword is generally used
with a file name as an argument. The file contains a list of strings to be sought inside the packet. 
Every string is placed on a separate line of the file. The msg keyword is used in rule options to add a 
text string for use in logs and alerts (Snort 2016).
3.5 The layer 3 Cisco Catalyst switch technology
A layer 3 Cisco switch was used in the proposed solution. A layer 3 Cisco switch is a high-
performance switch optimised for the LAN/WLAN or internet, providing wire-speed switch interface
services. The switch performs three major purposes: packet switching, packet route processing, and 
intelligent network services. Layer 3 Cisco switches improve network performance through a variety
of means: Quality of Service (QoS); DiffServ, which is based on DSCP (Differentiated Services Code
Point) or IP precedence values; packets classification and modification services; rating limiting; ACLs
(assess control lists); high-performance IP routing while maintain the simplicity of traditional LAN
switching; and route processing queues. 
A layer 3 switch contains a group of routing protocols based on Cisco IOS software, network
protocols, such as IP and IPX, and routing protocols such as RIP (Router Information Protocol), 
OSPF (Open Shortest Path First), IGRP (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol). (Szigeti et al. 2013 and
Cisco 2016a). The switch offers granular QoS features which help ensure that network traffic is
classified and prioritised, and that congestion is avoided in the best possible manner.
QoS technology is identified to provide a different treatment for network traffic in different
classes, which can be assigned to a specific QoS. The class to which the packet belongs can determine
or discard the packet’s scheduling and policies. Implementing QoS including technologies, such as








       
       
   
 
         
    
   
          
          
       
      
        
     
       
        
          
        
         
        
          
       
  
 
        
     
      
    




    
        
         
          
       
traffic bandwidth, network traffic delay and packet drop. QoS technology supports some features
including local administrative policy and DiffServ architecture, which can deal with different TCP/IP
traffic (Cisco 2014a and Cisco2016a).
Furthermore, Layer 3 switches offer a range of security features such as enabling businesses
to protect important information, keep unauthorized traffic off the network, guard privacy, and
maintain uninterrupted operation. The switch can deal with malicious traffic and high-speed attacks
such as flooding, malicious traffic, and DoS by using ACL (Access Control List) services, which can
restrict access to sensitive portions of the network by denying packets based on source and destination
MAC/IP addresses, or TCP/UDP ports. The switch delivers high-performance IP routing architecture.
This architecture offers a speedy lookups while helping ensure the stability and scalability necessary
to meet the needs of experiment requirements. The switches support extra features, such as
“constrained multicast flooding (CMF), IP routing, IP multicast routing, routing protocol convergence
with Routing Information Protocol (RIP), EtherChannel and load sharing across equal cost Layer 3 
paths and spanning trees (for Layer 2 based networks)” (Cisco 2014a and Cisco2016a). They also 
support remote monitoring (RMON) groups. RMON (Remote Network MONitoring) is a network
managing protocol for gathering network information and checking traffic flow data within remote
LAN segments. RMON lets permitted users to see all traffic nodes and their interaction on a LAN
segment. In the router, RMON allows the configurable user to view traffic that flows through the
router by conjunction with the SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) agent. A Layer 3
switch combines RMON events and actions with existing MIBs (Management Information Bases) so
the configurable user can choose where monitoring will occur (Cisco 2016a and Cisco 2014a). 
A load balancing function distributes packets (traffic) over network interfaces such as ports or
switch virtual interfaces (SVIs). This method benefits network traffic, because it is able to distribute
the traffic more effectively without extending the data path. Load balancing improves the utilisation
of network segments, which increases effective network range. Layer 3 Cisco switches support 
different layer protocols as well as advanced layer 3 IP and IPX (Internetwork Packet Exchange)
protocol technology, which optimises network performance and scalability for networks which exhibit
large and dynamic traffic patterns.
Layer 3 switches offer a high routing traffic performance between interfaces by identifying 
the availability of available interface on the network without relying on any single router. Likewise,
they support 10/100/1000 Mb (Megabit) Ethernet, Gb (Gigabit) Ethernet, FEC (Fast Ethernet
Channel), GEC (Gigabit Ethernet Channel) and BVI (Bridge Virtual interface). Layer 3 switches












       
  
      
        
    
     
 
 
      
    
     
       
       
    
     
 
 
         
    
     
             
    
       
       
         
         
       
        
       
    
interfaces and segments within an inter-network into an autonomous user group, which appears as one
LAN (Szigeti 2013:294-299). 
3.6 Quality of Service (QoS) configuration technology
The proposed solution includes QoS configuration. A QoS technique permits the control of
traffic over a network and guarantees the throughput of traffic applications in terms of time scale. QoS
concerns the performance of the network traffic over several technologies, including 802.1 networks,
IP-routed networks, Frame relay and Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) as seen from the user’s
perspective. Furthermore, QoS uses congestion management and avoidance techniques along with
configuration and prioritises traffic based on its importance (Szigeti et al. 2013:1-9:83-85, Cisco 
2014a:7-12 and Cisco 2016a:827).
The features of QoS are classified into the following functions: classifying and marking,
policing, congestion management and avoidance. It offers a better and more reliable performance of
network traffic service. QoS supports network management traffic and configuration methods,
including a memory reservation, a dedicated bandwidth, a threshold, a throughput performance of
network traffic (queues technology), shaping and sharing network traffic, and priority characteristics
(Szigeti et al. 2013:31-32:83-109, Cisco 2014a:7-14 and Cisco 2016a:829). Employing QoS brands
performance of network traffic more expectable and the utilisation of network bandwidth more
effective.
Classification is the process of distinguishing one type of traffic from another by checking the
fields in the packets or in the header. After traffic was classified, a traffic policy and marking were 
implemented to specify the bandwidth limits for each input and output traffic on the interfaces.
Policing can decide on a packet-by-packet basis whether the packets are in or out of the scope of the
profile and specify the action on the packets. The actions can be carried out by the marking function, 
including allowing the packets to pass without modification, dropping the packets and modifying the
packets (marking down), such as assigning traffic to be matched with a DSCP value to allow the
packets to pass through without being dropped. After traffic was classified and policing and marking
had been implemented, a set of packets was processed in queues (input and output queues) at the
specific bandwidth, and congestion was prevented by using congestion avoidance and Shared/Shaped 
Round Robin (SRR) features. Both the input and output queues use the SRR function to manage the
guarantee of bandwidth. They use a congestion-avoidance mechanism called a weighted tail drop










         
        
        
       
  
        
     
         
          
          
          
       
       
         
    
      
              
       
    
 
 
     
3.7 Parallel NIDPS technology
The solution made use of parallel NIDPS. Parallel NIDPS is a form of computation in which
many NIDPS nodes work simultaneously, operating on the principle that the large incoming data can
be divided into smaller sets, which are processed at the same time. Parallelism of NIDPS can occur at
three general levels: the high-level processing node (entire system), the component level (specific
tasks are isolated and parallelised) and the sub-component level parallelism (function within a specific
task) (Wheeler and Fulp 2007). The handling of data can also be parallelised with traffic being split
into separate streams to be processed by parallel nodes or components.  This is data parallelism which 
can occur in various ways with the three general levels of parallelisation. In the novel architecture of
this thesis, a parallel traffic was implemented through the use of queues (2 input queues and 4 output
queues) on a switch virtual interface (SVI) where component level parallelism of NIDPS nodes was
implemented with QoS configuration with the aim of improving NIDPS throughput performance and
reducing NIDPS processor time (see Figure 3.5). The bandwidth capacity for each ingress queue was
50Mbps and each output queue was 25Mbps for each 100Mbps interface. For Gbps interfaces, the 
bandwidth was set to 500Mbps for each ingress queue and 250Mbps for each egress queue. Each
ingress and egress buffer can be increased to its maximum interface bandwidth (100Mbps and/or
1Gbps). The NIDPS node was configured from a single-node NIDPS to a multi-node NIDPS. Each
node was configured to check for a certain type of packet (e.g. UDP, TCP and ICMP) and was able to
access discrete parts of a centralised, common rule base to order to carry out its task. The kernel
buffer parameters for each NIDPS node was configured as each output queue rate.








       
           
             
       
 
    
        




       
      
   
    
 
    
         
     
       
     
        
  
 
      
         
      
        
   
       
          
         
     
     
       
The parallelisation of data (traffic) that was distributed through ingress and egress queues into
critical and non-critical is viewed as multiple traffic parallelism (MTP) (Queues may be operating a 
different data (traffic)). This level parallelism of MT processing was linked to the component level
parallelisation of the Snort NIDPS. Critical pre-processing of traffic is performed on queues to create
particular groups of packets (threads) before the traffic is examined by a queue algorithm. Non-critical
pre-processing occurred after the packets had been matched to queues. The NIDPS node component
can be parallelised in either non-functional or a functional manner. Component level parallelism is
defined as function parallelism of the NIDPS processing node. In component parallelism, individual
components of NIDPS were isolated, and each output queue was given its own processing element. 
3.8 NIDPS Methodology
As covered in chapter two, NIDPS methodology is divided into the following four categories:
misuse/ signature-based; anomaly/ statistical-based; protocol analysis-based; and hybrid
methodologies. In this research the technique of misuse detection was used to find known intrusions
through signature detection.
In the experiments, a signature-based methodology is used to observe patterns inside the data
packet. This method enables detection of various types of malicious traffic. Furthermore, this
methodology can distinguish signatures in the headers of IP, UPD, TCP and ICMP. When a sought-
after signature is found, alerts are activated and sent to system logs, databases, management teams or
a trap. The NIDPS node was tested in a high-speed environment with large amounts of data. Three
modes were configured to test the NIDPS performance: sniffing (analysis), passive (detection) and
inline (prevention) method.
Analysis mode is employed to recognise and display the types of packets coming into the
network. Various levels of detail can be displayed on the console, for instance, layer data attached to
the packet in addition to TCP, UDP and ICMP header information. The detection system is capable of
detecting suspicious activity and generating alerts based on recognised signatures and rules. Signature
analysis is generally based on patterns inside the data packet. This technique aims to detect multiple
kinds of attacks, such as the presence of scripts in packets destined for web services. Logging and 
alerts depend on the nature of what is detected inside the packets. If any suspicious activity is found
inside a packet, the packet logs the malicious activity and/or generates an alert. Prevention mode 
intervenes to block intrusions that are detected before they reach the target. Prevention can be
implemented through the use of signatures. Signatures contain IP addresses and can be considered








    
    
     
   
 
       
        
        
   










        
    
        





    
         




        
   
signatures. The detection mode is used to detect suspicious activity in the logs and generate alerts 
based on these signatures and rules. Furthermore, these technologies have proved their effectiveness
in fighting flood type attacks (Burton, Baumrucker and Dubrawsky 2003, Wu, Schwab and Peckham
2008 and Weaver, Weaver and Farwood 2013). 
To be effective, a NIDPS must see the entire network and must be placed at an appropriate
point in the network. The NIDPS’s sniffing mechanism is effectively configured and implemented at
the network gateway, which delivers valuable information about traffic types and processing speed. In
the experiments, the NIDPS was placed at a switch where QoS configuration and parallel technologies
were implemented to enable a complete view and control of traffic to monitor, detect or prevent
malicious packets in the network.
3.9 Experimental Design
3.9.1 The Experimental Stages
The overall experimental design can be seen as three stages:
A. Stage 1
Snort NIDPS was configured and tested in three modes: analysis (sniffer mode), detection
(passive mode) and prevention (inline mode). Experiments were carried out to establish
the amount of packet loss in increasing network traffic speed and volume for each mode. 
TCP/IP traffic was sent in 1 milliseconds (ms) and malicious packets in 1 microsecond
(mSec) intervals. Both Windows and Linux operating systems were used.
B. Stage 2
The second set of experiments was conducted to establish the different packets dropped 
between (1) different operating systems, (2) different processor speeds and finally (3)
different buffer sizes (speeds). Here, a virtual system was used.
C. Stage 3
An improved configuration based on QoS and parallel technology was developed. A third










        
   
 
       
   
   
     
 





   
    
  
   
  
       





       
 
      
  
   
    
 
  
        
 
3.9.2 The Experimental Testbed
A network was set up to serve as a model for the purpose of analysis and data acquisition (see 
Figure 3.6). It consisted of six physical stations and two virtual stations distributed as follows:
• Two physical check stations connected to the Cisco 3560/24P catalyst series switch;
which supports QoS configuration;
• Four other physical stations connected to a Cisco switch 2950/16P; and 
• Two VMware virtual machines running on one of the physical stations
Several tools, including both software and hardware, were used to carry out the research
experiments, implementation and evaluation. 
The software includes the following:
• Snort NIDPS software, installed on Windows operating systems 7, 8 and Linux OSs;
• Pcap tools (WinPcap and libpcap ) to capture packets on OSs (Windows and Linux);
• NetScanPro tool to manage traffic in different time scales;
• Packet Generator tool to generate ICMP, UDP and TCP traffic at different speeds and 
values; and 
• Flooder Packet, Tcpreply and Traceroute Packet tools to generate flood traffic and
malicious UDP packets (threads) at high-load (65000KB) and high-speed (1ms and
1mSec). 
The hardware includes the following:
• Cisco 3560/24P catalyst series switch, which supports QoS configuration. The
system’s  capacity is shown as the following below :
➢ 24 Fast Ethernet interface with 2 Small Form-Factor Pluggable (SFP)-based
Gigabits Ethernet and 2 x2-based 10 Gigabit Ethernet ports Uplink;
➢ 1 rack unit (RU) fixed-configuration, multilayer switch;
➢ 32-Gbps forwarding bandwidth with maximum 128-Gbps wire rate, non-
blocking switching fabric capacity;
➢ 4 GB DDRAM with 64 MB Flash memory; and









      
 





        
       
 
    
 
 
     
 
   
 
            




• Cisco Switch 2950, to implement Ethernet (port) channel (Ethchannel). The system’s
performance are:
➢ 8 Fast Ethernet 10/100Mb with Uplinks 2x1G copper or 1G SFP;
➢ 16-Gbps forwarding bandwidth with Maximum 32-Gbps switch bandwidth;
➢ 2 GB with 32 MB Flash memory; and
➢ Buffer for each interface is 100Mb.
• Computer network consisting of a minimum of six PCs with two VMware Virtual
software machines (see Figure 3.6) with Intel Pentium® D CPU 2.2GHz, Intel®
corei5 2.27GHz and Intel® corei7 2.40GHz.
• Network cables to connect the network.
Figure 3. 6: Experiment network design.
3.9.3 Snort NIDPS tools and system requirements
Most of IDPS tools need configuration and additional software must be installed in order to
run successfully. The following factors were considered in determining the tools to use with the Snort
NIDPS:









    
   
 
        
       
      
        
  
 
         
       
            
            
 
 
        
    
        
       
     
 
 
         
      
      
        





        
          
      
• Information about installing and setup configuration.
• If applicable, free of charge tools.
• The available tutorial and work related support.
The monitoring environment is an important component, as it helps analyse and protect or
prevent networks from any malicious traffic or attacks. Monitoring environments are implemented by 
different OS interfaces, for example SSH, Apache, Linux and Windows. In this research, Terminal
Service and Command Prompt interfaces were used to access the Snort NIDPS to meet experiment
requirements.
Snort is one of most common monitoring NIDPS tools that safeguards a computer network
and systems from any predictable attacks. It can be operated in either normal or special environments.
Snort is not limited to a specific hardware, as it depends on the scalability of the network and systems. 
The technology of the host processor affects the application’s speed in gathering and processing data
packets. It also affects the network connection speed and data collection performance with regard to 
storage and logs.
For the research experiment design, the Switch Virtual Interface (SVI) and the host’s NIC
card needed to be the same speed as well as the network cable connections, otherwise, packets
(traffic) may be dropped (missed). Furthermore, one of the switch’s ports was used as a monitoring
port, while the others were used for general serving, such as sending different traffic and speeds
between hosts. An additional recommended requirement is to have a sufficient memory to grip a large 
amount of traffic (packets), which are exposed on the network detection engine. 
Relevant libraries were required to install Snort NIDPS successfully in Windows and Linux
OS. These included: WinPcap (Windows Packets capture) for Windows OSs; Pcap (libpcap-dev), 
PCRE (libpcre3-dev), and Libdnet (libdumbnet-dev) for Linux OSs; and DAQ (Data Acquisition)
(Snort 2016). Furthermore, Snort NIDPS needed to be configured to run in different modes, such as
sniffer, passive or inline mode. The following sections the associated tools used with Snort to create
the experimental testbed are described.
3.9.4 Packets capture (Pcap) tool
The Pcap tool captures the traffic passing through the NIC card network; otherwise, traffic
cannot be monitored. Pcap is the industry-standard tool for link-layer network access in OS








       
            
        
 
 
       
        
  
    
      
     
 
 
     
        
     
        





    
          
        
     
    
         




        
           
        
           
NIDPSs, to capture and resend network packets while avoiding the protocol stack. It has additional
valuable features, such as packet filtering at the kernel level, statistics of network engine and also
supports remote packet capture (Naveen, Natarajan and Srinivasan 2012 and Thanasekaran 2011 and
WinPcap 2013).
WinPcap is a packet capture and filtering engine that is used with many commercial network
tools, including open source, traffic and protocol analysers, network monitors, IDSs, IPSs, packets
sniffers, traffic generators and network testers (Thanasekaran 2011and WinPcap 2013). Some such
network tools, including e.g., NetScanPro, Nmap, Snort, Packets Flooder and ntop are identified and
used throughout network community. WinPcap is a version of TcpDump and WinDump libraries,
which are used to watch, diagnose and save network traffic according to various complex rules
(WinPcap 2013). 
Other tools required for Snort NIDPS in Unix OS include the following: PCRE (Perl-
compatible regular expressions) and libdnet libraries. The PCRE library is a set of functions that
execute systematic expression pattern matching. Libdnet simplifies transportable interfaces to
numerous low-level networking routines, including manipulations of: network interfaces lookup;
network IP address; kernel interfaces; IP header and Ethernet frame transmission (Mitra, Najjar and
Bhuyan 2007 and Gullett 2012).
3.9.5 NetScanPro tool
NetScanPro is a tool that sends a certain type of traffic to specific networks and hosts. It
offers a range of tools that gather internet information, monitor network and troubleshoot utilities for
network professionals. These tools include the Packet Generator, Packet Flooder, Traceroute, Packet
Capture, OS Fingerprinting, Ping-Enhanced, Ping Scanner and many more. Furthermore, it collects
and captures IPv4, IPv6 and Hostnames, domain names, email addresses and URL information
(NetScanToolsPro 2013). NetScanPro was designed to run on Win OS. The NetScanPro tool contains
packet tools used in the research including the following:
1) Packet Flooder tool
The Packet Flooder tool is a network traffic generator. It can be sent different flooding
packets (threads) to a target IPv4 or IPv6 address. It has control over the target interface and payload
in the packets. It can send packets at a rate approaching nearly 100% of the interfaces bandwidth








        
        
 
 
   
 
       
         
    
        
  
 
          
             
      
                  
            
       
       
   
            





       
        
     
             
     




computer’s networking system will allow. The tool can send more than 65000 bytes per second 
(65000Bps) with up to 256 malicious packets (threads) in interval packet trips per microsecond
(mSec). 
2) Traceroute tool
The Traceroute tool is used to show the route of network packets that are traveling between a
source computer and a target host. It can determine the upstream internet provider(s) that service a
network connected device. Traceroute shows the individual routers that pass packets between
computer and a target computer including the countries that are assigned to IP addresses along the
route. The mechanism of tracing a network is based upon the ICMP protocol. 
A very powerful additional mode is TCP Traceroute, which works by sending TCP packets to
a valid network interface on the target, usually port 80, which means that this mode of traceroute will
often penetrate firewalls from the outside. Although, when a traceroute attack starts sending malicious
packets, a packet will be sent to a target address or a host with a TTL value of 1 (unless the user
specifies otherwise); then if a timeout will occur from a responding system, another packet will be
sent with a TTL of 2 and so forth. The TTL value is decremented on the header for each router in a
network path. When the value of TTL is zero, the packet will discarded; then an ICMP message will
be returned to the source with a signal that the time has been exceeded. When an ICMP packet’s field
is set to time exceeded, the IP address of the router will be placed in the IP header source field, which
can be exploited by hackers. However, Traceroute is fully configurable, allowing users to control
many parameters of the tracing process. 
3) Packets Generation tool
The Packets Generation tool creates different types of traffic (packets), such as TCP, UDP,
ICMP, CDP, ARP and RAW at different speeds (milliseconds) with having much control over most
parameters of the IP and TCP/UDP headers. In the experiments, any packets that were sent used an 
actual source IP address in the IPv4 header. Packets were sent using the WinPcap driver. The tool can
only send packets from WinPcap compatible interfaces, which are typically wired Ethernet interfaces,











     
             
      
        
      
 
 
     
 
       
     
        
      
         
     
         
           
        
 
 
   
 
     
     





      
     




Tcpreplay is a generator TCP traffic tool. It is employed in Linux OSs. It offers users an 
ability to test and capture traffic in network devices and systems. It can classify packets as clients or
servers, rewrite the headers of Layers 2, 3 and 4 and replay the packets back onto the network and
through other machines, such as switches, routers, and NIDPS, etc. Tcpreplay supports most of NIC
modes (such as single and dual) for testing analysis, detection and prevention mechanisms. This tool
can send traffic at speeds of more than 10Gbps.
3.9.7 Layer 2 and 3 Cisco Catalyst switches
Cisco Catalyst 3560 category belongs to layer 2 and 3 switches (Cisco 2016a:88). It provides
support for IP-based functions, for example, rate limiting, access control lists (ACLs), QoS, IPv6 and
advanced routing protocols. Policy and class enterprise features are supported by IP service software.
Despite a packet’s size and content, this switch provides the best effort services for each packet of
network traffic. The packets are sent with no surety of delay bounds, reliability or throughput (Cisco
2016a:826). Using QoS configuration in this kind of switch can provide more control over traffic
header and port parameters including setting queues, ACLs, VLANs, buffer, threshold, queue and
traffic priority and bandwidth. Two other Cisco catalyst 2950 series switches were used to implement
ether VLANs and channel techniques in order to investigate how to improve the throughput of data
using parallel Snort NIDPS.  
3.9.8 Experiment Performance Metrics
Performance metrics were used in the experiments to measure the capability of NIDPS to
perform a certain task and to fit within the performance constraints. These metrics measure and 
evaluate the parameters that impact NIDPS performance. The following aspects were measured in the
experiments.
1. Packet generation
The performance of TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols was measured when running over the
IPv4 header. The WinPcap, Packets Generator tool and Flooder packets tools were used to vary the
type of traffic and malicious packets (threads) in terms of IP header protocol (TCP, UDP and ICMP),










           
  
 
   
 
         
 
 






























   
  
  
   
   










   
 
            
       
 
2. Timing statistics
The Snort processor time includes total runtime of the packets processor as well as packet
processing rates (Pkts).
3. Packets I/O totals and percentages
Various totals and percentages were used to measure the number of packets processed or not
in the various experiments. The specific metrics used are shown in Table 3.1.




















Packets received Number of packets received by machines
Input / output 
total section
Packets analysed Percentage of packets analysed from total packets received
Packets dropped Percentage of packets dropped from total packets received
Packets filtered Packets filtered out and not handed to Snort for analysis
Packets
outstanding
Number of the packets buffered waiting processing /or not 
processed
Packets injected Injected packets are the result of active response, which can be


















Percentage of packets Eth received of total packets analysed
Breakdown by 
protocol section
IP4 packets Percentage of IP4 packets received of total Eth packets analysed
ICMP packets Number of ICMP packets analysed of total Eth packets received
UDP packets Number of UDP packets analysed of total Eth packets received
TCP packets Number of TCP packets analysed of total Eth packets received
Alerts Number of packet alerts of total packets analysed Action status




















All traffic for all protocols decoded by Snort are summarised in the Snort breakdown section
(see Table 3.1), which includes categories, such as Eth (Ethernet interfaces), VLAN, IP4, Frag

















    
      
   
 
 
    






   
   
    
    
   





    




The experiments carried out are listed in Table 3.2, along with their purpose.





Stage 1 - Experiments to analyse the problem
Experiment 1 to 4 Test NIDPS analysis performance at high-speed and heavy traffic 4.3
Experiment 5 to 8 Test NIDPS detection performance at high-speed traffic 4.4
Experiment 9 -11 Test NIDPS prevention performance at high-speed traffic 4.5
Stage 2 - Experiments to investigate reason of the problem and support stage 1.
Experiment 12 To test NIDPS performance under different Oss, different Buffer size and
different processor (speed).
4.6
Stage 3 - Experiments to evaluate the solution
Experiment 13 Test  the evaluation solution for NIDPS analysis performance 6.2.2
Experiment 14-18 Test the evaluation solution for NIDPS detection performance 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
Experiment 19-20 Test the evaluation solution  for NIDPS prevention performance 6.2.5
Experiment 21 Show how parallel technology can benefit NIDPS through QoS 6.3.1




This chapter provided information and details about the methodology and experimental









     
 
 
    
 
            
        
    
   
         
     










     
     
      
         
 
       
   
   







   
     
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH PROBLEM ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, analysis of the research problem is provided. The analysis was carried out
through experimentation which was termed stage 1 experimentation in this research. The results are
presented of the stage 1 and stage 2 experiments. The list of experiments is given in section 4.2. The
stage 1 experiments were carried out to establish the level of packet loss using three NIDPS modes:
analysis; detection; and prevention. The results for analysis mode are presented in section 4.3, for
detection mode in section 4.4 and prevention mode in section 4.5. Stage 2 experiments tested NIDPS
performance under different OSs, buffer size and processor speeds and the results are presented in
section 4.6. Overall the research found that the NIDPS performance decreases in a high-speed and
high-volume traffic in all three modes and tasks.
4.2 Summary of Experiments carried out
The experiments carried out are shown in Table 4.1, along with their purpose.






1 to show Snort-NIDPS analysis performance under heavy traffic 4.3.1
2 to show Snort-NIDPS analysis performance under high-speed traffic 4.3.2
3 to show Snort-NIDPS analysis performance under large data traffic 4.3.3
4 to show Snort-NIDPS analysis performance under heavy traffic and high-speed 4.3.4
Detection Mode Experiments
5 to show Snort-NIDPS performance detection under high-speed ICMP traffic 4.4.1 
6 to show Snort-NIDPS performance detection  under high-speed UDP traffic 4.4.2
7 to show Snort-NIDPS performance detection  under high-speed TCP traffic 4.4.3




9 to show Snort-NIDPS performance prevention under high-speed IP (ICMP and
UDP) traffic
4.5.1 
10 to show Snort-NIDPS performance prevention under high-speed TCP traffic 4.5.2
















       
          
          
        
   
 
     
 
        
      
       
      
        

































           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
Different tasks Experiments
12 To show Snort-NIDPS performance under different OSs, buffer size and processor 
speeds.
4.6
4.3 NIDPS’s Performance analysis-mode (sniffer mode)
Here, Snort NIDPS has been configured to analysis or Sniffer mode. The following metrics
were recorded: the number of packets received of the total packets sent; the number of packets
analysed of the total packets received; the number of packets dropped of the total packets received; 
the number of packets rejected of the total packets received; and the number of packets outstanding of
the total packets received. Specific results are given in the following sections.
4.3.1 Experiments 1s: Testing Snort NIDPS under heavy traffic
The transmission rate of packets was kept to the same speed (1ms intervals) to obtain a fair
analysis of different numbers of packets. For this experiment, three (3) consecutive tests were run to
test TCP, UDP and ICMP headers. For each test, the number of the packets sent was increased. The
packets sent were 1024 bytes (each packet carried 1KB). NetScanPro and WinPcap tools were used to
manage traffic through the network and the Packet Generator tool was used to send different numbers
of packets and types of traffic (TCP, UDP or ICMP) at the same speed (1ms intervals) through the
network and hosts.
4.3.1.1 Experiment 1.1: Snort reactions to TCP header under heavy traffic.



























1 100 105 105 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 200 202 202 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3 400 402 402 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4 800 805 538 0 0 266 267 66.832% 24.837% 33.168%
5 1600 1,606 970 0 0 636 636 60.399% 28.368% 39.601%
6 3200 3,208 964 0 0 2,241 2241 30.050% 41.127% 69.950%
7 6400 6,417 1,418 0 0 4,998 4999 22.098% 43.784% 77.902%
8 100000 100067 13169 0 0 86898 86898 13.160% 46.478% 86.840%













    
 
 
         
 
   
 



























           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           






























Figure 4. 1: Snort reaction to TCP header under heavy traffic.
4.3.1.2 Experiment 1.2: Snort reactions to UDP header under heavy traffic.



























1 100 105 105 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0% 0%
2 200 210 161 0 0 49 49 76.667% 18.919% 23.333%
3 400 406 151 0 0 255 255 37.192% 38.578% 62.808%
4 800 813 273 0 0 539 540 33.579% 39.867% 66.421%
5 1600 1607 266 0 0 1341 1341 16.553% 45.488% 83.447%
6 3200 3219 390 0 0 2829 2829 12.116% 46.776% 87.884%
7 6400 6420 603 0 0 5817 5817 9.393% 47.536% 90.607%
8 100000 100174 7246 0 0 92928 92928 7.233% 48.124% 92.767%
9 200000 200357 14466 0 0 185885 185891 7.220% 48.127% 92.780%
120.00% Packets received 
100.00% 




20.00% Packets filtered 
0.00% 
100 200 400 800 1600 3,200 6,400 100000 200000 Packets outstanding 





















































           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
 
         
 
      
             
            
      
       
         
          
          
          
     
       
 
     
4.3.1.3 Experiment 1.3: Snort reactions to ICMP header under heavy traffic.



























1 100 105 105 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 200 206 206 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3 400 403 296 0 0 107 107 73.449% 26.551% 20.980%
4 800 804 370 0 0 434 434 46.020% 53.980% 35.057%
5 1600 1605 527 0 0 1,078 1078 32.835% 67.165% 40.179%
6 3200 3,212 752 0 0 2,458 2460 23.412% 76.588% 43.351%
7 6400 6,417 993 0 0 5,424 5424 15.475% 84.525% 45.807%
8 12800 12812 1905 0 0 10907 10907 14.869% 85.131% 45.984%
9 100000 100061 12043 0 0 88018 88018 12.036% 87.964% 46.798%





























Figure 4. 3: Snort reaction to ICMP header under heavy traffic.
As demonstrated by the results shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, all the packets that were
sent reached the wire. Figures show that when 100 and 200 packets were sent at speed 1ms, Snort
analysed 100% of the total packets that it received. As the number of packets was increased, Snort
started dropping packets or leaving packets outstanding (see Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Figures also
show that as the number of packets increases, more packets are dropped and left outstanding .The
experiments show that dropped packets start to occur from 400 to 200000 at speed 1ms, Snort’s
efficiency dropped more than 46 percent for (TCP) and (ICMP) headers (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4), and
more than 43 percent for (UDP) headers (see Table 4.3). More than 87 percent of packets were
outstanding for (TCP) headers (see Table 4.2), more than 77 percent for (UDP) headers (see Table
4.3) and more than 88 percent for ICMP headers (see Table 4.4), and less than 13, 23 and 12 percent








     
  
 
   
 
         
































         
  
 
         
 
  
         
  
 
         
  
 
         
  
 
         
 
  
         
4.3 and 4.4,). The experiments show that Snort performance analysis has been affected when the
value of the traffic is increased.
4.3.2 Experiments 2s: Testing Snort NIDPS under high-speed traffic
The number of the packets was kept to the same value, 200,000, for a fair analysis between
different speeds. Here, three (3) consecutive tests were run for (TCP, UDP and ICMP) headers, for
each test, the speed at which the packets were sent was increased.
4.3.2.1 Experiment 2.1: Snort reactions to ICMP header under high-speed traffic.


























203622 203622 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
16ms
interval
201757 201757 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
8ms
interval
201266 188205 0 0 13060 13061 93.511% 6.489% 6.094%
4ms
interval
200420 94154 0 0 106266 106266 46.978% 53.022% 34.650%
2ms
interval
200221 47130 0 0 153090 153091 23.539% 76.461% 43.330%
1ms
interval
200131 23793 0 0 176338 176338 11.889% 88.111% 46.840%
0.5ms
interval








































         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 






























Figure 4. 4: Snort reaction to ICMP header under high-speed traffic.
4.3.2.2 Experiment 2.2: Snort reactions to UDP header under high-speed traffic.


























201099 200601 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
16ms
Interval
201067 201067 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
8ms
interval
200997 200997 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4ms
interval
200922 108799 0 0 92123 92123 54.149% 45.851% 31.436%
3ms
interval
200715 81950 0 0 118765 118765 40.829% 59.171% 37.174%
2ms
interval
200426 54730 0 0 145694 145697 27.307% 72.693% 42.09%
1ms
interval
200225 27831 0 0 172394 172394 13.600% 86.400% 46.26%
0.5ms
interval








































         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
   







20.00% Packets filtered 
0.00% 
Packets outstanding 32ms 16ms 8ms 4ms 3ms 2ms 1ms 0.5ms 















Figure 4. 5: Snort reaction to UDP header under high-speed traffic.
4.3.2.3 Experiment 2.3: Snort reactions to TCP header under high-speed traffic.



























200320 200420 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0% 0%
16ms
interval
200350 200741 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0% 0%
8ms
interval
200004 200000 0 0 0 4 99.998% 0.002% 0%
4ms
interval
200469 104070 0 0 96397 96399 51.913% 48.087% 32.472%
3ms
interval
200382 78141 0 0 122238 122241 38.996% 61.004% 37.889%
2ms
Interval
200327 52458 0 0 147869 147869 26.186% 73.814% 42.467%
1ms
interval
200147 26734 0 0 173413 173413 13.357% 86.643% 46.422%
0.5ms
interval









         
 
           
          
            
       
     
       
         
      
 
 
     
 
    
             
        




























          
          
 






























Figure 4. 6: Snort reaction to TCP header under high-speed traffic.
The results shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 reveal that Snort initially was analysed all
packets that reached the wire. As the speed increased, Snort started dropping the packets and some 
were left outstanding. Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show that the number of packets dropped and the
number of packets outstanding increase as the speeds increase. The experiments show that Snort
dropped more than 49, 49 and 48 percent, and left outstanding more than 98, 98 and 93 percent. So
Snort analysed less than 2, 2 and 7 percent of the total packets analysed for ICMP, UDP and TCP
respectively as the transmission interval decreased from 4ms to 0.5ms (see Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7).
The experiments show that Snort’s analysis performance reduced while speed of transmission
increased.
4.3.3 Experiments 3s: Test Snort NIDPS under large packets
For this experiment the number of the packets was kept to the same value, 5000, and the same 
speed (rate of transmission 2ms per packet) for fair analysis between different sizes and lengths of
packets. Here, three (3) consecutive tests were run; for each test, the size of each packet sent “Len”
was increased, starting from 1 byte, 400bytes, 800bytes to 1Kbyte.
4.3.3.1 Experiment 3.1: Snort reactions to ICMP header under large packets.
























0 bytes 10011 10011 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%








          
 
 
         
 
 






























          
          
          
 
         
 
 
         
 
   
 
  
800 bytes 5023 636 4387 0 0 4387 12.661% 87.339% 46.615%
1024 bytes
(1kB)











0 bytes 400 bytes 800 bytes 1024 bytes 
Packets outstanding 
(1kB) 
















Figure 4. 7: Snort reaction to ICMP header under large packets.
4.3.3.2 Experiment 3.2: Snort reactions to UDP header under large packets.

























0 bytes 5023 5022 0 0 0 1 99.980% 0.020% 0%
400 bytes 5019 2649 2366 0 0 2370 52.779% 47.221% 32.038%
800 bytes 5019 1393 3625 0 0 3626 27.755% 72.245% 41.937%
1024(1KB) 
bytes

































































          
          
          
 
         
 
 
         
 
      
          
        
     
     
           
         
      
  
 
     
 




4.3.3.3 Experiment 3.3: Snort reactions to TCP header under large packets.
























0 bytes 5019 5019 0 0 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
400 bytes 5012 2070 2942 0 0 2942 41.310% 58.690% 36.984%
800 bytes 5013 1359 3654 0 1 3654 27.115% 72.885% 42.148%
1024(1kb) 
bytes
5006 920 4086 0 0 4086 18.379% 81.621% 44.940%
120.00% Packets received 
100.00% 
80.00% Packets analysed 
60.00% 
40.00% Packets dropped 
20.00% 
0.00% Packets filtered 
0 bytes 400 bytes 800 bytes 1024 bytes 
(1kB) 
Packets outstanding 
















Figure 4. 9: Snort reaction to TCP header under large packets.
As shown in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, Snort initially analysed every single packet that reached
the wire. As the size of packets was increased, Snort started dropping and leaving the packets
outstanding. Also the figures show that while the size of packets (Len) was increased, the number of
packets outstanding and packets dropped increased as well. The experiments showed that Snort
dropped more than 47 percent of ICMP packets, and more than 44 percent of UDP and TCP packets
of the total packets received as the size of packet changed from 400B to 1KB. Left outstanding was
more than 89 percent of ICMP, 80 percent of UDP and 81 percent of TCP packets of the total packets
received (see Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10). The experiments show that Snort analysis performance was
affected while increasing the size (Len) of packets.
4.3.4 Experiment 4: Testing Snort NIDPS under heavy traffic and high-speed
In this experiment, IP traffic has been sent with different values, speed and size. For each test








        
      
   
 
 
      
 
 
    
         
          
             
      
            
       





    
   
         
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.10, the experiment demonstrated that, as the volume and speed of
traffic increased, the number of packets dropped and outstanding increased drastically as well. Snort’s





































Packets sent 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 
Packets received 5014 10020 15031 20042 25049 30064 35066 40081 45087 50130 
Packets analysed 5014 10018 10179 10424 10789 10820 10736 10711 10681 7637 
Packets dropped 0 0 4852 9618 14260 19244 24330 29370 34406 42493 
Packets outstanding 0 2 4852 9612 14262 19245 24330 29372 34408 42496 
Figure 4. 10: Snort reactions under heavy traffic and high-speed.
4.4 NIDPS’s Performance detection-mode (passive-mode) 
Here, Snort NIDPS has been configured to NIDPS detection mode (NID-mode). This mode is 
used to detect malicious traffic. In this part of the experiments, the second and third sections of the
Snort metrics has been used, such as Snort’s breakdown by protocol (i.e., the number of packets
analysed of the total packets received, the number of Ethernet (Eth) packets received of the total
packets analysed, the number of IP packets received of the total Eth packets received, and the number
of TCP, UDP and ICMP packets analysed) and Snort’s action statistics (i.e., the number of packet
alerts of the total TCP/IP packets analysed and the total packets logged of the total TCP/IP packets
analysed). The experiments were conducted to test Snort NID-mode performance reaction to detect
(TCP/IP) headers and malicious packets (threads) under high-speed traffic. 
4.4.1 Experiment 5: Snort NIDPS reactions to alerts and logs with ICMP 
header
In this experiment, more than 1 million IP/ICMP packets have been sent at different speeds
(10ms, 5ms and 1ms interval). The size of each packet was carried out 1KB. The rule below was used









   
 



































           
         
  




   
 
       
         
   
    





     
      
 
 
Alert icmp any any ->any any (msg:”Detect ICMP Packets”; sid: 100001 ;).









































10ms 100% 4.300% 100% 1874 0 44459 1874 1874 100% 100%

































ICMP Packets Analysed 
ICMP Packets Alerts 
ICMP Packets logged 
10ms 5ms 1ms 
Packets speed 
Figure 4. 11: ICMP packets detection.
As the results show in Figure 4.11, Snort analysed every packet that reached the wire. When
ICMP traffic was sent at 10ms, Snort alerted and logged nearly 100% of the total ICMP packets 
analysed (see Table 4.10). As the speed increased from 10ms to 1ms, Snort started missing alerts and 
logged packets. Also, Figure 4.11 shows that the number of missed alerts increased when the speed
increased. The experiment shows that Snort detected 55.47 % of the total ICMP packets that it
analysed (see Table 4.11).
4.4.2 Experiment 6: Snort NIDPS reactions to alerts and logs with UDP 
header
In this experiment, more than 1 million IP/UDP packets were sent at different speeds (10ms, 








           
 
 
   
 


































           
           
           
           
 
 
   
 
           
         
          
  





detect any UDP packets from any sources to any destination address and to any source and destination
ports:
Alert udp any any ->any any (msg:”Detect UDP Packets”; sid: 100002 ;).











































10ms 100% 11.293% 100% 0 0 7854 7798 7798 99.28% 99.28%
5ms 100% 3.128% 100% 0 0 2958 2896 2896 97.90% 97.90%
3ms 100% 1.274% 100% 0 0 1358 946 946 69.66% 69.66%


























UDP Packets Analysed 
UDP Packets Alerts 
UDP Packets logged 
10ms 5ms 3ms 1ms 
Packets speed 
Figure 4. 12: UDP packets detection.
As shown in Figure 4.12, when UDP traffic was sent at a speed of 10ms, Snort alerted and
logged nearly 100% of the total UDP packets that it analysed (see Table 4.11). When the traffic’s
speed increased to 5ms, Snort detected 97.90% of the total UDP packets analysed (see Table 4.12).
Figure 4.12 shows that, as the speed increased, missed alerts and logs also increased. This experiment










     



































           
           
           
 
 
   
 
        
         
          
       
        





4.4.3 Experiment 7: Snort NIDPS reactions to alerts and logs with TCP 
header
Here, more than 1 million TCP/IP packets were sent at different speeds (10ms, 5ms and 1ms).
Each packet was 1KB in size. The following rule was made to allow Snort to detect any TCP packets
from any sources to any destinations, from and to any ports:
Alert tcp any any ->any any (msg:”Detect tcp Packets”; sid: 100003)


































10ms 100% 51.567% 100% 128 51070 25 5170 5170 100% 100%
5ms 100% 3.122% 100% 110 33113 31 33113 33113 100% 100%





60% TCP Packets Analysed 
50% 
40% TCP Packets Alerts 





Figure 4. 13: TCP packets detection.
As shown in Figure 4.13, Snort analysed all packets that reached the system. The experiment
shows that Snort detected all TCP packets that it analysed, even if the speed increased (see Table
4.13). This effectiveness occurred because TCP does not send the next packet until it receives an
acknowledgement that the previous package has been received. For example, when a device sends a 
TCP packet at a specific time, it waits for an acknowledgement for a certain period, and the 
transmission will be paused until the acknowledgement is received. These acknowledgements make























   
 
 
   
            
        
        
  
 
     
 
 
      
        
        
    
            
  
     
       
   
 



























         
         
         
         
         
         
 
4.4.4 Experiment 8: Snort NIDPS reactions to detecting malicious packet
(Threads) in high-speed traffic
In this experiment, WinPcap and Flooder packet tools were used to send flood traffic with 
malicious UDP packets (255 threads per 1mSec) to specific hosts or networks at different speeds (see
Table 4.14). The following rule allowed Snort to alert and log any UDP threads or malicious packets
that contain the variables ‘abcdef’ and time to live (TTL) 128 that comes from any source and port
address and goes to any destination address and ports:
Alert udp any any ->any any (msg: “Detect Malicious UDP Packets”; ttl: 128; content:|’ 61 62
63 64 65 66 ’|; Sid: 100004 ;)
This experiment is different from the previous ones. The previous experiments tried to detect
headers, such as TCP, UDP and ICMP. The system received the TCP, UDP and ICMP packets at
different speeds, but in this experiment, flood traffic was sent in different bandwidths (speeds) with
255 malicious UDP packets (threads) in interval packets with a delay of 1 microsecond (1 mSec). 
Snort was set up to detect only the malicious UDP threads by using two conditions of additional rules
(TTL and content). These two key rules will detect any UDP malicious packet that is matched in order
to determine that the TTL value is equal to 128 and to determine if a data pattern inside the malicious
packet has variables (‘abcdef’). The hexadecimal number (‘61 62 63 64 65 66’), which the rule
contained, is equal to the ASCII characters (‘a b c d e f’).   
Table 4. 14: Snort reaction to udp malicious packets.
flood traffic
(Byte PerSeconds)


























16 Bps 100% 0 0 9868 9820 9820 99.51% 99.51%
32 Bps 100% 0 0 8702 8654 8654 99.44% 99.44%
200 Bps 100% 0 0 7166 7083 7083 98.84% 98.84%
1200 Bps 100% 0 0 6024 5854 5854 97.17% 97.17%
4800 Bps 100% 0 0 2876 1421 1421 49.40% 49.40%









   
 
      
      
            
     
      
           
   
    
 
 
      
        
            
          
 
 
   
 
 
       
   


































Figure 4. 14: Malicious packets detection.
As shown in Figure 4.14, Snort initially analysed every packet that reached the wire. When 
malicious UDP packets were sent at a speed of 1 mSec and flood traffic at 16 bytes per second (Bps), 
Snort alerted and logged more than 99% of the total UDP packets that it analysed. As the flood traffic
(speed) was increased to 200, 1200, 4800 and 60000 bytes per second (Bps), Snort alerted and logged 
packets to a decreasing degree, respectively, at 98.84, 97.17, 49.40 and 35.75% of the total malicious
packets analysed (see Table 4.14). Figure 4.14 shows that the number of missed malicious packet
alerts increased when the speed increased. The experiment shows that, when the speed was 60000
Bps, Snort only detected nearly 35% of the malicious packets analysed (see Table 4.14).
4.5 NIDPS’s performance prevention mode (inline-mode)
Snort was configured to inline mode (NIP-mode) on Linux OS, because Win OS does not
support inline mode. In this experiment, the fourth (4th) processor section action has been used on
Snort, and the metrics considered are: the number of packets dropped of the total packets analysed; 
the number of packets blocked of the total packets analysed; and the number of packets rejected of the
total packets analysed.
4.5.1 Experiment 9: Snort NIDPs reaction to drop (prevent) IP (ICMP/UDP)
header 
In this experiment, IP traffic has been sent at different speeds (1200KBps, 10000KBps,
11000KBps and 12000KBps). NetScanPro, Packet Flooder and WinPcap tools were used to send IP 
traffic at different speeds through the network to hosts. The following rule below tells Snort to prevent








    
 







































         
         
         
         
 
 
        
 
      





       
         
           
 
 
   
 
Drop ip any any ->any any (msg:”Prevent IP traffic”; sid: 100005).





































1200-KBps 232867 100.00% 99.988% 21 0 232817 232838 100.00%
10000-kBps 266764 100.00% 99.991% 13 0 239249 239262 100.00%
11000-kBps 306188 100.00% 99.986% 41 0 231077 231118 100.00%
12000-kBps 351467 100.00% 99.991% 47 0 205152 205199 100.00%

























Eth packets analysed 
IP packets analysed 
IP packets prevented 
Figure 4. 15: Snort reaction to prevent IP header in high-speed traffic.
As the results in Figure 4.15 show, Snort analysed all packets that reached the system. The
experiment shows that Snort NIDPS prevents all unwanted traffic event if it came in high-speed (over
12000KBps).
4.5.2 Experiment 10: Snort NIDPs reaction to block (prevent) TCP header 
TCP/IP packets have been sent at different speeds ((1200KBps, 10000KBps, 11000KBps and
12000KBps) by using NetScanPro, WinPcap and Tcpreply tools. The following rule was used to
prevent any TCP packets from any sources to any destinations address from and to any source and
destinations ports.















   

















        
        
        
        
 
 
        
 
       





   
       
          
 
 
           
   
 
        
        
 







Total Eth  Packets

















1200-KBps 222821 100.00% 19 222786 16 222786 100.00%
10000-kBps 236652 100.00% 23 236615 14 236615 100.00%
11000-kBps 296258 100.00% 45 15054 28 15054 100.00%
12000-kBps 301456 100.00% 80 10152 30 10152 100.00%
























Eth packets analysed 
TCP packets analysed 
TCP packets prevented 
12000-kBps 
Figure 4. 16: Snort reaction to prevent TCP header in high-speed traffic.
Figure 4.16 and Table 4.16 show that Snort prevented all TCP packets even if the traffic came
at high-speed (over 12000KBps).
4.5.3 Experiment 11: Snort NIDPS’s prevention mode reaction to reject
(prevent) malicious packets
Flood packets and WinPcap were used to send malicious traffic at varying transmission
speeds to specific network and hosts. The following rule sets Snort to prevent any UDP packets which
contain content ‘.H`..OK.’ and which have TTL of 128 and that travel from any source and ports to
any destination and ports. 
reject udp any any ->any any (msg: “Prevent Malicious UDP Packets”; ttl: 128; content:|’ C2 
48 60 AE 97 4F 4B C3 ’|; Sid: 100007 ;)
In this experiment, flood traffic was sent at different bandwidths (speeds) (see Table 4.17)
with 255 malicious UDP packets (threads) in interval packets with a delay of 1 microsecond (1 mSec). 








        




     
 
 
































         
         
         
         
 
 
       
 
     
      
        
      
 
 
      




options will prevent any UDP malicious packet that is matched with the TTL value equal to 128 and a
data pattern inside the malicious packet with content “.H`..OK.”. The hexadecimal number (‘C2, 48,
60, AE, 97, 4F, 4B, C3’), which the rule contained, is equal to the ASCII characters (‘., H, `, ., ., O, K,
. ‘). 




































100-Bps 267032 100.00% 89.066% 28 0 237777 237777 100.00%
1000-Bps 266863 100.00% 99.991% 7 0 235338 235338 100.00%
10000-Bps 329926 100.00% 99.988% 522 0 15092 7585 50.258%


























Malicious UDP Packets Analysed 
Malicious UDP Packets prevented 
Figure 4. 17: Snort reaction to prevent malicious packets in high-speed traffic.
As shown in Figure 4.17, Snort analysed every packet that reached the wire. When malicious
UDP packets were sent at a speed of 1 mSec and flood traffic at 100 bytes per second (Bps), Snort
prevented 100% of the total UDP packets that it analysed. As the flood traffic (speed) was increased
to 10000 bytes per second (Bps), Snort prevented less than 51% of the total malicious packets
analysed (see Table 4.17).
Figure 4.17 shows that the number of missed malicious packets increased when the speed 
increased. The experiment shows that, when the speed was 60000 Bps, Snort only prevented just










        
       
     
          
  
 
       
 
  









      
 
  
4.6 Experiment 12: Snort NIDPS performance under different OSs, 
buffer size and processor speed.
This experiment was designed to show how the performance of NIDPS is different under
different operating systems (OSs), processor speed and different buffer sizes (speeds). Three tests
were developed. The experiments were carried out in a virtual environment (see section 3.9.2) and are
listed in Table 4.18. In each experiment more than 50,000 packets were sent at an interval delay of
1ms. The size of each packet was 1KB.




1 Evaluate NIDPS performance under different OSs Little difference between OSs
2 Evaluate NIDPS performance under different 
processor speeds.
Performance improvement with increased
processor speed
3 Evaluate NIDPS performance under different NIC 
buffer speeds.
Performance improvement with increased NIC 
buffer speed
WinXP Win7 Win8 ubuntu 
Packets recived 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 10.10% 9.82% 10.10% 9.73% 
Packets dropped 47.34% 47.36% 47.34% 47.44% 



















50,000KB sent in interval 1ms to Different OSs 









      
 
 
       
 
       
          
     
        
      
       
     




     
Figure 4. 19: NIDPS performance for different processors speeds.
Corei7 Corei5 Intel P4 
Packets received 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 10.28% 7.31% 4.60% 
Packets dropped 47.29% 48.10% 48.88% 




























Packets received 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 9.70% 10.84% 11.97% 14.25% 
Packets dropped 47.45% 46.85% 46.26% 45.06% 



















50,000KB packets sent in interval 1ms to Different  Buffer Speed
Figure 4. 20: NIDPS performance for different NIC buffer speeds.
As shown in Figures 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20, when the system was tested under different OSs, 
such as Win 8, 7, XP and UNIX with the same processor and buffer speed, there were no differences
in the number of packets dropped (see Figure 4.18). On the contrary, when we tested Snort with
different processor speeds (Intel Pentium® D CPU 2.2GHz, Intel® corei5 2.27GHz and Intel® corei7
2.40GHz) and also different buffer speeds (size), the differences between them were considerable (see
Figures 4.19 and 4.20). As shown in Figure 4.19, Corei7 dropped fewer packets than the others.
Figure 4.20 shows that while buffer speed increases, fewer packets are dropped and outstanding, and
more packets will be analysed. These experiments show that the important components in NIDPS










    
        
    
    
        
       
       




       
        
         
    
 
  
4.7 Summary of experiments
Experiments 1 to 4 have showed that Snort drops and outstanding packets in high-speed 
network traffic. They show that Snort NIDP’s performance analysis was affected when it was
deployed in high-speed and high-load traffic. Experiment 5 to 8 showed how Snort-NIDPS’s 
performance detection decreased while traffic speed limit on the network is increased. They show that
Snort NIDPS missed malicious packet alerts when it is implemented in a speedy network.
Experiments 9, 10 and 11 showed Snort cannot prevent all unwanted traffic (malicious packets) when
the traffic comes at high-speed. The experiments show that Snort NIDPS performance prevention will
be at a lower performance when traffic speed is increased. Finally, experiment 12 shows that the
limitation of buffer size and processor speed affect Snort NIDPS performance. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported on experiments carried out to test NIDPS performance under high-
speed and high-volume traffic. Snort NIDPS performance has been tested under different
circumstances (speed and volume). The results show that Snort NIDPS has been affected and is 








    
 
 
     
       
       
    
          
        




     
      
       
           
  
    
        
     
      
      
  
  
      
 
 




     
        
CHAPTER 5: PROPOSED SOLUTION
5.1 Introduction
The results of the experiments described in chapter 4 shows that the NIDPS’s performance
decreases when faced with heavy and high-speed attacks. This chapter outlines a novel solution that
uses QoS configuration and parallel technologies in a layer 3 switch in order to increase NIDPS
performance in the analysis, detection, and prevention of malicious attacks. The chapter describes the
technical problems that affect NIDPS performance and provides a novel solution to the problems of
dropped and outstanding packets, of lost alerts and logged packets, and of inability to prevent
(blocked) unwanted packets. These can be a prevalent issue for NIDPS performance in heavy and
high-speed traffic environments. 
5.2 Proposed Solution
Critical analyses were done for the previous experiments presented in chapter 4 (see Figures 
4.1 to 4.10, respectively). The figures show that performance of Snort’s throughput is affected when
Snort NIDPS is exposed to a high-volume and speed of traffic; more packets will be dropped and left
outstanding as the size of packets and the speed of traffic increases. Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13
show that Snort’s performance detection decreased when the traffic speed increased. There were more
missed alerts and missed logs for packets as the speed of traffic increased. Furthermore, when the
malicious traffic was sent at high-speed, Snort lost more malicious packet alerts and logs (see Figure
4.14). Figure 4.17 shows that Snort NIDPS cannot prevent unwanted and malicious packets in a high-
speed traffic environment. Furthermore, when the Snort performance was tested under different OSs, 
buffer size and processor speed (see Figures 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20), the experimental results show that
Snort performance was positively increased while the processor and buffer speeds were increased.
According to the results shown in the previous chapter, the following activities affect Snort-
NIDPS performance:
• high-speed traffic
• large sized packets 
• high-volume of traffic
However, Snort is used as a real-time traffic processor on the network. It is a multimode 








        
           
         
       
        
             
            
   
 
       
     
           
       
     
      
 
 
         
            
       
             
         
  
 
        
  
        
       
              
        
     
           
            
          
          
           
    
searching/matching in real-time as well as for forensic post-processing. Snort has a limited time in 
which to analyse traffic and then alert, log, and prevent any unwanted and malicious packets; it will
drop or leave outstanding packets without analysis if the speed of a network’s traffic is higher than
Snort’s processing limit. Snort will also miss detection and prevention of unwanted traffic in this
circumstance. The performance of an NIDPS could be described as ineffective if the NIDPS is unable
to detect or stop unwanted packets that could reach the system. Based on literature review in chapter 2 
and experiment 12 in chapter 4, there are two main causes of ineffective NIDPS: buffer size and 
processing speed. 
When traffic moves through the network interface card (NIC) to the NIDPS node, the packets
are stored on the buffer until the other relevant packets have completed transmission to processing
nodes. In the event of high-speed and heavy traffic in multiple directions, the buffer will fill up. Then
packets may be dropped or left outstanding (Kishore, Hendel, and Kalkunte 2015, Naouri and
Perlman 2015 and Zhu et al. 2015). In this case, there is no security concern about the packets
dropped; the packets are dropped outside the system. The outstanding packets that are waiting or have
not been processed by the NIDPS node may affect the system, however.
Packets can also be lost in a host-based IDPS. Most software tools use a computer program
such as the kernel, which manages input/output (I/O) requests from software and decodes the requests
into instructions to direct the CPU’s data processing. When traffic moves from the interface (NIC)
through the kernel’s buffer to the processor space, where most of processing nodes are executed, the
packets will be held in the kernel buffer before being processed by the CPU. When some nodes
experience a high-volume of data, the buffer will fill up and packets may be dropped.  
Configuring the kernel parameter can enhance kernel performance by increasing the level of
optimization and selecting multivariate features such as kernel complex quantitative near-infrared (K-
NIR), kernel support vector regression (k-SVR), or kernel partial least squares (K-PLS) to improve 
the accuracy of packet processing (Salah and Kahtani 2009, Wu, Cadambi, and Chakradhar 2015, 
Fraser et al. 2015, Lee et al. 2015 and Lutz, Fensch, and Cole 2015). In order to hold and process
packets quickly, these kernel performance enhancements pull a high value of packets from interfaces
and bind them with obtainable CPU cycles, which limit packet speed and time and have no buffer
memory. Furthermore, it requires a great deal of CPU to process a vast amount of data buffered in the
kernel; the CPU cycles may run out of time. In this case, the packets that were dropped in the kernel
and NIC might drop very early in the CPU cycles, which cannot buffer packets (Smith et al. 2014 and 
Emmerich et al. 2015). In the cases of network, host, and processor packet loss, NIDPS is affected
because packets are dropped before reaching the NIDPS node or dropped after reaching the node but









     
        
          
      
         
    
     
     
 
 
      
       
          
    
      
        
             
       
 
 
          
      
      
        
         
 
 
         
            
           
           
         
          
              
       
        
This research does not focus much on the network-based packets drop, because these are 
dropped out of the system and lost before they reach the NIDPS. Packets dropped after having been
received by the NIDPS are of greater security concern, and thus are the focus of this research. Such
packets might reach the target systems when they are missed by the NIDPS. This study also focuses
on outstanding packets based in the NIC network. In order to solve the problem of dropped packets in
NIDPS, the researcher investigated the use of a QoS configuration in layer-3 switches with parallel
NIDPS technology to organise and improve the interval packets processing speed. The increased 
speed should improve throughput performance of NIDPS, even during a high-speed, high-volume 
traffic environment. 
One mechanism that QoS offers is queue technology, which can give a switch a new logical
throughput-traffic-forwarding plan. A configurable QoS offers two input queues and four output
queues at the physical switch interfaces, which might be switch virtual interfaces (SVIs) or ports. As
Figure 5.1 shows, the switch interface has been configured to have two input queues and four output
queues. The queues parameters were configured to allow queues to process traffic as a group of bytes.
These load a set of packets equally among the queues and divide traffic into parallel streams in order
to increase the rate of packet processing. The system then uses parallel NIDPS to increase the NIDPS
throughput performance and analyses each portion of traffic separately to determine whether it is free
of malicious codes.
A class map and a policy map were made for each input queue. The class map recognises and 
classifies a certain type of traffic for each input queue, while the policy map controls and organises
the speed limit for each input queue and applies the limit to all interfaces. The bandwidth, threshold,
buffer, memory reservation, and priority (queue and traffic) were configured for all ingress and egress
queues to treat and control traffic in order to help prevent congestion or complete failure through
overload. 
To guarantee the bandwidth for an interface including ingress and egress queues, one of two
functions can be used inside the switch: Shaped or Share Round Robin (SRR). Network devices such
as switches and routers can classify all traffic that flows through. The Shaped task only exists on
output queues. With it, a queue books a percentage of a total port’s bandwidth and this is guaranteed
to that queue and cannot be shared with other queues The Share function (SRR) operates on both
input and output queues. It guarantees a queue a portion of a total port’s bandwidth, but this
bandwidth can be shared with other queues if it is unused. Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of the
system. The Share queue has been configured for two input queues to use the maximam efficiency of












     
 
      
           
      
            
          
      
     
            
the shaped queue to control and organise traffic speed for each output queuewhich is processed
separately via parallel NIDPS nodes. 
Figure 5. 1: Novel architecture for NIDPS.
One queue was configured as an expedited queue. It prioritised QoS services and did not
service other queues until the bandwidth of prioritised queue reaches its limit. A memory buffer
reservation technique was set on the proposed novel configuration for each queue to guarantee that
each queue’s buffer could attain more space once it reached its limit by reserving space from an
available queue buffer, from SVI or port interfaces’ memory buffers, or by switching to a common 
memory pool buffer. However, headers such as ICMP, TCP, and UDP as well as malicious packets
have different characteristics and techniques. The SRR, threshold, and priority methods for each








     
 
 
     
         




      
    
       
       
       
      
           
   
 
 
     
 
    
             
          
headers and malicious packets. For example, when all input and output queue buffers are flooded with
traffic, priority queue and threshold map values can deny buffer overflow. 
The main idea of this novel configuration design is to manage and allocate a specific traffic
weight, or set of bytes, into each input queue and process each output queue individually in parallel,
thereby increasing NIDPS processor speed and reducing traffic congestion, even if the traffic is high-
load and high-speed.
5.3 Technical Discussion of QoS and Parallel NIDPS Configuration
A network intrusion detection and prevention system (NIDPS) is contingent upon the nodes
being able to see the traffic on the network between source and destination targets. Traffic
identification is frequently prepared at the network border by employing the node on a mirrored port
arranged to send the node a copy of the entire packet flow in and out of the network. When some of
these packets fail to reach the NIDPS node for analysis, packet drop may occur. The NIDPS node 
drops/loses the packets because it cannot see them or packets (traffic) bandwidth is over its limit. Two 
(2) types of packet loss (drop) may occur: packets are dropped before reaching a system; and packets
are dropped after reaching a system. 
Figure 5. 2: General model of buffer packets drop.
However, there are three (3) places that packets could be dropped: in the network, in the host
or in the processor, because all of them are dependent on buffer size and processing speed. If the












      
   
        
 
 
      
       
          
        
     
        
           
    
 
 
       
 
          
         
     
      
   
0) packets may occur (see Figure 5.2), and even increasing the buffer speed can affect processor
speed and cause packet drop.
Dropped (λ𝑑)  and outstanding packet (λo) rates range from > 0% to nearly 100% of n packets
dependent on the traffic arrival speed and traffic load. Various traffic is applied at different speeds (λ) 
and is organised through the configuration in datasets of bytes. The resulting abridged datasets are
analysed at the NIDPS node to show analysed packet rates and lost packets rates (dropped or
outstanding packets rates).
For network based packet loss, the NIDPS node fails to analyse this traffic (packets) because
the network drops packets and the node cannot see them. Packet loss has no negative impact on the
node’s ability to detect or prevent internal malicious packets, but it does have an impact on the
receiving system in that useful packets would not be delivered. In host based and processor based
packet loss, the NIDPS node has analysed this traffic because these packets have reached the host
system but the NIDPS node has not been able to process them. This kind of packet loss has a negative 
impact on the node’s ability to detect or prevent attacks. In this research, a novel design based on a 
Layer 3 network switch was proposed to reduce this kind of packet loss.
Figure 5. 3: Positioning of CoS and DSCP values.
A layer-3 switch enables a network to get the best performance effort from a network traffic
delivery system. Through it, packets of various priorities can be delivered on network in a timely 
manner. When networks experience high-speed and heavy traffic, each packet has a similar chance of
being dropped or modified. Implementing QoS methods, such as queueing, memory reservation,








     
    
           
 
 
         
           
           
     
       
  
 
      
         
             
        
       




           
 
prioritise traffic according to its relative importance. Furthermore, QoS technology ensures that
network performance is more predictable and that bandwidth utilization is more effective (Cisco
2014a:42). QoS can be configured on physical interfaces such as ports and SVIs (Szigeti et al.
2013:294-299 and Cisco 2016a:826).
By default, most of the switches work in layer 2, which is the data link layer. The switches
use the class of services (CoS) value (see Figure 5.3), which enables differentiation of the packets
(Szigeti et al. 2013 and Cisco 2016a:827-828). However Layer 2 provides insufficient methods to
support switch features such as QoS features, dynamic access control lists (ACLs), VLAN features,
static IP routing, and policy-based routing (PBR) Cisco-default Smartports (Cisco 2014b, Bul'ajoul,
James and Pannu 2015 and Cisco 2016a). 
Other mechanisms operate at Layer 3 (see Figure 5.3). For example, differentiated services
(DiffServ) allow different types of services to be offered depending on a code (configuration).
DiffServ allows a policy that gives priority to a certain type of package (Szigeti et al. 2013, Cisco
2014a:42 and Cisco 2016a:827-828). DiffServ architecture is the basis for the QoS implementation in
this research. It assigns each packet a classification upon entry that states its priority and its likelihood
of being delivered into a network before packets are distributed. It adjusts each packet for different
traffic speeds to ensure timely delivery. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. 
The unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University








   
         
    
  
 
       
        
  
 
    
         
       
          
      
      
      
     
  
 
        
 
       
   
 
    
          
        
 
       
      
          
    
 
    
          
        
          
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the relative layers at which CoS and Differentiated Services
Code Point (DSCP) operate. QoS has supported the use of both values because DSCP values are
backward-compatible with IP precedence values. Layer-3 DSCP values range from 0 to 63, while IP
precedence values range from 0 to 7 (Szigeti et al. 2013:191, Cisco 2016a:827:830-833).
The static and dynamic classification methods involved Layer 3 header information matching.
The IP precedence or DSCP value indicated the type of service required. For example, a dynamic 
classification access list can be used to identify what IP traffic can be placed into a reserved queue. 
Classification can also take place in the Layer 2 frame. Packet classification should occur
close to the edge of the network because it is processor-intensive and every hop must decide how a
packet should be treated. Setting the type of service (ToS) field in the IP header can be used to
achieve a simpler classification which can be carried with the packet across the network (Szigeti et al.
2013:32 and Cisco 2016a:830-833). In Layer 2, 802.1Q and 802.1p frames use 3 bits for the IP ToS
field; in Layer 3 IPV4 packets use 6 bits for DSCP in the ToS field to carry the classification
information (see Figure 5.4). Regardless of a network’s capability to identify and classify IP packets,
hops can offer each IP packet a QoS service. Special techniques can be configured to approve a
priority queue in order to ensure that a large data packet does not interfere with transmission. 
“If a node can set the IP Precedence or DSCP bits in the ToS field of the IP header as soon as
it identifies traffic as being IP traffic, then all of the other nodes in the network can be classified based
on these bits. In most marking of IP networks, IP Precedence or DSCP should be sufficient to identify
traffic as IP traffic” (Szigeti et al. 2013:191-247 and Cisco 2016a).
In the configuration method utilized by this research, the first action changes the switch frame 
from Layer 2 to Layer 3 by mapping values from CoS to DSCP (See Appendix1:Section 1. Part 1). 
Because differentiated services technology can offer more precise handling of traffic on the network, 
can classify each packet upon entry into the network interfaces, and allows for adjustments to be made
for different traffic speeds and loads, the researcher considered DSCP to be the best choice for the 
intended usage. The mapping action between values determines the delay priority of the packets. CoS
has 8 values and DSCP has 64 values. Thus, the DSCP values allow for a higher degree of
differentiation (Szigeti et al. 2013 and Bul'ajoul and Pannu 2015). 
QoS features such as a policy map and class map can be given preliminary management to 
classify the traffic inside the switch with the same policy and class plan; different management can be
given to packets with different class and policy plans (Szigeti et al. 2013:32 and Cisco 2016a:833). 








         
            
         
         
             
             
        
  
 
     
       
  
      
            
     
 
     
   
       
 
 
        
           
      
       
     
   
      
          
         
 
 
      
          
 
         
packet appropriately (Szigeti et al. 2013a). Network devices use several match criteria to place
packets into classes that can be intensively processed if nodes must repeat classifications based on
access list matches. The class information can be assigned by switch, router, or end host. Therefore,
the node will mark packets as soon as they are identified and classified. Policing involves creating a 
policy that defines a group weight for the traffic (the number of bytes to be processed together) and
applies it to the interface. Policing can be applied to a packet per direction and can occur on the
ingress and egress interfaces. Different types of traffic can be recognised in terms of type and ports,
and differentiated policies can be set accordingly. 
Network QoS technology enables the implementation of a new logical and throughput-traffic-
forwarding plan in the switch. For the purpose of this research, a physical interface was configured to
two input queues and four output queues (See Appendix 1: Section 1. Part 1). This configuration helps 
to prevent congestion traffic (which would cause buffer overflow) and helps to improve buffer
throughput performance. A buffer was set for each queue and a memory reservation method using a
dynamic memory reservation technology was created and implemented in order to organise and hold
more traffic. After all packets were placed into input queues, class and policy maps were implemented
to packets based on their QoS requirements (See Appendix 1: Section 1. Part 3). Appropriate services
were then provided, including bandwidth guarantees, thresholds, queue setting, and priority servicing
through an intelligent ingress and egress queueing mechanism (See Appendix 1: Section 1. Part 3, 4
and 5). 
The packets’ class map information is assigned along the path of a switch. QoS users can use
this information to limit the volume of incoming packets distributed to each traffic class. The default
behaviour in Layer 3 switches handle packets using the DiffServ architecture using “per-hop” 
behaviour (Szigeti et al. 2013:6:940-941 and Cisco 2016a:828,). If a switch along the path does not
provide a consistent behaviour per hop, QoS provides a conceptual and constructed solution, such as
an end-to-end queue solution. The solution is based on a configurable policy map that allows the 
system to examine packet information closer to the edge of the network, which helps prevent the core
switch from experiencing overload. The output queues are processed individually where parallel Snort
NIDPS nodes are implemented (each output queue has own NIDPS node) (see Figure 5.5) in order to
enhance the performance of NIDPS and increase packet processing speed.
Queues and class and policy map technologies can use access control lists (ACLs) to allow
the processing management of different types and patterns of incoming and outgoing packets (Cisco
2014b:1). The novel configuration proposed in this research uses an ACL technology with a class map












        
 
 
     
implementing parallel output queues with associated parallel NIDPS nodes (see Figure 5.6) (See
Appendix 1: Section 1. Part 2).  
Figure 5. 5: Parallel Snort-NIDPS Using QoS and ACLs.








      
    
                
         
 
 
    
     
    
   
 
  
                
    
     
   
      
 
         
        
 





        
           
      
        
        
         
    
       
  
This novel QoS configuration includes a novel architecture of packets classification as well
(see Figure 5.7). Data were classified through a class map that which enabled packets to be processed
as a group of bytes (See Appendix 1 :Section 1. Part 2) defined by a policy and ACLs that were
matched with DSCP values. A policy map was made to specify what traffic classes should inspire
action. The following actions constitute the method:
• Classify the ACL traffic with a class map for SVI and ports
• Organise a rate-limit for each group of bytes for the class traffic
• Establish the matching of DSCP values with classes 
• Set a particular DSCP value to be mapped with classes
After packets were classified and policed with a specific bandwidth, some were dropped out
of the profile. Each policy can specify what actions should be carried out ( Szigeti et al. 2013 and
Cisco 2016a:833), including dropping packets, allowing dropped packets to be modified, allowing
packets to pass through without modification, and deciding on a packet-by-packet basis whether a
packet is in or outside the profile. This novel QoS policy map architecture was proposed as follows:
• Packets dropped were modified to be re-processed again and mapped with new DSCP 
values based on the original QoS label.
• When packets are reprocessed, they may get out of order. To prevent this, a policy
was designed to allow packets to be re-processed in the same queue as the original
QoS label.
• The system has the ability to mark up a limit speed (as a set of bytes) for each input
queue.
• If packets are not matched with DSCP values, packets will be dropped. See Figure 5.7 
for an illustration of the architecture (See Appendix 1:Section 1 .Part 2 ).
A hierarchical policy map was created and applied it to the traffic path inside the ingress
physical queues. The policy map targeted SVIs and ports. Two types of QoS policy were created:
individual and aggregate. Individual QoS applies a separate policy to specify a bandwidth limit for
each traffic class. Aggregate QoS specifies an aggregate policy with which to apply a bandwidth limit
to all matched traffic flows. The individual policer only affects packets on a physical port. 
Furthermore, if more than one type of traffic needs to be classified, it is possible to create more ACLs, 
class maps, and policy maps (Szigeti et al. 2013). In our experiments, three types of traffic (TCP,
UDP, and ICMP) were classified using three criteria groups: ACL, class map, and policy map. Each 
type of traffic matches an instance of these related criteria groups and enables the matching time of









       
 
 








     
          
     
             
          
 
     
    
   
 
 
       
 
     
      
Switches receive each traffic frame in a token bucket (Szigeti et al. 2013:62 and Cisco
2016a:835), which is defined as an algorithm used in packet switches to check leaks of data
transmissions. It is set at the same rate as the configured average packets rate and conforms to defined
limits on bandwidth to allow a burst of traffic for short periods. It is used in traffic policy mapping to
prevent the problem of the bucket hole overflow. Each time a token is added to the bucket, the
algorithm checks to see if enough room is available in the bucket. If not, the packets will be marked as
non-conforming, and the specified policy action will be taken. In the novel QoS architecture of this
research, packets dropped out of profile were marked down with new DSCP values and the DSCP
value was modified to generate a new QoS label (see Figure 5.8) (See Appendix 1:Section 1.Part 2).
Figure 5. 8: Novel architecture of packet policing and marking.
During traffic classification, QoS employs configurable map tables to match a corresponding








      




         
QoS domains, a configurable mutation map (DSCP-to-DSCP values) can be used. Throughout QoS
policing, the DSCP value is assigned according to the IP traffic. This value assignment creates a
policed-DSCP map (Szigeti et al. 2013 and Cisco 2016a). 








         
    
          
      
     
       
     
      
          
      
    
         
         
      
 
 
      
       
     
      
   
          
           
         
            
 
 
         
   
            
         
       
        
    
      
           
      
QoS stores packets in input and output queues according to the QoS label, which is defined
and identified by the DSCP values in the packets. Threshold map values can be selected through the
DSCP ingress and egress values. The QoS label also identifies the weighted tail drop (WTD)
threshold value (Szigeti et al. 2013:260 and Cisco 2016a:838). In the novel QoS architecture created
in this research, WTDs were employed on ingress and egress queues to cope the bandwidth length of
each queue and deliver the drop precedence for different classifications of packets (See Appendix
1:Section 1. Part 2, 4 and 5). As each packet is assigned to a specific ingress and egress queue, WTD
allows the packets assigned under the QoS label to be subject to different thresholds. If the available
space on a destination queue is less than the volume of packets, the threshold is exceeded for that QoS
label and the switch drops the packet (Szigeti et al. 2013:260 and Cisco 2016a:839). In this research
(see Figure 5.9), DSCP values were mapped to ingress and egress queues and located buffer space.
WTD thresholds for input and output queues were set. Each queue has three drop thresholds. This
means that different thresholds can be set for different types of packets. Each value of the threshold
represents a percentage of the queue’s total buffer. Furthermore, one of the important techniques that
used in the QoS architecture is a buffer reservation.
Buffers are universal throughout the software and hardware layers of any network computer
system. They are valuable in reducing the impact of traffic rate variability on the network especially
in the case of traffic rate points. By having sufficiently large buffers to absorb traffic rate spike, high
latencies associated with retransmissions and lost data (traffic) can be avoided. They are also useful if
there is a temporary difference in the rate at which traffic is produced and consumed. However, 
increasing the buffer size cannot compensate for packet processing that is perpetually slower than the
packet arrival rate. A switch may have different buffer configurations. The total rate of all buffers is
β; and each ingress and egress buffer of an interface is limited to rate α. The same α applies to all
interfaces. The rate of a buffer is the speed at which packets move out of it and this depends on the
underlying processing system.
The multi-interfaces switch manages buffering across a number of ingress interfaces (ports).
An ingress interface has ingress buffers connected to common egress buffers. The switch algorithm is
also responsible for scheduling. At each event of scheduling, the switch algorithm selects one of the
ingress buffers. The packet at the head of the selected buffer is then transmitted to the inside at the
switch and via the egress buffer to the target system. There are some formulations that model the
entire switch rather than just one interface (Kawahara, Kobayashi and Maeda 2015). For example: a 
switch consists of n ingress and n egress interfaces, where each interface has buffer. An arrival event
(packets) arrives at the ingress interfaces (which have specified destination egress interfaces) . At the 
scheduling event, packets at the top end of the ingress interface buffers are sent to the egress interface








    
       
        
    
         
    
       
    
 
      
         
           
        
          
 
 
        
          
           
        
    
      
   
       
            
         
    
        
     
 
     
           
     
       
     
       
According to this matching, the packets in the ingress interfaces will be transmitted to the
corresponding egress interfaces. In this scheduling task, there is also a buffer for each pair of ingress 
and egress interfaces. Thus there arises anther buffer management problem at scheduling phases. In
the implementation of QoS architecture proposed in this thesis, QoS DiffServ was used to assign a
value to each packet according to its importance and then it decides the order of packets to be
processed through queues based on the value of packets. Additional buffers were provided
dynamically to the ingress and egress interfaces. A QoS switch was used to control the input and
output traffic. A priority queue was implemented for one of the ingress queues in an interface. 
By default, the ingress buffer rate is the same as egress buffer rate. However, when the arrival
event of traffic (packets) rate (λ𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) is more than total rate of egress buffers, or one of n egress buffers
already reached α , the packets would be dropped (λ𝑑>0). In the novel configuration, Sharing policy
α 
was configured for each ingress-queue’s buffer which corresponds to rate and the egress-queue’s
2 
α 
buffer was to rate , where α is the maximum rate for the interface’s buffer. All buffers were
4 
assumed to have the same maximum rate.
WTD (Weighted Tail Drop) is employed on the queues to manage the queue lengths and to be
responsible for drop precedence for different packets classification. It used the frame’s assigned QoS
label to subject it to different thresholds. If the thresholds are exceeded for that QoS label (the
available buffer space in the destination queue is less than the size of n packets), the switch drops n
packets (Cisco 2016a:839 and Szigeti et al. 2013). In the QoS configuration proposed in this thesis,
each ingress queue was assigned to a specific threshold value (See Appendix 1:Section 1. Part 3, 4
and 5, Section 2). Each value of the threshold holds a percentage of the ingress interface’s buffer
space. One of ingress queues was assigned to maximum queue threshold (the queue can hold up to its
limit of frames at up to ≤ 100% threshold). The other ingress queue was assigned to minimum queue
threshold (the queue can hold up to minimum of queue frames at < 100% threshold). A high-
threshold queue was configured as a high-priority queue (See Appendix 1:Section 2), where
percentage of maximum queue threshold ≤ 100 (non-empty queue) and a low-threshold queue was
configured as a low priority queue, where minimum queue threshold < maximum queue threshold.
A buffer reservation technique has been used to increase buffer size along with implemented
parallel nodes of buffers to increase buffer speed performance. A switch buffer’s memory space was
divided between the switch common memory pool, the SVI, and the queue reserved pool (see Figure
5.10). a specific buffer memory space was defined for each queue, including ingress and egress
thresholds. Packets were divided between two ingress and four egress queues via configured queue-








     
        
   
 
 
      
 
      
         
  
       
          
 
 
     
       
   
        
        
        
            
    
      
     
 
 
      
       
Thus, all buffers cannot be consumed by one egress queue, and the system can manage whether
funding buffer space to demand queue. The remaining free common pool interfaces were set to
reserve up to 50% of the available switch memory pool.
Figure 5. 10: : Novel egress queue buffer reservation.
A switch identifies whether the target queue has consumed less buffer space than its reserved 
volume (under-limit), whether the target queue has consumed all of its reserved amount (over-limit),
and whether the switch memory pool is empty or not (no free buffers and free buffers, respectively). If
the queue is not over-limit, the switch can reserve a buffer space from the interface pool or from the 
switch common memory pool. If no more space is available on the common pool or if queues are
over-limit, the switch drops the packet.
After traffic has been classified, marked, and policed in two ingress queues, each packet is
processed into four output queues that implement parallel NIDPS nodes. QoS also offers Shaped or
Share Round Robin (SRR) technologies, which can vary the bandwidth, provided for the queues in the
interface and control the rate at which packets are sent ( Szigeti et al. 2013:260 and Cisco 2016a:840).
The Shaped function SRR can guarantee each queue a bandwidth limit, but queues cannot share with
each other if one or more queues reach their bandwidth limits. The Share function SRR can guarantee
a bandwidth limit for each queue, and the other queues can share with each other if one or more
queues reach their bandwidth limits. This research utilised Share in the ingress queues and Shaped in
the first three egress queues. In the fourth queue, the Share mode was set to allow the queue to share
process traffic with other available output queues (See Appendix1: Section 1. Part 4 and 5 and Section
2).
Queue technology is placed at specific points in Cisco switches to help prevent congestion








      
      
       
         
          
 
 
      
            
     
        
    
 
 
   
           
         
     
          
 
 
         
             
             
           
        
           
   
 
      
           
    
    
    
space of internal bandwidth. After packets are processed through classification, policing, and
marking, and before packets pass into the switch fabric, the system allocates them to input queues.
Because multiple input queue interfaces can simultaneously send packets to output queue interfaces,
outbound queues are allocated after the internal ring in order to avoid congestion. The SRR ingress
queue transmits packets to the internal ring, while the SRR egress queue sends the packets to the
output link. 
The novel configurable architecture has a large limit of buffer space and a generous
bandwidth allocation for each queue. One of the ingress queues was set as a priority queue, which
allowed the system to prioritise packets with particular DSCP values and thereby allocate a large
buffer. It also allows buffer space to be used more frequently, and then adjusts the thresholds for each
queue so that packets with inferior priorities are dropped when queues are full. This allows the system
to ensure that high priority traffic is not dropped. 
For more information, when the traffic comes to the interface, the packets are buffered in the
priority ingress buffer (priority queue) and if the priority buffer is getting full, the traffic will transmit
to the second ingress buffer. If all ingress buffers are getting full, the packets will be dropped or the
switch can reserve another ingress buffer (which has the same priority) up to n, where n is the
maximum number of ingress buffers. The formulae apply in one interface when there are two ingress
queues and four egress queues. 
When the λ𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the arrival rate of packets, the rate for each ingress queue in one interface is
λ𝑖𝑛𝑖 λini⁄ .The output rate of arrival packets is ⁄ for each queue j in an interface i. The output rate2 4
4 λ𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑛(λ𝑜𝑢𝑡) of packets for one link is ∑𝑖=1 ⁄ . The arrival traffic rate (λ𝑖𝑛) is ∑𝑖=1 λ𝑖𝑛𝑖; The λ𝑖𝑛 is 4
the highest arrival traffic rate when i=n; and n is the maximum number of output links (interfaces). At
the highest supported arrival rate the maximum number of output queues will have been λ𝑖𝑛, 
λ𝑖𝑛⁄4⁄ λ𝑖𝑛configured and the output rate for each output queue is = ⁄ . The highest output traffic𝑛 𝑛4 
𝑛 4 λ𝑖𝑛rate of n packets (λ𝑜𝑢𝑡) is ∑ (∑ ( ⁄ )).i=1 j=1 𝑛4 
In other hand, when the arrival packets pass through ingress buffers at speed rate (λ𝑖𝑛𝑖 ), the
traffic (packets) speed (λ𝑖𝑛𝑖) was re-controlled as an interface speed limit (μ) (group of bytes per
second) to organise and improve performance of ingress traffic speed, and then the traffic is stored in
its range space, where packets were arranged and managed to exit the interface through egress queues









          
   
       
  
         
      
    
       
      
   
 
 
        
 
      
          
        
         
         
   
 
       
       
Every arrival packet needs to be sent out of an ingress interface and then placed in egress
buffers which permit an interface to hold packets when there are more packets to be transmitted than
can physically be sent (experiencing congestion). If the switch cannot allocate enough buffers to hold
all incoming traffic, the packets will be dropped. Availability of egress buffers determine if a packet is
transmitted or not. When it comes to reducing packet drop, the switch does not concern itself with
packets. Rather, it is concerned with the number of requested (reservation) buffers to which
unbuffered packets can be added. The volume of egress buffering differs from platform to platform. 
Typically, two (2) reservation pools are available for Layer 3 network switches. These pools are the
SVI reserved pool and the switch memory common pool. The switch memory common pool is used
when the SVI reservation pool has previously been consumed.
Figure 5. 11: Reservation buffer from n node of switches (η_n).
Furthermore, when packets (traffic) go through the output queues, the switch reserves buffers
from the SVI reservation pool for all egress buffers and then if one egress buffer is fully consumed,
the consumed egress buffer can reserve buffer space from the available buffers of other egress queues.
When the SVI reservation pool is consumed by all egress buffers, it reserves more buffer from the
switch memory command pool (see Figure 5.10). If all the switch’s buffers are consumed, the packets
will be dropped because no more space will be available. 
All ingress and egress buffers above are collectively called one node of the switch’s buffer








     
         
       
        
 
 
    
          
      




        
             
    
      
         
             
              
          
  
         
 
       
         
      
     
       
             
              
 
  
can be processed. If the holdup area is full, more reservation buffer can be achieved by reserving
memory from another switch memory pool in the network (see Figure 5.11) and even can be from
outside networks. However, all egress buffers were controlled to limit rate β𝑘 (kernel buffer speed) to
prevent host based dropped packets. The kernel buffer rate (speed) should be the same as output
queue.  
In sensible implementations, limited buffers always have been implemented. If all the buffer
space is already consumed, the arrival of additional packages causes buffer overflow. A buffer’s
queues, priority and threshold methods are part of the classification mechanisms that are responsible
for dealing with the excess traffic. One of the possible measures taken because of buffer overflow is
dropped packets. 
5.4 Conclusion 
NIDPSs are often unable to detect or prevent all unwanted traffic or malicious activities when
traffic comes in at high-speeds and volumes. As a solution, this chapter has described a novel
architecture that exploits Layer 3 Cisco switch technology, combined with parallel NIDPS nodes, to 
create queues with specific buffer and bandwidth sizes. The system thus increases queue buffer size 
automatically up to a network limit. It also services buffer space from an available queue buffer, port
buffer, or switch pool memory buffer in order to hold more packets. This allows the system to
organise and increase the processing speed of arriving packets by setting a number of parallel queues
to be processed by parallel NIDPS nodes. The number of parallel processing NIDPS nodes needed in
any particular system depends on network arrival rates. Therefore, it was necessary to operate with the 
class and quality of service technologies within the network switch. QoS DiffServ, including CoS and
DSCP values, and a buffer reservation method were exploited in the proposed architecture which aims 
to reduce dropped buffer packets in egress queuing traffic in order to improve NIDPS performance.
Property categories such as queue technology including ingress and egress, priority queue and
thresholds, queue bandwidth, classification and policy methods including ACLs, buffer queue
memory reservation and switch memory pool reservation are also important factors in the proposed
solutionAn assumption is that there will be an underlying parallel implementation of the target
destination (NIDPS in this case) and for each egress buffer commissioned there will be a port to a
parallel node of the target system This will enable better performance and higher volumes of traffic to








       
 
 
   
      
   
         
        
   
 
 
      
      
      
       
  
 








   
       
        
   
 
         
     
   
 
  
    
  
 
       
CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an evaluation of the proposed solution of using a novel QoS architecture
with parallel technology to improve NIDPS performance. The research uses Snort IDS in network
based IDPS, which is configured to three modes (NIDPS analysis mode, detection mode and
prevention mode). Experiments were conducted to test Snort NIDPS performance under high-speed
traffic. It was demonstrated that Snort NIDPS performance (analysis, detection and prevention) rate
can be increased by using the proposed solution
6.2 Evaluation of the Solution
In this section, two types of experiments were ran for each NIDPSs mode, one to test Snort’s
performance in terms of throughput without the support of the proposed solution (QoS and parallel
technologies) and one with the proposed solution. Each experiment tested Snort NIDPS throughput
when analysing traffic such as TCP/IP headers and when detecting or preventing unwanted traffic or
malicious packets in a high-speed traffic.
6.2.1 Summary of experiments for evaluating the solution
The experiments evaluation carried out are shown in Table 6.1, along with their purpose.





Evaluate QoS technology proposed solution
13 Evaluate the proposed solution to NIDPS analysis mode under high-speed traffic 6.2.2
14, 15, 16 and 17 Evaluate the proposed solution to NIDPS detection mode under high-speed ICMP,
UDP and TCP traffic and malicious packets.
6.2.3
18 Evaluate different rules to detect malicious packets under high-speed traffic 6.2.4
19 and 20 Evaluate the proposed solution to NIDPS prevention mode under high-speed
TCP/IP traffic and malicious packets
6.2.5
Evaluate QoS and parallel technologies proposed solution
21 Evaluate the proposed solution of using QoS and parallel technologies together 
under high-speed traffic
6.3.1











          
          
 
 
      
 
 




       
 
 
       
 
6.2.2 Evaluate NIDPS analysis mode (NID-mode)
In this section, Snort NIDPS has been configured to sniffing mode. TCP/IP traffic been sent
at speed 1ms (packets trip at 1 ms intervals). Two tests were done, the first one tested Snort without
QoS and the second one test Snort with QoS.
6.2.2.1 Experiment 13: Snort with and without QoS to analyse TCP/IP header in
high-speed traffic
In this experiment more than 38,000 packets (TCP/IP traffic) has been sent. Each packet was
1KB in size and the interval between each transmission was 1ms. 
Figure 6. 1: Snort NIDPS without QoS in 1ms




















































         
    
 
 
         
     
 
 
          
 
        
         
     
          
       





     
              















































Without 39809 6760 33049 0 33049 0 16.981% 45.361% 83.019%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 64s -> (Pkts/min:6760 - Pkts/sec:105)
With 40210 40209 0 0 1 0 99.998% 0.00% 0.002%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 250s-> (Pkts/min:10052 – Pkts/sec:160)
TCP/IP Traffic TCP/IP Traffic with (QoS)
 Packets Received 100% 100%
 Packets Analysed 17% 100%
 Packets dropped 45.36% 0.00% 
Packets filtered 0% 0.00% 
Packets outstanding 83.02% 0.00% 























Analysis TCP/IP Header 
Figure 6. 3: Snort NIDPS with QoS reaction to TCP/IP in 1ms.
As the results in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show, all packets that were sent have been received
by the machines. Figure 6.1 demonstrates that Snort without QoS analysed just less than 17% of the
traffic that reached the wire with more than 45% dropped and more than 83% outstanding (see Table
6.2 and Figure 6.3). When the same experiment was run with QoS, Snort analysed nearly 100 % of
the total packets that it received with 0 % dropped and 0.002% outstanding packets (see Figure 6.3).
The results show that Snort performance analysis is significantly improved when using QoS 
technology.
6.2.3 Evaluate NIDPS detection mode (NID-mode)
In this section, we ran four experiments, each to test Snort’s detection rate with and without
support a QoS technology for a particular type of header or packet. The headers and packets were











    
     
 
 
      
 
 
        
 











































          
     
6.2.3.1 Experiment 14: Snort with QoS reaction to detect ICMP header in high-
speed traffic
In this experiment, more than 38,000 IP/ICMP packets were sent in interval traffic (packets)
speed of 1ms. Each packet carried 1Kbyte. The aim was to detect IP/ICMP packets.
Figure 6. 4: Snort detects ICMP header in 1ms.
Figure 6. 5: Snort with QoS detects ICMP header in 1ms.









































Without 39121 37.259% 100% 14438 0 97 7220 7220 50.007% 50.007%










          
     
 
 
         
 
   
       
        
       
          
           
  
 
      
 
 
       
  
With 38668 99.943% 100% 37393 0 757 37393 37393 100.00% 100.00%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 293s -> (Pkts/min:9661 – Pkts/sec:131)
ICMP Packets Detected ICMP packets detected( QoS)
 Packets Analysed 100% 100%
 Packets Alerts 50.01% 100%























Detecting ICMP Header 
Figure 6. 6: Snort with QoS reaction to detect ICMP packets in 1ms.
As the results show in Figures 6.5, 6.5 and 6.6, when more than 38,000 IP/ICMP packets
were sent with an interval time of 1ms, Snort alerted and logged 7220 of the 14,438 ICMP packets
that were analysed (see Figure 6.6 and Table 6.3). When the same number of packets was sent at the
same speed, using QoS, Snort detected all of the ICMP packets that it analysed (see Figure 6.5 and
6.6). This experiment shows that when Snort NIDPS was used without QoS, it only detected 50% of
the total packets analysed, but when Snort was used with QoS, Snort detected 100% of the total
packets that it analysed (see Figure 6.6). 
6.2.3.2 Experiment 15: Snort with and without QoS to detect UDP headers in high-
speed traffic
In this experiment, more than 38,000 IP/UDP packets were sent at interval traffic speed of









      
 
 
        
 











































          
   
 
 
          
    
 
Figure 6. 7: Snort detects UDP header in 0.5ms.
Figure 6. 8: Snort with QoS detect UDP header in 0.5ms.
Table 6. 4: Snort with QoS reaction to UDP header in high-speed traffic.




























Without 36213 12.391% 100.00% 763 0 59 4 4 6.780% 6.780%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 59s -> (Pkts/sec:76)
With 37783 99.942% 100.00% 0 0 37564 37257 37257 99.182% 99.182%









         
 
     
       
        
 
          
        
   
 
     
 
 
      
    
 
 
    
  
UDP Packets Detected (no QoS) UDP Packets Detected (QoS)
 Packets Analysed 100% 100%
 Avrage Packets Alerts 6.78% 99.18% 























Detecting UDP Header 
Figure 6. 9: Snort with QoS reaction to detect UDP packets in 0.5ms
As the results show in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, when the traffic (packets) was sent in an
interval time 0.5ms, Snort only alerted and logged nearly 4 of the 59 UDP packets that were analysed
(see Table 6.3). It detected fewer than 7% of all UDP packets that it analysed (see Figure 6.7 and 6.9).
When Snort was used with QoS and was sent the same traffic and speed at 0.5ms, Snort detected more
than 99% of the total UDP packets analysed (see Figure 6.9 and Table 6.4). This experiment shows
that the Snort NIDPS performance detection improved from 7% to 99% when the QoS configuration
was used (see Figure 6.9).
6.2.3.3 Experiment 16: Snort with and without QoS to detect TCP header in high-
speed traffic
In this experiment, more than 38,000 TCP/IP packets were sent at interval packets speed of
0.5ms. Each packet carried 1Kbyte. The aim was to detect TCP packets.










       
 
 











































          
   
 
 
          
     
 
 
        
 




Figure 6. 11: Snort with QoS detect TCP header in 0.5ms.
Table 6. 5: Snort with QoS reaction to TCP Header in high-speed traffic.




























Without 32108 1.884% 100.00% 0 497 85 497 497 100.00% 100.00%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 34s -> (Pkts/sec:17)
With 31058 99.997% 100.00% 0 30057 779 30057 30057 100.00% 100.00%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 322s -> (Pkts/min:6211 – Pkts/sec:96)
TCP Pakcets Detected TCP packets detected (QoS)
 Packets Analysed 100% 100%
 Avrage Packets Alerts 100% 100% 























Detecting TCP Header 
Figure 6. 12: Snort with QoS reaction to detect TCP packets in 0.5ms.
Figures 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12 show that Snort detected 100% of the total TCP packets that it is








     
 
 
    




     
 
 
       
 











































            
6.2.3.4 Experiment 17: Snort with and without QoS to detect malicious packets in
high-speed traffic
In this experiment, flood traffic was generated with UDP malicious packets (threads) in
traffic speed (60000Bps of flooded traffic with 225 threads sent at an interval time of 1 mSec). Two
tests were conducted: one test of Snort without QoS and one of Snort with QoS.
Figure 6. 13: Snort detects malicious packets in high-speed traffic.
Figure 6. 14: Snort with QoS detects malicious packets in high-speed traffic.



















































      
 
 
          
     
 
 




    
          
     
       










   
     
QoS Snort Processor Times = 125s -> (Pkts/min:5090 – Pkts/sec:82)
With 996005 99.999% 100.00% 0 0 995155 990344 990344 99.517% 99.517%
























Malicious Packets Detected Malicious Packets Detected (QoS)
 Packets Analysed 100% 100%
 Avrage Packets Alerts 34.05% 99.52% 
Avrage Packets Logged 34.05% 99.52% 
Figure 6. 15: Snort with QoS reaction to detect malicious packets in high-speed traffic.
6.2.3.5 Summary of Detection Experiments
As the results show in Figures 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15, when malicious traffic was sent at high-
speeds and values, Snort detected 270 of the 793 malicious packets that it analysed. It detected fewer
than 35% of the total malicious packets analysed (see Table 6.6). When the same traffic was
generated with the same speed and value, but Snort was supported by QoS, Snort detected more than
99% of the total malicious packets that it analysed (see Figure 6.15 and Table 6.6). This experiment

















Packets Analysed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Avrage Packets Alerts 50.01% 100% 6.78% 99.18% 100% 100% 34.05% 99.52% 























Snort and QoS reaction to ICMP, UDP,TCP Headers and Malicous packets 








      
           
            
            
          
          
          
        





      
           
      
            
        











           
    
           
 
 
           
  
 
As a summary for experiments 14, 15, 16 and 17see Figure 6.16 which shows that Snort
analysed every single packet that reached the wire. When IP traffic was sent at an average of 35000
packets per 1ms, Snort lost alerts and logs. For ICMP headers, Snort lost more than 49 % of the total
ICMP packets that it is analysed and it missed more than 96 % of the total UDP packets analysed, but
and for TCP , Snort alerted 100 % of the total TCP packets analysed (see Figure 6.16) . With the
proposed new QoS architecture, Snort alerted 100 % of ICMP packets, more than 99 % of UDP
packets and 100 % of TCP traffic (see Figure 6.16). Also Figure 6.11 shows that Snort lost more 66%
of the total malicious packets that it is analysed, but when QoS is used, Snort detected more than 99%
of the total packets that it analysed. The experiments show that Snort NIDPS detection performance
improved when supported by QoS configuration.
6.2.4 Evaluation of different Snort NIDPS rules
In this section experiments are presented which evaluated Snort’s capability with different
types of rules to detect malicious packets with and without QoS. In these experiments, malicious
packets (threads) have been generated in high-speed traffic by using NetScanPro, WinPcap, Packets
Flooder and Packets Traceroute tools. Every single test was repeated 3 times with and without QoS to 
get the average number of packet alerts and logs. Different Snort rules have been tested under high-
speed traffic. Flood traffic has been sent at 65000Bps with different types of 255 threats at interval
time 1mSec.
6.2.4.1 Experiment 18: Snort rules with QoS reaction to detect malicious packets 
in high-speed traffic.
In experiment 18, six action rules (ttl, content, hexadecimal content, offset depth and dsize)
have been tested to show Snort NIDPS performance detection with and without QoS.
Test 1: Time To Live (TTL) rules
The TTL rule detects any packet matched to the specified ttl value. The ttl keyword takes
numbers from 0 to 255. In this experiment, 255 UDP malicious packets have been sent with ttl 128 at
1mSec with flooding traffic at 65000Bps. The following rule was written to check if ttl of the UDP 
packets is equal to 128. If a packet matches the rule, Snort will provide an alert packet.













































        
  




       
  
       
   
   
 





































        
  
        
  
        
  
       
   




     
        
     
       
 
 
          
 























































The Average of Snort Processor Times : (125s+126s+126s) / 3 = 125.6s -> (Pkts/min:5308 – Pkts/sec:84)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 33.37%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 33.37%























































The Average of Snort Processor Times : (18.52m+19.22m+17.54m) / 3 = 18.42m -> (Pkts/min:53349 – Pkts/sec:855)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.605%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.605%
Test 2: Content Keyword rule
Snort has a capability to catch a data pattern inside packets and headers. The pattern can be
expressed as an ASCII string from (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) or as a
hexadecimal number. For example, some malicious attacks have signatures and the content rule can
detect them. The following rule was created to detect a pattern “abcdef” in the data part of all UDP 
packets.
Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Check or to find data pattern inside packets”; ttl: 128;









        
  
 







   
  
 
   





























        
  
        
  
        
  
       
   
   
 
         
 
   
 
 




































          
 
 
         
          
       
   




    
     
          
  
 
In this experiment, 255 UDP malicious packets were sent at 1ms intervals with flood traffic
65000Bps. The malicious packets were sent are including “abcdef” with ttl 128.

























































The Average of Snort Processor Times : (125s+125s+124s) / 3 = 124.6s -> (Pkts/min:5195 – Pkts/sec:83)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 40.15%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 40.15%









































999158 92.242% 100% 0 0 920850 919567 919567 99.860% 99.860%
999973 92.070% 100% 0 0 919855 918164 918164 99.816% 99.816%
1017310 99.999% 100% 0 0 1016423 1012125 1012125 99.577% 99.577%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (19.33m+19.36m+19.51m) / 3 = 19.4m -> (Pkts/min:50168 – Pkts/sec:807)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.751%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.751%
Test 3: Content-hexadecimal Keyword rules
In this test encrypted UDP malicious packets were sent at speed 1mSec with flood traffic
65000Bps.The following rule was designed to the same Content rule, but the pattern is listed in the
hexadecimal. The hexadecimal number 61 is equal to ASCII character (a), 62 is equal to (b), 63 is








             
 
 
        
 






































        
  
        
  
        
  
       
   
   
 









































          
          
          
        
   
   
 
   
 
        
              
                 
  
 
Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Check hexadecimal characters in side data”; ttl: 128;
content: “|61 62 63 64|”; Sid: 100000173 ;). 




















































The Average of Snort Processor Times : (126s+124s+124s) / 3 = 124.3s -> (Pkts/min:5278 – Pkts/sec:83)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 42.12%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 42.12%









































1003040 99.999% 100% 0 0 1002190 997235 997235 99.505% 99.505%
1003428 99.999% 100% 0 0 1002583 997600 997600 99.502% 99.502%
1003200 99.999% 100% 0 0 1002355 997403 997403 99.505% 99.505%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (19.31m+19.30m+19.31m) / 3 = 19.3m -> (Pkts/min:52801– Pkts/sec:856)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.504%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.504%
Test 4: Offset Keyword rules
The offset keyword rule can be used together with the content rule. It is used to examine a
target signatures at a specific domain offset from the start of the data part of the packets. The
following rule was made to start detecting for the characters “abcdef” after 100 bytes from the start of








        
    
 








































          
          
          
       
   
   
 









































          
          
          
    
   




             
           
            
           
        
          
    
 
Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Start research for the word “abcdef” after 100 bytes
from the start of data”; ttl: 128; content: “abcdef”; offset: 100; Sid: 100000174 ;).








































990286 1.057% 100% 0 0 553 232 232 41.952% 41.952%
990631 1.072% 100% 0 0 544 235 235 43.198% 43.198%
985661 1.062% 100% 0 0 562 238 238 42.348% 42.348%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (125s+125s+124s) / 3 = 124.6s -> (Pkts/min:5277 – Pkts/sec:84)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 42.26%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 42.26%










































1000607 99.999% 100% 0 0 999753 998507 998507 99.875% 99.875%
1000516 99.999% 100% 0 0 999664 998348 998348 99.868% 99.868%
1000830 99.999% 100% 0 0 999976 998729 998729 99.875% 99.875%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (19.31m+19.31m+19.31m) / 3 = 19.31m (Pkts/min: 52665 – Pkts/sec:854)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.872%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.872%
Test 5: Depth Keyword rules
To specify more check of matching limit in the pattern of data, the depth rule can be used 
together with the content rule. This depth rule is used to specify offset from data part starting. The
data after that offset rule will not be checked for pattern matching. The depth rule defines the point
after which Snort should stop examining the pattern inside the data. If offset and depth keywords are 
used together with the content keyword, a specific pattern matching within the range of data can be 
done. The following rule was written to find out the characters “abcdef” between characters 4 and 100








          
  
 








































          
          
          
       
   
   
 








































          
          
          
       
   




     
         
        
       
 
           
  
 
          
            
Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Start research for the word “abcdef” between characters
4 and 100 bytes of the data”; ttl: 128; content: “abcdef”; offset: 4; depth: 100; Sid: 100000175 ;).








































988438 1.059% 100% 0 0 564 236 236 41.843% 41.843%
989543 1.066% 100% 0 0 557 235 235 42.190% 42.190%
989471 1.067% 100% 0 0 571 234 234 40.980% 40.980%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (125s+125s+125s) / 3 = 125s -> (Pkts/min:5233 – Pkts/sec:83)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 41.66%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 41.66%








































999025 99.999% 100% 0 0 998134 994787 994787 99.664% 99.664%
1001853 100.000% 100% 0 0 1000963 996965 996965 99.600% 99.600%
1000624 99.999% 100% 0 0 999733 995775 995775 99.604% 99.604%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (19.32m+19.31m+19.31m) / 3 = 19.31m - > (Pkts/min:52657– Pkts/sec:853)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.622%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.622%
Test 6: Dsize Keyword rules
Various malicious attacks are distributed a large size packets to the target system to cause
buffer overflow which can be prevented by using the dsize rule. This rule is used to check if packets 
contain data of a length greater than, less than, or equal to a specified number. The following rule
detects any UDP traffic, if the UDP packet size is over than 30000 bytes.
Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Check data size for packets”; ttl: 128; dsize :> 30000;
Sid: 10000176 ;). In this experiment, UDP traffic has been sent at 65000Bps.
Table 6. 17: Snort dsize keyword rule reaction to malicious packets in high-speed traffic without QoS






































          
          
          
       
   
   
 









































          
          
          
       
   
   
    
 
          
 
         
         
        































989268 1.031% 100% 0 0 552 236 236 42.753% 42.753%
987379 1.058% 100% 0 0 559 244 244 43.649% 43.649%
989191 1.059% 100% 0 0 568 242 242 42.605% 42.605%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (125s+125s+124s) / 3 = 124.6s -> (Pkts/min:5223 – Pkts/sec:83)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 42.93%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 42.93%









































999185 99.999% 100% 0 0 998332 997108 997108 99.877% 99.877%
1004432 99.999% 100% 0 0 1003579 1002351 1002351 99.877% 99.877%
1000284 99.999% 100% 0 0 999431 998209 998209 99.877% 99.877%
The Average of Snort Processor Times : (19.31m+19.34m+19.31m) / 3 = 19.32 -> (Pkts/min: 52699 – Pkts/sec:854)
The average of UDP Malicious Packets logged = 99.877%
The average of UDP Malicious Packets alerts = 99.877%

















 Packets Analysed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 Packets Alerts 33.37% 99.61% 40.15% 99.75% 42.12% 99.50% 42.93% 99.88% 42.26% 99.87% 41.66% 99.62%























Snort Rules Keyword with QoS 
Figure 6. 17: Snort keyword rules and QoS reaction to detect malicious packets (threads) in high-speed traffic.
A summary of the rule tests of experiment 18 are shown in Figure 6.17, Snort analysed every
single packet that reached the wire. When flood traffic was sent at an average speed of 65000 bytes
with 255 UDP malicious packets per 1mSec, Snort loses alerts and logs for all rules that are used.








        
         





     
        
     
 
    
  
 
         
        
       
           
           
             
 
 
         
 
 




























        




        




        
   
 
59 % for content and depth rules; and more than 57 % for Content-hexadecimal, offset and dsize rules
(see Figure 6.17). When QoS is used, Snort alerted more than 99 % of the malicious packet that were
sent for all the rules (see Figure 6.17). Our experiments show that Snort detection performance has
been improved when QoS technology is used. 
6.2.5 Evaluate NIDPS prevention mode (NIP-mode)
In this section, two experiments are presented which tested Snort NIDPS performance in 
prevention mode in high-speed traffic. In Experiment 19, Snort NIDPS was set to prevent TCP/IP
traffic and in Experiment 20, it was set to prevent malicious packets (threads)
6.2.5.1 Experiment 19: Snort prevention rules with QoS reaction to prevent
TCP/IP Header in High-Speed Traffic
In this experiment, Snort actions such as Reject, Drop and Block were tested in the task to
prevent TCP/IP packets in high-speed traffic. More than 150000 TCP/IP packets were sent at interval
speed of 1ms and each packet carried 1Kbyte. This experiment was also carried out in stage 1 of the
experimental design but here it is carried out with QoS. However, the reason to return to this
experiment (earlier presented in chapter 4, experiment 10, and section 4.5.2.) was to ascertain whether
the output result of the Snort prevention mode test has the same results as the stage 1 experiment
when QoS was used.
Table 6.19: Snort with QoS reaction to prevent TCP/IP Header in high-speed traffic.
Test Total packets Total Eth packets ICMP TCP UDP IP4 TCP/IP %
type analysed of the total received of total packets packets packets packets packets packets




159649 100.00% 50000 53737 50095 153832 153832 100.00%




150153 100.00% 50000 50000 50118 150118 150118 100.00%




157745 100.00% 57625 50000 50092 157717 157717 100.00%









       
 
         
        





    
       
   
 
 
           
 






















Reject Rule Drop Rule Block Rule
 Packets Analysed 100% 100% 100.00%
 Packets Prevent 100.00% 100.00% 100% 
Figure 6. 18: Snort reaction to prevent TCP/IP traffic in 1ms.
Our experiment shows that Snort NIDPS with QoS prevents all unwanted traffic in all NIDPS
prevention action rules (see Figures 6.18 and Table 6.19). The percentages of prevent performance
was the same as in experiment 10 but the speed of packets processing was increased to nearly
5701kpts/sec.
6.2.5.2 Experiment 20: Snort with QoS Reaction to prevent malicious packets in 
High-Speed Traffic
In this experiment, Snort prevention mode has been tested under high-speed traffic. Two tests
were run, one Snort without QoS and one with QoS. IP traffic has been sent at 65000Bps with 255 
malicious UDP threads in interval packets delay of 1 mSec.









           
 
 










































         
    
 
 
         
     
 
 
         
 
 
Figure 6. 20: Snort with QoS preventing malicious UDP packets in high-speed and heavy traffic.














































170129 2222 100.00% 0 0 101 2265 51 50.495%
Snort Processor Times = 70s -> (Pkts/min:2222 – Pkts/sec:31)
With
QoS
172505 172569 100.00% 0 0 1715925 141592 171592 100.00%
Snort Processor Times = 18.28m -> (Pkts/min:9587 – Pkts/sec:154)


















(no QoS) Prevent Malicious Packets 
(QoS) 
Prevent Malicious Packets (no QoS) Prevent Malicious Packets (QoS)
 Packets Analysed 100% 100%
 Packets Prevented 50.50% 100.00% 









    
      
       
         




     
   
    
        
    
            
           
      
          
         
       
         
                
    
     
 








     
As the results show in Figures 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21, when malicious traffic was sent at high-
speed and volume, Snort prevents 51 of the 101 malicious UDP packets that it analysed (see Table 
6.20). It blocked fewer than 51% of the total malicious packets analysed (Figures 6.19 and 6.21).
When the same traffic was generated with the same speed and value, but Snort was supported by QoS, 
Snort prevented 100% of the total malicious UDP packets that it analysed (see Figures 6.20 and 6.21
and Table 6.20). This experiment showed that the Snort NIDPS performance prevention rate is
improved when QoS technology is used. 
6.3 Parallel NIDPS with QoS technologies
All the experiments presented in this chapter so far tested NIDPS performance analysis,
detection and prevention with and without QoS technology under high-speed traffic. The experimental
results show that Snort performance is significantly improved when QoS configuration technology is 
used; and the experimental results show that Snort NIDPS packets processing performance
(throughput) is improved as well (see Figures 6.1 to 6.21 and Tables 6.1 to 6.20). For example in
experiment 20, Snort NIDPS was tested with and without support from QoS. Without QoS, Snort
analysed less than 2% of the total packets received, detected less than 51% of the total packets
analysed, and prevented less than 51% of the total packets analysed with packets processing speed at
2222 Pktspm and 31Pktsps (see Figures 6.19 and 6.22 and Table 6.20). When the QoS is used , Snort
analysed 100% of total packets received, detected 100% of the total packets analysed, and prevented
all unwanted traffic with improved packets processing speed of 9587Pktspm and 154Pktsps (see
Figures 6.20 and 6.22 and Table 6.20). Also experiment 20 shows that when 172505 packets were
sent, Snort just processes 2222 packets at running time 70s and with QoS, Snort processes most of
packets that it received at running time 18.28m, giving a higher Pkt throughput rate (see Figure 6.22). 
Snort Processor Time (for more than 172505 Pkts) 
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As a solution to reduce Snort’s overall processing running time and increase packets
processing throughput further, it is proposed to use parallel NIDPS technology with QoS. Snort
NIDPS has been configured from a single node system to a multi-node system. We configured and
treated traffic using QoS management, which produced four output queues (see Figure 6.23). Then
each queue was scanned individually using an access control list function (ACL). Traffic was filtered
according to classification and different packages were sent to specific parallel Snort nodes. 
6.3.1 Experiment 21: Parallel Snort NIDPS with QoS technologies
In experiment 13 (see section 6.2.2.1), a single node of Snort NIDPS was tested without any
QoS treatment. Nearly 38,000 TCP/IP packets were sent at 1ms, each packet carrying 1kbyte. Snort
analysed less than 17% of the total packets received in 64s with a processing rate of 105 Pktsps (see
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1), but when a single Snort NIDPS was run with a QoS configuration and sent
the same packets Snort NIDPS analysed all the packets that reached the wire in 250s without dropping
any and only having 1 packet outstanding yielding a processing rate of 160 Pkts/s (see Table 6.2 and
Figure 6.2). In this experiment 21, the same number of packets was sent at the same speed and of the
same size. Parallel NIDPS technology was used (in three queues). After configuring the switch using
QoS, Snort analysed 100% of the packets in less time (103s) (see Figure 6.23 and Table 6.21) and 
increased packet processing rate to 389 Pkts/s (see Table 6.21 and Figure 6.24). 
Table 6. 21: Parallel Snort with QoS.































Without 39809 6760 33049 0 33049 0 16.981% 45.361% 00.002%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 64 -> (PKts/min:6760 - PKts/sec:105)
With 40210 40209 0 0 1 0 99.998% 0.00% 0.00%
QoS Snort Processor Times = 250s-> (PKts/min:10052 – PKts/sec:160)













           
 
        
        
               
       
           
















Snort Processing Time (for more than 39500kb/1ms) 











Figure 6. 23: Parallel Snort NIDPS Processing Time for 40,000kb sending at 1ms intervals.
The experiment also shows that, Snort’s processing running time decreased from 250s to 103s
(see Figure 6.24); and Snort’s performance in packets processing throughput has been improved form
105 Pkts/s to 389 Pktsps, showing an improvement of around 60% or roughly 3 times speed up (see
Figure 6.24). The experiments prove that Snort performance improves significantly using QoS and
parallel NIDPs technology. It has processed more than 40,000KB in 103s with 0 percent dropped or
outstanding (see Figures 6.23). Obviously speed up depends on the number of nodes and processors
used and far greater speed up is possible with more nodes.
Snort (Pkts/s) processing speed  
Snort without QoS Snort with QoS Parralell Snort with QoS 
105 Pkts/s (16%) 
160 Pkts/s (24%) 
389 Pkts/s (60%) 








     
    
 
       
          
         




        
 
      
          
     





















   
 
   
6.3.2 Experiment 22: Test NIDPS architecture performance under more 
than 8 Gbps traffic speed.
In this experiment, TCP replay tool was used to generate traffic at different speeds (Gbps)
(see Figure 6.25) through the system. Two 1Gb interfaces were used. Each interface was configured
as 4 output queues and connected to a Snort NIDPS node. Each Snort node was configured as 4 Snort
instances, one for each output queue of the connected interface. Each queue can reserve buffer up to










1Gbps 2Gbps 4Gbps 8Gbps 10Gbps 
(Gb)s speed 






0% 0% 0% 0% 
19.992% 
Figure 6. 25: Novel NIDPS architecture with more 8Gbps traffic speed.
As the results show in Figure 6.25, Snort NIDPS processed every single packet that reached
the wire. Snort processed 100% of packets that were received while the traffic speed was less than or
equal 8 Gbps. When the traffic speed was increased to 10 Gbps , Snort started to drop packets. By
using 2x 1Gb interfaces, the experiment results showed that the Snort NIDPS processed more that
8Gbps with 0 packets dropped. 
6.4 Summary of experiments
A summary of the results of the stage 2 experiments is shown in Table 6.22

























     
 
 
     
    
 
 
     
   
 
 
     
   
 
 






     
   
 
  
     
    
 
 
     
     
 













    
    
      
   
 
     
      
   
      
         
        
        
      
experiment rate speed rate 
(Pkts/sec)
rate speed rate 
(Pkts/sec)
13 Testsolution performance -
NIDPS analysis mode (IP
traffic)
17% 105 100% 160 6.2.2.1
14 Test solution  performance -
NIDPS detection mode (
IP/ICMP traffic)
50% 94 100% 131 6.2.3.1
15 Test  solution performance -
NIDPS detection mode (
IP/UDP)
7% 76 99% 129 6.2.3.2
16 Test  solution performance -
NIDPS detection mode (
TCP/IP)
100% 17 100% 96 6.2.3.3
17 Test  solutionperformance -
NIDPS detecting malicious
packets
34% 82 99% 857 6.2.3.4
18 Test  solution performance -
NIDPS using various rules to
detect malicious packets
35% 83 99% 853 6.2.4.1
19 Test solution performance -
NIDPS prevention mode (IP
traffic)
100% 853 100% 4416 6.2.5.1
20 Test performance - NIDPS
preventing malicious packets
50% 31 100% 154 6.2.5.2
21
QoS and Parallel technologies proposed Solution
6.3.1
Test solution performance -
NIDPS analysis mode with QoS
and parallel technologies
Performance rate Packet processing speed
rate (Pkts/sec)
100% 389
22 Test solution performance
- NIDPS architecture with
up to 8 Gbps traffic 
100% 11904 6.3.2
Experiment 13 has shown how QoS configuration within the Cisco Catalyst 3560 Series
switch can enhance performance such that packets are no longer dropped or outstanding; and 
experiments 14, 15 and 16 show the improvement of NIDPS detection performance with headers such
as TCP, UDP and ICMP. Experiments 17 and 18 have shown that how QoS can improve NIDPS
performance to detect malicious traffic such that alerts and logs are no longer lost. Experiments 19 
and 20 have shown the improvement of NIDPS performance prevention mode with QoS. Experiment
21 shows how parallel technology can be used to speed up packets processing. Finally, experiment 22










        
          
    
           
       
      




NIDPSs are important components for the security of modern computer network systems. An
NIDPS needs to perform packet examination of inbound traffic at or near network speed. Otherwise
malicious packets may infiltrate the network undetected. This chapter outlined the evaluation results
of the novel architecture and unique infrastructure for NIDPS proposed in this thesis. The chapter has
presented the results of experiments to show how a novel configuration of QoS and parallel
technology can improve NIDPS performance when deployed in a high-speed network. The results
show that using the novel QoS configuration in Layer 3 Cisco Catalyst switches with parallel NIDPS
















       
     
       
    
    
      
   
 
 
      
         
      
         
     
 
 
       
        
           
         
      
       
 
 
    
      
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE
WORK
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the outcomes achieved in the research and then provides
recommendations for future research.
7.2 Contribution and achievements
A novel architecture for NIDPS deployment was designed, implemented and evaluated. There
has recently been an incredible development in the ways computer networks are used, especially
regarding their ability to handle different speeds and data volumes. As a result of this rapid
development, computer networks are now more vulnerable than ever to high-speed attacks and
threats. These can cause considerable trouble to computer networks and systems. Network intrusions
can be categorised at various levels. Many high-speed attacks can be classified as being difficult to
detect or prevent. It will become ever more difficult to analyse increasing volumes of traffic due to the
rapid shifts in technology that are increasing network speed. 
For many years the number of attacks made on networks has been rising dramatically.
Network disruptions are often carried out intentionally by several types of direct attack. These attacks
are made at various layers in the TCP/IP protocol suite, including the applications layer. Besides the 
external body, attacks can be made on the network by the internal body as well. Various technologies
and methods have been used to prevent such incidents; NIDPS in particular have gained substantial
importance. 
NIDPS is considered to be one of the best technologies for detecting or preventing threats and
attacks. NIDPS closely looks out for any malicious activity in the network and the systems, and reacts
to deny or to permit packets from entering the network. An NIDPS is able to provide numerous
methods for finding any suspicious packets in normal network traffic. It either directly rejects or
blocks suspicious traffic, users, or IP addresses. NIDPSs have attracted the interest of many
organisations and governments, and any internet user can deploy them. An NIDPS usually secures a
computer system network in four stages: analysis, detection, prevention and correction.
Recently, various open-source tools have become available to cover security requirements for








         
       
         
         
          
  
 
      
     
      
       
  
 
      
      
     




        
 
   
        
 
          
  
           
    
    
          
 
 
    
        
        
evaluated in the context of high-speed and volume attacks. The purpose of the evaluation was to
determine the performance of the NIDPS under high-speed attack when restricted by off-the-shelf
hardware, and then find ways to improve it. ‘Snort’ was installed and configured as the open source
NIDPS. It was chosen for evaluation on account of its being the de facto NIDPS standard. The 
evaluation system was implemented on real hosts on a real computer network to simulate real-life
traffic with malicious packets arriving at different speeds and volumes.
This research focused on the weakness of NIDPS in high-speed network connectivity and
proposed a solution for reducing this weakness. It presents a novel architecture in NIDPS
development that utilises QoS and parallel technologies to organise and improve network
management and traffic processing performance in order to improve the performance of the NIDPS
when it is deployed in high-speed traffic.
Many studies are theoretically based and lack supporting practical experimentation. In this 
research, the author aimed to present practical research in both real and virtual environments, which 
may be able to move faster to take-up. Furthermore, the author provided intensive technical
information as a part of the research that describes the innovative research architecture.
7.2.1 Weaknesses addressed
The current design and implementation of NIDPS was challenged. The most important of the
weaknesses found are listed below.
• NIDPS fail to handle high-speed malicious packets and IP traffic.
• The performance rate of Snort NIDPS (analysis, detection and prevention) decreases
as the traffic speed increases.
• Snort NIDPS rate of dropped and outstanding packets were very high and increased
when traffic speed was increased.
• Snort NIDPS was unable to detect or prevent up to 93% of unwanted IP traffic when 
the speed was 1KBp0.5ms and up to 65% of malicious packets when malicious
packets speed was 255Bp1mSec with flood traffic speed 60KBps. The consequence
of this weakness is that standard deployment of Snort NIDPS may not detect or
prevent high-speed attacks.
An attack such as flood attack (e.g. ICMP and UDP) uses a high-volume of traffic and a high-
speed to create a lot of noise in the network (for example, congestion traffic and buffer overflow) and








          
         
              
       
         
         
      
             
          
  
 
   
       
     
     
   
         
        
         
      
     
        
       
        
              
    
  
 
            
     
       
 
  
   
        
 
by the NIDPS, they may traverse the network without any prior analysis. Hence, the network is
unprotected against any variety of attack that carries such packets. This fault was addressed by adding
other methods to the Snort NIDPS component. Snort NIDPS was unable to analyse a major portion of
the headers in a high-speed environment. When traffic was sent at nearly 38,000KBp1ms, Snort
analysed less than 17% of the total number of packets that the system received with processing speed
105 Pkts/s. When QoS was used, Snort analysed nearly 99% of the total number of packets that it
received in a processing time of 250s with 160 Pkts/s. The incorporation of parallel Snort NIDPS
improved its performance by increasing its level of analysis by up to 100% and the speed of system
processing by 60% (389 Pkts/s). Snort processor time is reduced from 250s to 102s using three
parallel processing nodes.
7.2.2 A Novel Architecture for NIDPS
In order to solve the problems summarised in 7.2.1, a novel QoS configuration using network
Layer 3 switch features was designed and implemented in this research. The QoS configuration
boosted the NIDPS performance with regard to its congestion management and its congestion
avoidance. Congestion management created balanced queuing by evaluating the internal DSCP and
determining in which of the four egress queues to place the packets. Other items related to queuing
were also configured: defining the priority queue, defining a queue set, guaranteeing buffer
availability, limiting memory allocation, specifying buffer allocation, setting drop thresholds,
mapping the CoS to the DSCP value, configuring SRR, and limiting the bandwidth on each of the
outbound queues. The congestion avoidance method also helped with the performance of the NIDPS,
by, for example, setting output queuing, configuring Weighted Tail Drop (WTD) parameters and
thresholds for the four-queue set, guaranteeing buffer availability for a queue’s maximum memory,
and allocating a queue buffer for all the output queues of an interface. The research enhanced policy
and classification methods of the standard QoS architecture. The novel QoS architecture showed a
substantial improvement in overall network system management, performance and security.
A further important component of the new architecture was the use of parallel NIDPS nodes
to match each of the switch egress queues. This enabled NIDPS packet checking to keep up with
increased arrival rates typical of an attack. Snort’s performance improved markedly, allowing more 
packets to be checked before they were delivered into the network. The performance (analysis, 
detection and prevention rate) of Snort NIDPS increased to more than 99%. By using 2 machines (PC)
connected to two Gb interfaces, Snort NIDPS processed more than 8 Gbps with 0 drop. This number
can be increased up to 32Gbps which is the full system capacity forward bandwidth by implementing













      
      
 
  
   
  
      
  
          
 
 
    
 
         
   
      
   
   
 
 
    
        
       
 
 
       
    
         
  
 
7.2.3 Contributions to Knowledge
This research has made the following contributions to knowledge:
(1) A new architecture for NIDPS which uses QoS switch technology and parallel
processing nodes has been developed to combat the issue of dropped packets in high-
speed signature-based attacks.
Important features of the new architecture are:
• improvement of the NIDPS analysis, detection and prevention rates;
• handling of any high-speed network traffic variations;
• preventing high-speed attacks from inside or outside the network; and an increase
of nearly 99 percent in Snort NIDPS performance.
(2) A new NIDPS architecture has been processed for up to 8Gbps traffic speed with 0 
packets drop. 
There is always a limit to the number of packets a system can receive and process. This may 
cause serious security breaches. The research adapted an established technique in order to improve the 
capability of NIDPS, allowing it to deal with any volume of incoming traffic. The technique supports
the NIDPS analysis, detection and prevention engine to help it process high-speed traffic. The
research focused on establishing technical information of the problem and solution. This information
generalises the problem and solution and thus enables the proposed approach to be applied more 
easily to infrastructures that are different to the testbed used in this research
7.3 Limitations 
The output of the research was the design of a new architecture for NIDPS, which is achieved 
by adding other processing methods to the existing program. The system processed 8Gbps with 0
packets dropped. This number can be improved but it depends on the system capacity which is always 
limited.
No methodological development was added to Snort except configured multi-node of Snort
(parallel component). Snort on its own was found to be vulnerable to the experiments required at
diverse stages of the research. Snort never can hold all attacks and malicious packets but should be 












     
      
     
  
   
 
     
      
         
      
         
      
    
       
            
           
       




        
         
         
       
    
 
     
     
      
      
To add any hardware, tools or features, a full cost-benefit analysis should be carried out in
order to discover whether a sufficient level of security can be achieved at an acceptable cost.
7.4 Further research
The research centred on the failure of NIDPS to adequately handle traffic that occurs in high-
speed network attacks. Experiments were carried out which presented the weakness of NIDPSs and
which later showed how a novel architecture improved NIDPSs in terms of performance, efficiency
and effectiveness. The experimental results show vast improvement in reducing packet loss (drop) and 
therefore give better protection against attacks. However there remain areas to investigate.
NIDPSs are used to capture data and detect malicious packets that travelling on the network
media (cables, wireless) and match them to a database of signatures. Signature-based NIDPS are able
to detect known attacks, but the major problem of the signature-based approach is that every signature
should have an entry in a database in order to compare with the incoming packets. New signatures
arise constantly and an issue is how to keep track up with new signatures. Another problem is
processing time required to check all signatures. Knowledge sharing may provide a solution. Cloud
computing which provides for massive processing distribution and sharing is a possible future 
direction but this also raises issues of trust. An avenue of future investigation should aim to develop a
trusted cloud solution to NIDPS deployment such that if the threshold monitoring tool indicates that
traffic is increasing then extra Snort nodes can be brought into play from the cloud. Future work
should investigate the use of specialized and trustworthy security clouds i.e a parallel node of NIDPS
can be implemented on a mulit-core/multi-processing cloud environment which can increase the
NIDPS processing speed in order to improve its performance. 
Statistical based anomaly detection is designed to detect deviations from a baseline model of
network behaviour. When the rate of "malicious" packet transmission is very high, the attack will
almost certainly be detected by a statistical anomaly detector. Therefore, the fact that Snort's
performance falls when the rate of transfers is high might be inconsequential in real world networks.
The author considers this issue needs further investigating. 
When the rate of malicious packet transmission increases, Snort’s detection power may fall in
terms of the True Positive rate (i.e. number of malicious packets detected). However, any anomaly 
detector faces a trade-off between true detection and network performance. For example, while the








      
     
 
 
           
      
        
       
          
       
      
  
 
      
 
      
  
   
 
        
      
       
     
 
 
         






said were clean and actually were clean) may have increased. As Snort does not provide parameters
that allow the network admin to customize this trade-off, more research is needed to justify the trade-
off between network performance and security.
In the area of development of the NIDPS detection function, intelligent techniques can be
exploited to develop new rules for more precise detection of attacks to counteract the growth in
diversity and deviousness. The current and anticipated future demands for online security require the
revision of existing systems towards the development of improved parallel systems as well as stronger
rule sets. Furthermore, using multi-core processors, further research can be done such as looking into
some of the potential technological advancements in NIDPSs that can be employed for beneficial
purposes and objectives. Finally, the success of this project has revealed more challenges, as
following:
• Importance analysis of interdependencies and possible cascading effects across related
processes within the QoS framework.
• Develop and execute a coordinated research to fully utilize the potential of IDPS to 
capture and analyse attacks trends.
• Generate complex detection, prevention and correction algorithms;
In the system, we identified that there is limitation for the number of packets processing
which is 8.0 Gbps with 0% packets dropped. The idea has been examined further in terms of
performance limitation above 8.0 Gbps, and therefore modification may be made for better response. 
As experiment 22 showed, packets started to be dropped when load-balancing for traffic exceeding
8.0 Gbps. Analys is still in development and shall be covered in the future efforts.
Establishing a relationship between traffic size and number of IDPS cluster nodes for an
efficient performance is also an interesting research area. Defining parameters to identify the number
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Appendix 1. QoS Configuration
Section 1: Lab Task 1
Globally Enabling QoS
SW3560 (config) # mls qos “enable QoS”
Enable VLAN-Based classification 
Classification can be port-based or VLAN-based. To use the VLAN-based approach; enable 
VLAN-Based QoS on individual interfaces” port interfaces that bellowing in that VLAN”:
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos VLAN-Based
SW3560 (config) #interface Vlan 100
SW3560 (config-if) # service-policy input test “apply the policy to Switch Vlan Interface
(SVI)”
SW3560 (config-if) #exit
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/1
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos Vlan-based “take the qos policy setting from SVI”
Setting the port’s CoS value
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos CoS  “value 0-7”
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos CoS override “that mean it will take default value”
Setting the Ports trust state
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos trust ?
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust  ip “trust IP traffic”
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust  udp
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust  icmp
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust  tcp
SW3560 (config) #mls qos trust CoS
QoS Mapping
Once trusted an incoming marking, remark that frame/ packet based on a mapping table.
SW3560 (config) #mls qos trust cos pass-through dscp
SW3560 (config) #show mls qos maps CoS-DSCP
SW3560 (config) # mls qos map ?
SW3560 (config) # mls qos map CoS-DSCP 0 8 16 24 32 46 48 56
SW3560 (config) #exit
SW3560 #show mls qos map CoS-DSCP
SW3560 (config) # class-map match-any dscp_class
SW3560 (config)# match ip dscp 9
SW3560 (config-cmap)# exit
SW3560 (config) # class-map match-all vlan_class
SW3560 (config-cmap)# match vlan 100
Switch(config-cmap)# match class-map dscp_class
Importance notes:
You could classification/or recognize different type of traffic at layer 2 using MAC address or access














            
          
       
       
       
       
       
 
         
     
              
     
         
     
         
 
  
          
    
      
      
               
    
     
    




   
     
      
       
   
     
      
       
   
     
      




        
 
     
   








Classifying and Class map
SW3560 (config) #access-list 100 permit udp any any “you can add or not range 16384
32767 Cisco rules used UDP range form 16384 – 32767”
SW3560 (config) #access-list 100 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 110 permit tcp any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 110 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 120 permit icmp any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 120 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #class map (inter-class map name(C-UDP, C-TCP, C-ICMP)).
SW3560 (config) #class map C-UDP
SW3560 (config-C-map) #match access-group 100 “match access list 100 with class map”
SW3560 (config) #class map C-TCP
SW3560 (config-C-map) #match access-group 110
SW3560 (config) #class map C-ICMP
SW3560 (config-C-map) #match access-group 120
Creating policy map
SW3560 (config) #policy-map (inter name of policy map (P-UDP, P-TCP, P-ICMP)).
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-UDP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 100000000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #no match exceed-action drop.
“100000000 is rate limit in bytes / s (bps), 8000 is not rate, it is a number of bytes”.
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-TCP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 100000000 8000.
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-ICMP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 100000000 8000.
Applying policy map in interface
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/1
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-UDP.
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust dscp
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos dscp-mutation FastEthernet 0/1-mutation
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/2
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-TCP.
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust dscp
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos dscp-mutation FastEthernet 0/2-mutation
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/3
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-ICMP.
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust dscp
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos dscp-mutation FastEthernet 0/3-mutation
All interface 1, 2 and 3 inside VLAN-1 
Notes:
We should focus about the following below:
Delay traffic inside switch.










    
 
     
           
     
             
       
          
        
        
         
 
             
                 
   
 
           




              
   
 
   
         
   
         
 
          
 
 
          
   
   
 
          
          
                
          
              




       
     
 
           
           
          
          











Priority queue configuration 
To change the default input priority queue configuration
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue?
<1-2> enter priority queue number [1-2]
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue 1?
Bandwidth ingress priority queue bandwidth & at stack ring
SW3560 (config) # mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue 1 bandwidth?
<0-40> enter bandwidth number [0-40]
SW3560 (config) # mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue 1 bandwidth 30?
<cr>
SW3560 (config) # mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue 1 bandwidth 30
Here from default ingress priority queue is queue2, it has 10 percentage of priority queue. So from the
command above, we change priority queue form q2 to q1 and then we change the bandwidth to 30
percent of the interface bandwidth.
To enable output of priority queuing on queue1 into the port you can use this command:
SW3560 (config-if) #priority-queue out
Congestion Avoidance
Queue sets
By default, all ports belong to queue set 1. However ports can be assigned to a second queue 
set with the following command:
SW3560 (config-if) #queue-set queue_set-id
SW3560 (config)# mls qos queue-set output qset-id threshold queue-id drop threshold1 drop-
threshold2 reserved-threshold maximum-threshold.
SW3560 (config)# mls qos queue-set output qset-id buffers allocation1 allocation2 allocation3
allocation4.
SW3560 (config)# mls qos queue-set output 2 buffers 50 25 15 10
Port buffer space
SW3560 (config)# mls qos queue-set output 2 threshold 100 90 70 50
SW3560 (config)# interface fast 0/1
SW3560 (config-if)# queue-set 2
For queue set2, 50 percent a port’s buffer space is allocated for queue1. 25 percent is allocated for 
queue2. 10 percent is allocated for queue3. 15 percent is allocated for queue4.Also queue set2, output
queue 2 of 4 has its first drop threshold at 100 percent and its second drop threshold at 90 percent.
100 percent of queue2 is allocate buffer space is guaranteed to be available , if needed if queue2 needs 
more buffer space , it can barrow from a port’s unused buffer space, up to a maximum of 200 percent 
of queue 2 is buffers allocation.
Mapping QoS Markings to an output queue and drop threshold 
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output [CoS-map / DSCP-map] queue queue-id
threshold threshold-id qos {marking-1…. Qos-marking-8}
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output CoS-map queue 1 threshold 1 0 1
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output CoS-map queue 1 threshold 2 2 3
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output CoS-map queue 2 threshold 1 4
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output CoS-map queue 3 threshold 2 5


















     
 
       
 






       
 
       






           
 
       







       
       
 
            
       
 
 
             
       
 
             
            
    
 
       
 
    
    
        
 
      
    
    
    
    
 
  
           
           
 
                      
                    
        
 
         
 
Shaped Round Robin (SRR)
Bandwidth allocation for input queues
Notes: queue sets are not used for input queues.
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input threshold queue-id threshold-precentage1
threshold-precentage2.
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input threshold 1 25 50
Set the second threshold to 50 percent of the Queue capacity
Set the first threshold to 25 percent of the Queue capacity
Queue1
We can set the buffer allocation for input queues with the following command:
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input buffers percentage1 precentage2
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input buffers 25 75
75 percent of a port’s buffers are given to queue2
25 percent of a port’s buffers are given to queue1
To give different a mounts of bandwidth to input queues, we can use the following command:
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input bandwidth weight1 weight2
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input bandwidth 30 70
70 percent of a port’s bandwidth is guaranteed to queue2
30 percent of a port’s bandwidth is guaranteed to queue1
Bandwidth allocation for output queues (shared mode)
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth share weight1 weight2 weight3 weight4
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth share 30 20 25 25
30 percentages is relative weight for queue1, 20 percentages is relative weight for queue2, 25
percentages is relative weight for queue3, and then 25 percentages is relative weight for queue4.
Notes
TIP: the relative weight to not have to total 100. However, selecting values that do total 100 makes it
easier to determine the bandwidth available to each queue.
So, 30 percentages it will be taken from the port’s bandwidth for queue1, 20 percentages it will be
taken from the port’s bandwidth for queue2, 25 percentages it will be taken from the port’s bandwidth
for queue3 and 25 for queue4.
Determine the amount of bandwidth available to each output queue on interface FastEthernet.
SW3560 (config) # interface FastEthernet 0/2
SW3560 (config-if) #speed 100
SW3560 (config) # srr-queue bandwidth share 10 25 35 50
BW for Q1: [10/ (10+25+35+50)] =8.33 mbps
BW for Q2: [25/ (10+25+35+50)] =20.83 mbps
BW for Q3: [35/ (10+25+35+50)] =29.17 mbps
BW for Q4: [50/ (10+25+35+50)] =41.67 mbps













       
        
            
   
 
 
              
       
 
       
 
 
    
    
        
 
     
     
     
     
 
        
 
 
    
    
        
        
 
          
 
      
      
   
    
    
    
    
 
  
          
         
 
     
     
      
 
 
     
 
 
    
     
 
  
     
    
 
 
    
 
Bandwidth allocation for output queues (shaped mode)
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth shape weight1 weight2 weight3 weight4
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth share 50 50 0 0
50 inverse weight for queue1, 50 inverse weight for queue2, 0 shaping not applied for queue3, and 0
shaping not applied for queue4
Note:
TIP: if a queue is configured for both shaped and share mode, the shaped mode config will be
applied, and share mode will be ignored.
Determine the amount of bandwidth limits applied to the output queues on interface 
FastEthernet.
SW3560 (config) # interface FastEthernet 0/3
SW3560 (config-if) #speed 100
SW3560 (config-f) # srr-queue bandwidth shape 30 0 0 0
BW limit for queue1:1/30*100 mbps=3.33 mbps
BW limit for queue2: no limit applied
BW limit for queue3: no limit applied
BW limit for queue4: no limit applied
Determine the amount of bandwidth guarantees or limits applied to the output queues on
interface FastEthernet.
SW3560 (config) # interface FastEthernet 0/4
SW3560 (config-if) #speed 100
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth shape 50 50 0 0
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth share 100 100 40 20
The shaping config for a queue (i.e. non-zero value) overrides the sharing configuration.
BW limit for queue1 (mbps):1/50*100 mbps=20 mbps
BW limit for queue2 (mbps): 1/50*100 mbps=20 mbps 
BW for queue3: [40/ (40+20)]*(100-20-20) mbps=40 mbps
BW for queue4: [20/ (40+20)]*(100-20-20) mbps=20 mbps
Total bandwidth (mbps) =20+20+40+20=100 mbps
Queue1 is guaranteed 20 mbps
Queue2 is guaranteed 20 mbps
Limiting Bandwidth on an output interface.
This command specifies the maximum amount of an interface’s bandwidth that can be used
for outgoing traffic, by default there is no limit(i.e a weight of 100)
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth limit weight
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth limit 85
Interface’s outbound bandwidth is limit to 85precent of interface speed.
To confirm mls qos is enabled
SW3560# show mls qos.
To view a port’s trust configuration 
SW3560#show mls qos interface interface-id
SW3560# show mls qos interface FastEthernet 0/1
To view interface’s policer configuration 
SW3560#show mls qos interface interface-id policers.
SW3560#show mls interface FastEthernet 0/1 policers
To view a queue set’s parameters:














     
     
        
 
      
      
      
      
 
     
       
       
               
     
   
      
 
       
          
 
       
     
              
 
         
     
      
   
     
 
       
         
 
       
 
           
       
           
 
     
     
 
        
             
 
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
          
           
         
Section 2: Lap task2
SW3560 (config) # mls qos
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos CoS 
SW3560 (config-if) #mls qos CoS override 
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust IP
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust UDP
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust TCP
SW3560 (config-if) # mls qos trust ICMP
SW3560 (config) #mls qos trust CoS
SW3560 (config) #show mls qos maps CoS-DSCP
SW3560 (config) # mls qos map ?
SW3560 (config) # mls qos map CoS-DSCP 0 8 16 24 32 46 48 56
SW3560 (config) #mls qos trust dscp
SW3560 (config) #exit
SW3560 #show mls qos map CoS-DSCP
SW3560 (config) #access-list 100 permit ip any any / or
SW3560 (config) #access-list 100 permit ip-id range any any to ip-id range any any
SW3560 (config) #class map (class map id-name)
SW3560 (config) #class map id-name
SW3560 (config-C-map) #match access-group 100 “match access list 100 with class map”
SW3560 (config) #policy-map (inter name of policy map (id-policy name)).
SW3560 (config) #policy-map id-class map
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 25600000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit. 
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet interface-id
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy policy-id.
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input buffers percentage1 precentage2
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input buffers 25 75
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input threshold queue-id threshold-precentage1
threshold-precentage2.
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input threshold 1 90 100
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input bandwidth weight1 weight2
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input bandwidth 50 50
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue queue-id
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input priority-queue 2
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input [CoS-map / DSCP-map] queue queue-id threshold
threshold-id qos {marking-0…. Qos-marking-65} or {marking-1…. Qos-marking-8}
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 1 threshold 1 0
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 1 threshold 2 8
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 1 threshold 3 16
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 2 threshold 1 24
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 2 threshold 2 32
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue input dscp-map queue 2 threshold 3 46
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 1 threshold 2 8
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 1 threshold 3 16
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 2 threshold 2 32
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 2 threshold 3 32
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 2 threshold 2 46
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 3 threshold 3 56








         
           
 
    
     
       
        
 
       
       
       
       
 
       
        
 
        
        
        
        
 
    
    
        
        
 
              
            
           
   
 
       
       
      
      
     
  
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 4 threshold 2 24
SW3560 (config) #mls qos srr-queue output dscp-map queue 4 threshold 3 48
SW3560 (config) # interface FastEthernet interface-id
SW3560 (config-if) #speed interface-speed –limit
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth shape weight1 weight2 weight3 weight4
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth shape x1 x2 x3 x4
Bandwidth limit for queue1: (1/x1)*interface-speed-limit mbps=bandwidth-limit for Q1 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue2: (1/x2)*interface-speed-limit mbps=bandwidth-limit for Q2 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue3: (1/x1)*interface-speed-limit mbps=bandwidth-limit for Q3 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue4: (1/x1)*interface-speed-limit mbps=bandwidth-limit for Q4 mbps
SW3560 (config-if) #srr-queue bandwidth share weight1 weight2 weight3 weight4
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth share y1 y2 y3 y4
Bandwidth limit for queue1: (y1/ (y1+y2+y3+y4)) =bandwidth-limit for Q1 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue2: (y2/ (y1+y2+y3+y4)) =bandwidth-limit for Q2 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue1: (y3/ (y1+y2+y3+y4)) =bandwidth-limit for Q3 mbps
Bandwidth limit for queue1: (y4/ (y1+y2+y3+y4)) =bandwidth-limit for Q4 mbps
SW3560 (config) # interface FastEthernet 0/1
SW3560 (config-if) #speed 100
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth shape 88 88 0 0
SW3560 (config-if) # srr-queue bandwidth shape 100 100 60 40
For shaped mode:88 inverse weight for queue1, 88 inverse weight for queue2, 0 shaping not applied for queue3,
and 0 shaping not applied for queue4.For share mode :10 percentages is relative weight for queue1, 100
percentages is relative weight for queue2, 60 percentages is relative weight for queue3, and then 40 percentages is
relative weight for queue4.
BW limit for queue1 (mbps):1/88*100 mbps=1.13 mbps
BW limit for queue1 (mbps):1/88*100 mbps=1.13 mbps
BW for queue3: [60/ (60+40)]*(100-1.13-1.13) mbps=58.644 mbps
BW for queue4: [40/ (60+40)]*(100-1.13-1.13) mbps=39.096 mbps










       
        
       
        
       
        
       
 
     
             
   
 
     
             
   
 
     
             
   
 
     
             
   
 
    
    
      
   
 
    
    
      
   
 
    
    
      
   
 
    
    
      
   
 
   
 
   
     
   
   
     
   
   
     
   
   
                  
                
Section 3: Lab task 3
SW3560 (config) #access-list 101 permit UDP any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 101 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 102 permit TCP any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 102 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 103 permit ICMP any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 103 deny ip any any
SW3560 (config) #access-list 104 permit ip any any
SW3560 (config) #class map C-UDP
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #match access-group 101 “match access list 101 with class map”
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #exit
SW3560 (config) #class map C-TCP
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #match access-group 102 “match access list 102 with class map”
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #exit
SW3560 (config) #class map C-ICMP
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #match access-group 103 “match access list 103 with class map”
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #exit
SW3560 (config) #class map C-Other
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #match access-group 104 “match access list 104 with class map”
SW3560 (config-C-UDP) #exit
Policy
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-UDP
SW3560 (config) #policy-map C-UDP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 13500000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #exit
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-TCP
SW3560 (config) #policy-map C-TCP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 13500000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit 
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #exit
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-ICMP
SW3560 (config) #policy-map C-ICMP
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 13500000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit 
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #exit
SW3560 (config) #policy-map P-Other
SW3560 (config) #policy-map C-Other
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #police 100000000 8000 exceed-action policed-dscp-transmit 
SW3560 (config-Pmap) #exit
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet interface-id/ VLAN-id
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/1
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-UDP
SW3560 (config-if) #exit
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/2
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-TCP
SW3560 (config-if) #exit
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/3
SW3560 (config-if) #service-policy input policy P-ICMP
SW3560 (config-if) #exit
SW3560 (config) #interface FastEthernet 0/4
















            









         
 
  
        
        









   
 
 
Appendix 2. Installation and Configuration of Snort NIDPS.
The following sections give instructions for installing and configuring Snort NIDPS for Windows, Linux OSs
and virtual machines
Section 1: Windows
1. Download Snort, Snort rules and Winpcap tools from the following website “ www.snort.org”
2. When you downloaded you will see the following structure on C: driver
3. Go to command prompt
4. C:>Snort –W
5. Go to C:\snort\etc\snort.config and then change some lines as the following :
From :
Path to your rules files (this can be a relative path)
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute path,























                 
   
 





     
  
     
  





     
  
     
  
      
   
 
                





     
 




          
           
            
            
           
           
             
                  
  
             
              
 
                
 
                   
     
                   
      
                
               
                
              
                    
  
            












# path to dynamic preprocessor libraries
dynamicpreprocessor directory c:/snort/_dynamicpreprocessor
# path to base preprocessor engine
dynamicengine c:/snort/snort_dynamicengine/engine.dll




# path to dynamic preprocessor libraries
dynamicpreprocessor directory c:\snort\lib\snort_dynamicpreprocessor
# path to base preprocessor engine
dynamicengine c:\snort\lib\snort_dynamicengine\sf_engine.dll
# path to dynamic rules libraries
dynamicdetection directory c:\snort\lib\snort_dynamicrules
Add:




At the send of step 5
6. Open local rule file and create your rules. The list of rules can be found it in the list below:
LOCAL RULES
➢ #alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Malicious UDP Packets "; sid:1000002;)
➢ #drop ip any any -> any any (msg:" ip Header TEST"; sid:1000001;)
➢ # block ip any any -> any any (msg:" ip Header TEST"; sid:10000001;)
➢ # alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:" TCP Packets Generatore TEST"; sid:1000002;)
➢ # alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:" ICMP Header Test "; sid:1000003;)
➢ # alert ip any any -> any any (msg:" udp flooder TEST"; sid:1000004;)
➢ # alert ip any any -> any any (msg:" ip Packets Generatore TEST"; sid:1000005;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" detect a specific time to live value of ip header"; ttl: 128;
o sid:1000006;)
➢ # alert ip any any -> any any (msg:" ip flooder TTL=128 TEST"; ttl: 128; sid:1000007;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" UDP flooder TTL=128 TEST"; ttl: 128; content: "abcdef"; 
sid:1000009;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" UDP flooder TTL=128 TEST"; ttl: 128; content: "|72 7D 98 8D|"; 
sid:10000010;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" start resrach for the word abcdef after 100 bytes from the start of the
o data"; ttl: 128; content: "abcdef"; offset:100; sid:10000011;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" start resrach for the word abcdef between characters4 and 100 bytes
of the data"; ttl: 128; content: "abcdef"; offset: 4; depth: 100; sid:10000012;)
➢ # # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" abc work match"; ttl: 128; content-list: "abc"; sid:10000014;)
➢ # alert ip any any -> any any (msg:" data size of an ip packets"; ttl: 128; dsize: <30000; sid:10000015;)
➢ # alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" data size of an udp packets"; ttl: 128; dsize: <30000; sid:10000016;)
➢ # alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:" check icmp-id field >oms ";icmp_id: 789; sid:10000017;)
➢ # alert IP any any -> any any (msg:" Check if the source and destination ip address are same "; sameip;
o sid:10000018;)
➢ # alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:" Check sequence number "; seq: 1; sid:10000019;)








            
                
   
 
                  
              
   
             
       
            
   
                   
   
             
         
  
                  











   
  
      
   
   
   
  
  
     
   
       
   
       
   
     
  
  
    
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
  
    





     
➢ # Alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:” check ICMP-ID field”; icmp_id:789; Sid: 1000005 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:” Detect Malicious packets (Check Time To Live value in udp
header)”; ttl: 128; Sid: 1000006 ;)
➢ # Alert ip any any -> any any (msg:” Check Time To Live value in ip header”; ttl: 128; Sid: 1000006 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Detect Malicious packets (Check or to find data pattern inside
o packets) "; ttl:128; content:"abcdef"; Sid:1000007;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Detect Malicious packets (Check hexadecimal characters in side
o data) "; ttl:128; content:"|61 62 63 64|"; Sid:1000008 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Detect Malicious packets (Check data size for packets) "; ttl:128;
o dsize:<660000; Sid:1000009 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Start research for the word “abcdef” after 1 bytes from the start of
data "; ttl:128; content:"abcdef"; offset:1; Sid:10000010 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Detect Malicious packets (Start research for the word “abcdef”
o between characters 1 and 100 bytes of the data) "; ttl:128; content:"abcdef"; offset:1; depth:100;
Sid:10000011 ;)
➢ # Alert udp any any -> any any (msg:" Start research for the word “abcdef” after 100 bytes from the start 
of data "; ttl:128; content:"abcdef"; offset:4; Sid:10000010 ;)
Section 2: Linux
1. Update the system
# apt-get update
# apt-get install openssh-server
# reboot
2. Install ethtool tool 
# apt-get install ethtool
3. Install build-essential tool
# apt-get install -y build-essential
4. Install Snort prerequisites
Install libpcap-dev, libpcre3-dev, zlib1g-dev and libdumbnet-dev packages
# apt-get install -y libpcap-dev
# apt-get install libpcre3-dev
# apt-get install -y libdumbnet-dev
# apt-get install zlib1g-dev
5. Install Snort DAQ Prerequisites
bison and flex are the requirement for Snort DAQ installation
# apt-get install bison flex
6. Create a directory to install tar packages of snort and Snort DAQ
# mkdir /home/snort/snort_src
7. Change working directory to newly created directory.
# cd /home/snort/snort_src/
8. Download and install DAQ
# wget https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/daq-2.0.6.tar.gz
9. Install the Package




# makes root@snort:/home/snort/snort_src/daq-2.0.6# make install
10. Install Snort in same directory
# wget https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/snort-2.9.7.5.tar.gz
11. Extract and Install the snort package
# gunzip snort-2.9.7.5.tar.gz














    
       
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
     
   
     
   
  
    
     
     
     
           
    
     
  
     
    
   
    
     
        
   
   






         
 
    
       
 




# ln -s /usr/local/bin/snort /usr/sbin/snort
13. Verify your Snort is installed correctly or not
# snort -V








15. Create Log Directory for snort
# mkdir /var/log/snort
16. Create a Directory for snort Dynamics rules
# mkdir /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules
17. Change permissions
# chmod -R 5775 /etc/snort/
# chmod -R 5775 /var/log/snort/
# chmod -R 5775 /usr/local/lib/snort
# chmod -R 5775 /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules/
18. Copy *.conf and *.map files from snort download directory to /etc/snort
# cp /home/snort/snort_src/snort-2.9.7.5/etc/*.conf* /etc/snort/
# cp -v /home/snort/snort_src/snort-2.9.7.5/etc/*.map* /etc/snort/
19. Configure /etc/snort/snort.conf
Before editing snort.conf get the backup of that file first
# cp /etc/snort/snort.conf /etc/snort/snort.conf_orig
20. Give following Command
# sed -i 's/include \$RULE\_PATH/#include \$RULE\_PATH/' /etc/snort/snort.conf
Note:Above Command will comment all rulesets which we will edit line by line
21. Go to line 45 of /etc/snort/snort.conf, edit to make like below
ipvar HOME_NET 10.0.0.0/8
ipvar EXTERNAL_NET !$HOME_NET






23. To enable local rules go to line 551 and uncomment following line
##include $RULE_PATH/local.rules
24. Save and Quit
25. Now Download Community rules from following link
https://www.snort.org/downloads/community/community-rules.tar.gz
Extract these rules and copy to /etc/snort/rules.
26. Test the configuration










        
    
   
     
       
   
      
  
  
    
  
   
     
  
   
       
   
     
       
    




   
   
     
   
  
   
  
  
   
     
     
  
  
   
    
  
   
  
  
   
     
     
    
  
       
       
    
    
        
    
    
    
   
   
Section 3: For a virtual machine
1. Download and run Ubuntu V 14.04.3 LTS in virtual machine 
2. Go to terminal 
3. :$ ifconfig
4. :$//installing prerequisite for compliny snort//
5. :$sudo apt-get install flex bison build-essential checkinstall libpcap-dev libnet1.dev libpcre3-dev
libmysqlclient15.dev libnetfilter-queue-dev iptables-dev
6. :$do you want to continue [y/n] y
7. :$wget http://libdnet.google.com/files/libdnet-1.12.tgz
8. :$ls
9. :$tar xvf2 libdnet-1.12.tg2
10. :$ls
11. :$cd libdnet-1.121
12. :$~/ libdnet-1.12 $ ./configure “CFLAGS—FPIC”
13. :$make
14. :$sudo checkinstall
15. :$ do you want to list them [y/n]: n
16. :$Should i exclude ……..[y/n]:y
17. :$sudo dpkg –I libnet-1.12-1_amd64.deb
18. :$sudo ln –s /usr / local / lib/ libnet.1.0.1 /usr/lib/libdnet.1
19. :$//” download “ snort/2//






25. //” you will find DAQ file and Snort file.//





31. :$sudo checkinstall 
32. :$Do you want to list them[y/n]:n










43. :$sudo dpkg –I snort.V.deb
44. :$sudo in –s /usr/local/bin/snort  /usr/sbin/snort
45. :$sudo ldconfig –v
46. :$snort –v
47. :$// netx step to configure snort and download snort rules//
48. :$// for security we requmanded to create seprate linex user//
49. :$sudo groupadd snort
50. :$sudo useradd snort
51. :$sudo useradd snort –d/var/log /snort –s/sbin/nologin –c snort_ids –g snort
52. :$sudo mkdir /var/log/snort
53. :$sudo chown snort:snort /var/log/snort
54. :$//go to snort rule//









    
      
    
    
     
     
   
    
        
  
    
      
   
                             
                          
      
                                    
   
       
   
  
   
      
     
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
       
 
  
57. :$sudo mkdir /etc/snort
58. :$Sudo tar xvfvz snortrules…. Tar.g2 –c /etc/snort
59. :$sudo touch /etc/snort/rules/white_list.rules/etc/snort/rules/black_list.rules
60. :$sudo mkdir /usr/local/lib/snort/snort_dynamicrules.
61. :$sudo chown –R snort:snort /etc/snort/
62. :$sudo mv /etc/snort/etc/* /etc/snort
63. :$// configure snort configuration file//
64. :$sudo pico /etc/snort/snort.conf
65. :$// file snort.config is oppend >> changed >>
66. *step#1
67. #Ipvar home_net ANY [YOUR NETWORK]EX[10.0.0.0/8]
68. #Ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any >> [!$HOME_NET]
69. #VAR rue.path. /etc/snort/rules
70. # /etc/snort/so_rules
71. # /etc/snort/pre_rules
72. #var wite_list_path /etc/snort/rules
73. /ect/snort/rules
74. #Close snort.config file
75. :$sudo –T –I eth0 –A snort –g snort –c /etc/snort/snort.config
76. :$// install tcp replay//
77. :$wget https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/98306176/captures/smallflows.pcap
78. :$wget http://download s.sourceforge.net/project/tcpreplay/tcpreplay/4.0.0/tcpreplay-4.0.0tar.gz
79. :$download libcap-1.6.2 tarz , “tcpdump-4.6.2”
80. :$tar xvzf libcap.16.2 tar.g2
81. :$cd libcap-1.6.2
82. :$./configure; make; sudo make install
83. :$tar xvzf tcpreplay-4.0.0
84. Cd tcpreplay
85. :$./configure; make ; sudo make install
86. :$./sudo make test
87. :$tcpreplay –V








   
 
   
   
  
   








   
   
   
  
  
   
  
  




   
      
  
 




       
  
   
  
  
   
     
Appendix 3. Terms and Expressions (Abbreviations)
ARP: Address Resolution Protocol.
ARP: Address Resolution Protocol.
ASA: Adaptive Security Appliance.
API: Application Program Interface.
ATM: Asynchronous Transfer Mode.
ASIC: Application-Specific Integrated Circuit.
ACL: Access Control List.
BVI: Bridge-group Virtual Interface.
Bps: Byte per Second.
Bpms: Byte per millisecond.
CPU: Central processing Unit.
CSI: Crime Scene of Investigation.
CGI: Common Gateway interface.
CDP: Cisco Discovery Protocol.
CoS: Class of Service.
CMF: Constrained Multicast Flooding.
DoS: Denial of Service.
DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service.
DiffServ: Differentiated Service.
DSCP: Differentiated Service Code Point.
EIGRP: Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol.
Eth: Ethernet interface.
Frag: Fragmented Packets.
FEC: Fast Ethernet Channel.
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
GrIDPS: Graph-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System.
GUI: Graphical User Interface.
GEC: Gigabit Ethernet Channel.
GPU: Graphics Processor Unit.
GB: Gigabyte.
Gb: Gigabit.
Gbps: Gigabit per second.
HIDPS: Host-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System.
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
HSRP: Host Standby router Protocol.
ID: Intrusion Detection.
IP: Intrusion Prevention.
IDS: Intrusion Detection System.
























   
   
      
    
  
  
   
 
 





   
   
   





   
  
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System.
ICMP: Internet Control Massage Protocol.
IOS: Interface Operating system.
IPX: Internetwork Packet Exchange.
ISL: Inter-Switch Link.
I/O: Input and Output.
KBps: Kilobytes per second.
LAN: Local Area Network.
Libpcap: Library Packets Capture.
MIB: Management Information Bases.






NID: Network Intrusion Detection.
NIP: Network Intrusion Prevention.
NIDPS: Network-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System.
NAPI: New Application Program Interface.
NIC: Network Interface Controller.
OSs: Operating Systems.
OSC: Operating System Compatibility.
POP: Post Office Protocol.
PPP: Point-to-Point Protocol.
PDP: Policy Decision Point.
Pcap: Packet Capture.
PCRE: Perl-Compatible Regular Expressions.
PBR: Policy-Based routing.
PEM: Parallel Exact Matching.
QoS: Quality of Service.
OSPF: Open Shortest Path First.
OPI: Open System Interconnection.
RIP: Routing Information Protocol.
RMON: Remote MONitoring.
SMB: Server Massage Block.
SNMP: simple Network Management Protocol.
SLIP: Serial-Line internet Protocol.
SQL: Structured Query Language.






















   
  
  
   
  
  
    
      
      
  
   
   
   
    
     
  
     
   
    






SSL: Secure Socket Layer.
SVI: Switch Virtual Interface.
SRR: Share or Shape Round Robin.
SRA: Snort Rule Accelerator.
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol.
ToS: Type of Service.
TTL: Time-To-Live.
UDP: User Datagram Protocol.
VPN: Virtual Private Network.
VIA: Virtual Internet Access.
VLAN: Virtual Local Network Interface.
WISR: Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report.
WTD: Weighted Tail Drop.
WinPcap: Windows Packets Capture.
XML: Extensible Mark-up Language.
𝛌: Traffic (packets) speed rate.
𝛃: Buffer Speed rate.
𝛌𝐝: Drop packets rate.
𝛌𝐨: Outstanding packets rate.
𝛃𝐞𝐱𝐢 : Output buffer rate for interface i.
𝛃𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐣 
: Ingress queue ( j) buffer rate for interface i.
𝛃𝐞𝐱𝐢𝐣 
: Egress queue ( j) buffer rate for interface i.
𝛌𝐢𝐧: The arrival traffic (packets) rate.
𝛌𝐢𝐧𝐢 : The arrival traffic (packets) rate for interface i.
𝛌𝐨𝐮𝐭: The output rate for output links (interface).
𝛌𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐢 : The output traffic (packets) rate for output link (interface i).
𝛂: The maximum rate of each buffer.
𝛍: Group of bytes per seconds.
𝛃𝐤: Kernel buffer rate.
𝛂𝐨𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐣
: The output packets rate for queue j in interface i.
𝛃𝐬𝐯𝐢: SVI memory pool rate.
𝛃𝐞𝐱: The rate for all egress buffers together.
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